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SUMMARY
The thesis endeavours to infer the effective incidence of the 
non-domestic property tax in the UK.
Chapter 1 briefly describes the history of the property tax and the 
existing rating system. In addition, the chapter examines the formal 
incidence of the tax and its purported merits and deficiencies.
Chapter 2 investigates the neoclassical theory of property tax 
incidence and focuses on the development of general equilibrium incidence 
analysis.
In contrast, Chapter 3 describes the Post-Keynesian theory of tax 
incidence and suggests an amendment to a model which is found to yield 
theoretically inconsistent results.
Chapter 4 reviews the existing empirical work on the impact of the 
non-domestic property tax in the UK. It is argued that most of these 
studies are based on theoretically inconsistent models, and hence do 
little to dispel doubts about the incidence of the tax.
In an attempt to remedy this deficiency7, Chapter 5 develops a 
theoretical general equilibrium model, which is used to infer the incidence 
of the non-domestic property tax. The results suggest that much of the 
non-domestic property tax burden is borne by firms.
However, general equilibrium incidence estimates are based on a 
plethora of stringent assumptions which are merely imposed on the data 
rather than statistically tested. It would therefore seem useful to use an 
alternative procedure to estimate the impact of the non-domestic property 
tax. Chapter 6 thus examines the various quantitative techniques 
employed in public finance to infer the incidence of taxes. It is suggested 
that econometric procedures, while not perfect, provide a method for 
discriminating between competing theories and deriving data coherent 
estimates of tax incidence.
Chapter 7 develops an econometric model which is used to infer the 
degree of short run property tax shifting. The investigation is based on a 
theoretically derived model of mark-up pricing. The chapter further 
examines the process by which agents form expectations of output and 
costs, and the impact of demand factors on prices and the mark-up. The 
results suggest that much of the non-domestic property tax burden is 
borne by firms. The chapter ends with a discussion of the theoretical 
implications of the empirical exercise.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the main results of the study and 
emphasises the contribution of incidence theory. The thesis concludes with 
suggestions for future empirical and theoretical research.
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Rates or property taxes are of considerable antiquity and have their 
origins in the Poor Relief Act of 1601. However, the history of the rating 
system has been one of recurring controversy and arguments, with no 
apparent solution. The property tax system has been reviewed by 
Government Commissions in 1901. 1914, 1969, 1971 and 19771, to cite but a 
few occasions, and proposals for its reform or abolition abouhd in the 
literature. Despite this sustained record of criticism, little attention has been 
paid to the critical issue of the incidence of the property tax. Much of the 
discussion of the rating system is based on the unsubstantiated assumption 
that the actual burden of the property tax falls on those who are legally 
obliged to pay the tax. These studies therefore ignore the crucial distinction 
between the formal incidence of a tax (i.e. the burden on those who are 
legally liable to pay the tax) and the effective incidence (i.e. the actual burden 
of the tax after the economy has adjusted to it). The present study 
endeavours to remedy this deficiency and seeks to infer the effective 
incidence of the non-domestic property tax in the UK.
More specifically, the analysis focuses on three particular areas in the 
voluminous literature on tax incidence which appear to have been 
particularly productive and illuminating. Perhaps the most significant 
theoretical development in public finance has been the application of the
Walrasian general equilibrium framework to the analysis of tax incidence. 
Thus the contribution of the general equilibrium approach to property tax 
incidence is explored in some detail. However, general equilibrium analysis is 
based on a plethora of restrictive assumptions which have been vigorously 
attacked by proponents of the Post-Keynesian paradigm. The Post-Keynesian 
view of the non-domestic property tax constitutes the second major topic of 
discussion. Finally, in an attempt to discriminate between alternative 
theories, and empirically infer the incidence of the non-domestic property 
tax, econometric techniques have been employed to measure the degree of 
tax shifting. The analysis is based on the methodological approach pioneered 
by Kryzyaniak and Musgrave (1963) in their study of the incidence of 
corporation taxes.
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis is divided into seven chapters of which the first four describe 
the institutional features of the rating system and theoretical and empirical 
work on the incidence of the non-domestic property tax, while the final three 
chapters seek to extend and develop the existing literature, and provide 
theory based measures of the incidence of non-domestic property taxes in the, 
UK.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the rating system and discusses its 
historical development and quantitative significance. The chapter further 
examines the purported advantages and disadvantages of the property tax.
It is suggested that these arguments rely on implicit and untested 
assumptions regarding the effective incidence of the non-domestic property 
tax. Hence in the absence of a full investigation into the actual burden of the 
tax, it appears difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the rating system.
Chapters 2 and 3 review the neoclassical and Post-Keynesian theories of 
property tax incidence. Chapter 2 traces the development of general 
equilibrium incidence analysis and explores the incidence of property taxes in 
neoclassical growth models and under imperfect competition. In contrast, 
Chapter 3 discusses the Post-Keynesian view of property tax incidence which 
derives its motivation from recent dissatisfaction with neoclassical incidence 
theory.
Having examined the theoretical aspects of property tax incidence, 
Chapter 4 reviews the existing empirical studies on the impact of the 
non-domestic property tax in the UK. It is argued that much of this work is 
based on theoretically misspecified and econometrically deficient models, and 
hence these studies do little to dispel doubts about the effective incidence of 
non-domestic property taxes.
In an attempt to partly remedy this deficiency, Chapter 5 derives a 
hierarchical general equilibrium model of property tax incidence which is 
used to measure the distortionary impact of the tax. General equilibrium 
analysis is, however, based on a plethora of stringent assumptions and hence 
these results may be criticised as misleading.
4Thus Chapter 6 examines the various quantitative techniques which are 
used in public finance to measure the incidence of taxes. The chapter 
discusses the income distribution approach, general equilibrium analysis and 
the econometric approach. It is suggested that both the income distribution 
and general equilibrium approaches rely on highly restrictive assumptions 
which are imposed on the data rather than empirically tested and these . 
therefore appear to be of questionable value. In contrast, the econometric 
approach, while not perfect, provides a framework for testing theories and 
generating data consistent estimates of tax shifting.
Hence, Chapter 7 endeavours to econometrically infer the extent to which 
the non-domestic property tax is shifted onto other agents in the economy. 
The analysis is based on a general model of mark-up pricing and employs the 
statistical procedures pioneered by Hendry (1980) et al. The chapter ends 
with a brief discussion of the theoretical implications of the results. .
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the main conclusions of the study, ft
■  --------
emphasises the contribution of incidence theory and the implications of the 
empirical analysis.
i
1.1 HISTORY OF THE RATING SYSTEM
The property tax or rates are one of the oldest taxes in Britain and, as 
noted earlier, have their origins in the Poor Relief/Act of 1601. In earlier
centuries, relief of the poor was a matter for charity, much of which was 
administered by the church. It was thus natural that the Act of 1601 made 
the parish the administrative unit for rating and confered on church-wardens 
the power to tax the inhabitants of the parish whatever sums were deemed 
to be necessary. Since rates were levied primarily for redistributive 
purposes, the principle of juxta facilitates dictated that poor relief should be 
paid for by greater contributions by the rich than the poor. Few people in the 
seventeenth century earned salaries and property was the primary source of 
income, hence a tax on property approximated to a local income tax levied 
according to ability to pay.
At first, poor relief was the only purpose for which rates could be levied, 
but as other local government services developed, new charges were added to 
the poor rate. For such beneficial local expenditure, it was viewed as 
desirable to relate tax payments to benefits received. It was customary to
assume that the benefits of local government services were proportional to
 —-
the value of property, hence a tax on property could also be treated as a 
benefit tax. Thus for instance, Cannan (1896) argued that: "in practice, the 
nearest approximation to ability and the benefit are one and the same thing, 
namely the rating of persons in respect of fixed property”. In recent years, 
the emphasis has changed and few commentators are now willing to justify a 
property tax either in terms of ability to pay or the benefit principle, for
property is no longer the main source of income ajid there is no necessary
/
#
6relationship between the quantity of services received and the value of 
property.
Over the next three centuries, particular aspects of the rating system 
figured prominently in several enactments and were the subject of numerous 
official reports. Eventually the position became so confused that the poor 
rate was abolished and a general rate was introduced by the Rating and . 
Valuation Act, 1925. The general rate was calculated as an amount in the
i
pound on the assessed net annual rental value of property. The Act 
substituted boroughs, urban districts and rural districts for the parish as the 
unit for rating, and attempted to simplify the entire system. The underlying 
principles of the Act are still operative, and form the basis of the rating 
system today.
GENERAL FEATURES OF THE RATING SYSTEM
  --
THE TAXABLE ENTITY:
The Poor Relief Act of 1601 placed the liability to pay rates upon the 
INHABITANTS of a parish and all personal property (fixed and movable) was
i
taxable. However, it soon became impossible to assess the value of all 
movable assets and hence an Act of 1840 restricted the tax to fixed property 
and introduced the principle, still in operation, of taxing the OCCUPIERS of
r
property. /
However, there is no statutory definition of ’occupation’. The meaning of 
this term for rating purposes has therefore evolved by case law and entails 
four conditions (see Cross [1981].) First, occupation must be beneficial in the 
sense of confering some convenience or pecuniary advantages. Second, the 
person who is legally liable to pay rates must have exclusive possession and 
control over the property. It follows that a lodger has neither exclusive 
possession nor control and hence cannot be taxed. Third, occupation of a 
property must be permanent and this implies that the structure cannot be 
temporary. The principle of permanence was introduced to determine 
physical possession of a property rather than the actual duration of 
occupation. Finally, there must be de-facto possession of the property 
embracing use or enjoyment.
On the basis of these principles, certain categories are excluded from rate 
liability. Common examples being vacant properties which do not confer any 
benefits, and temporary structures which do not entail permanent physical 
possession. In addition to these, special exemptions have been granted to 
Crown properties, agricultural land and buildings, places of worship, 
charitable organisations, sewers, waterways, and more recently, business 
properties in Enterprise Zones.
VALUATION AND ASSESSMENT:
Properties liable to be rated are referred to as hereditaments and are 
entered in a valuation list which constitutes the official record of the value of 
land and property in each rating authority. The assessed value of the 
property (termed the rateable value) defines the tax base to which is applied 
the rate poundage. The rateable value is based on the 'net annual value' of 
property which is defined as the " ... amount equal to the rent at which it is 
estimated the hereditament might reasonably be expected to let from year to 
year if the tenant undertook to pay the usual tenants rates and taxes and to 
bear the cost of the repairs and insurance and other expenses, if any, 
necessary to maintain the hereditament in a state to command that rent". 
(General Rate Act, 1967).
In essence, the valuation is based on the rent which would obtain in a
free market if there were no legal restrictions. There are no prescribed
   "
methods or systems for valuing property, but certain procedures have been 
established by courts in litigation. Four methods are typically used to value 
non-domestic properties:
(a) The Rental Method '
(b) The Profits or Accounts Basis
(c) The Contractors Basis
(d) Statutory Provisions /
9(a) The Rental Method: This is the most frequently used procedure and is 
typically considered as the best approach in litigation. Assessment under the 
rental method is either based on the rent of a similar hereditament located in 
a comparable economic site, or the ‘rack rent' of the premises under 
consideration. The 'rack rent' is defined by case law as ". . . the figure at 
which the hypothetical landlord and tenant, would. . ., come to terms as a 
result of bargaining for that hereditament, in the light of competition or its 
absence in both demand and supply as a result of the higgling of the 
market*. " (Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd v Houghton and Chester 
le-Street Assessment Committee [19371). The rack rent like the hypothetical 
bargain is purely a creation of law and need have no connection with either 
the actual tenant or landlord. In the hypothetical bargain, the hereditament 
is assumed to be:
1. Vacant, but complete with all plant attached to the property
2. Available for use in its present condition
3. Exclusive of all other plant and machinery
4. Available for one year at a time, with security of tenure.
This method is used principally for the valuation of shops, banks and small 
industrial premises.
(b) The Profits or Accounts Basis: Where there is no acceptable rental
evidence, rents are ascertained from the accounts of a firm as the amount
/
that would be left after meeting all expenses and allowing the tenant:
(i) interest on capital invested
(ii) a return for risk
(iii) a reasonable profit for trading
The balance is regarded as being available for rent and rates, after deducting 
a suitable amount for insurance and maintenance. Since the assessed rent is 
based on estimated profits, this approach implicitly assumes that the rent
which an occupier will pay is related to the profits that can be earned by
occupying the hereditament.
(c) The Contractors Basis: This method is employed when the other two 
approaches cannot be used. The procedure is based on the notion that the 
rent on a building can be infered from the capital invested in its construction. 
The contractors test therefore consists of an estimate of the capital value of 
the site and building, a fraction of which is assumed to represent the interest 
on capital (i.e. the rent) that the owner could reasonably expect. This 
procedure is mainly used for valuing local authority premises, libraries, and 
universities.
(d) Statutory Provisions: Where the above three methods of valuation have, 
been found to be inappropriate, a series of formulae have been developed to 
assess rateable values. These apply to the following traditional nationalised 
industries:
(i) Assets of the Electricity Board
(ii) Assets of the Gas Board
(iii) Assets of British Rail
(iv) National Coal Board property
(v) Assets of the water authorities
(vi) Docks and harbours
(vii) Post Office property
The formulae used to determine rate payments reflect the peculiarities of 
each industry, and they are fixed by statutory instrument following 
negotiations between representatives of the nationalised industries and local 
authorities under the Chairmanship of the Department of Environment.
Rateable values, however defined, are entered in a valuation list. The list 
reflects assessed open market rates of hereditaments in an area on a 
particular date. The Local Government Act (1948) stipulated that all
properties in England Wales were to be revalued every five years. However,
------
since the Second World War there have been only three revaluations in 1956, 
1963, and 1973. In contrast, in Scotland revaluations have been undertaken 
at seven year intervals.
Properties are improved and new structures built between revaluations. 
Hence the valuation lists are updated regularly. Changes in the list are based 
on the rental values at the time of the last valuation, so as to maintain
comparabiHty between old and new structures. However, the value of a
/
property depends partly on its location. In the parlance of the General Rate 
Act (1967), differences in property values resulting from locational factors 
are referred to as the 'tone of the list’.
The tax rate applied to the assessed rateable value is termed the rate 
poundage, and is largely determined by local authorities. Until 1985, local 
authorities enjoyed considerable autonomy in setting rate poundages. Their 
independence has, however, been eroded by the introduction of the 'rate cap' 
which sets a maximum lim it beyond which rates cannot be raised. The upper 
limit varies between authorities depending upon ’needs' as assessed for 
central grant purposes. In 1985-1986, the 'rate cap' was applied to thirteen 
authorities2.
However, not all local authorities are legally empowered to levy rates 
directly. In England and Wales, local authorities are divided into the 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan councils and districts. The districts are 
responsible for administering and levying rates, while the counties impose a 
precept upon the districts. In contrast, the local authorities in Scotland 
consist of regions and districts and both are entitled to levy rates, though it is 
only the regional councils that collect rates. There were 523 local authorities, 
in the UK in 1985 as shown in Table 1.1 below. In 1986, the number was 
reduced to 511, with the abolition of the Greater London Council and the 
Metropolitan counties.
TABLE 1,1
TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHOR ITV Number
ENGLAND AND DALES
Uoner Tier Authorities
Metropolitan Counties 6
Non-Metropolitan Counties 47
GLC t ;
loip.gr TlPF fluthprWe?
Metropolitan Districts 47
Non-Metropolitan Districts 333
London Boroughs 33
Special Authorities: ILEA 1
Metropolitan Police 1
SCOTLAND
Uooer Tier Authorities
Regions
------
9
Louier Tier Authorities
Districts 53
Island Councils 3
i
TOTAL: 523
1.2 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PROPERTY TAX
Having described the central features of the non-domestic property tax in 
the UK, we now examine the purported merits and failures of the rating 
system. The general nature of the debate is well documented in text books 
(see Hepworth (1984), King (1984), Prest (1978) ), and official reports (see 
Layfield Report (1977), Allen Report (1965) ) and w ill consequently be 
described briefly in this section. In what follows, it w ill be suggested that the 
arguments typically rely on implicit and unsubstantiated assumptions about 
the effective incidence of business rates.
Heading the litany of complaints against the non-domestic property tax is 
its alleged regressivity. Property tax payments depend on the assessed 
rateable value of a structure, rather than the profits or earnings of the 
occupier. Hence it is argued that rates are intrinsically unfair since tax 
payments are not related to ability to pay. It is clear that the argument
implicity assumes that the formal and effective incidence of the property tax
 —
are identical. If, however, firms profitably shift all or part of the tax burden 
onto other agents in the economy, the distributional impact of the tax can 
only be properly inferred by measuring its effective incidence. The actual 
incidence of the non-domestic property tax is a complex question on which 
there is little empirical evidence. The issue is thus dealt with in considerable 
detail in subsequent chapters.
It is frequently argued that firms owning the same value of taxable
/
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property are exposed to different tax bills because of inadequacies in 
assessment practices. The Layfield Committee compared the rateable values 
of properties which are similar in all relevant respects in different areas. As 
shown in Table 1.2, the figures reveal that the rateable value of a property is 
twice as high in London as in Wales and the non-metropolitan areas. Thus a 
firm with a given income, occupying a certain type of structure with given 
physical characteristics w ill be paying higher rates in certain areas than 
elsewhere, assuming a uniform rate poundage. Non-domestic property taxes 
have therefore been criticised as inequitable, since they are neither related to 
ability to pay or the physical characteristics of a structure. However, the 
argument appears to ignore the role of locational factors in the property 
market. The property market is spatially differentiated, hence identical 
structures located in different areas represent heterogeneous products which 
command different rents. Thus, considerations of horizontal equity would 
seem to require rateable valuer- to~vary in a manner which reflects 
differences in rental values. It follows, that the distribution of rateable 
values can only be regarded as unfair if they are unrelated to rents.
It is further argued, that a ’good' tax should have a base that is uniformly 
and widely distributed throughout the country. An even distribution is seen 
to be desirable since government grants are paid to compensate for variations
in the tax base to equalise the burden of taxes. A greater reliance on grants,
*
it is argued, undermines local government autonomy and accountability. In
TABLE.  1.2
INDE8 OF BOTEOBLE DRLUES OF IDENTICOL PROPERTIES BY REGION
Ulales 100
North 115
York and Humberside 124
East Midlands 129
South LUest 134
North lllest 136
Ulest Midlands 164
Greater London 225
Source: Layfield (1977) pp. 158
the UK, the resource and needs elements of grants seek to equalise rate 
poundages, so implicitly the rate poundage is assumed to be an accurate 
measure of the tax burden, and the rateable value an accurate measure of 
taxable capacity. Equalisation grants thus redistribute resources from high to 
low rateable value areas. However, since rateable values depend on assessed 
rents rather than incomes, this w ill not necessarily mean that transfers are 
made from high to low income areas. The distribution of rateable values is 
highly uneven in the UK, hence local authorities are heavily reliarit on grants 
which are used to equalise rate poundages. In so far as grant payments are 
hypothecated, or have conditions attached to them, local authority autonomy 
w ill be undermined.
Another major complaint about the property tax concerns the low 
elasticity of tax yields with respect to money incomes (i.e. the buoyancy of 
the tax). In part, the lack of buoyancy appears to stem from the infrequent 
revaluations in England and Wales. The Layfield Committee found that 
property values increased by 10% per annum between the revaluations of 
1963 and 1973. Thus much of the alleged money income inelasticity of yields 
stems from the infrequency of revaluations rather than any inherent 
deficiency of the property tax. More generally, thfc property tax w ill lack 
buoyancy only if the increase in nominal rents is less than that of the price of 
other goods and services.
Furthermore, critics of the property tax have argued that it is
/
distortionary in its impact, and has significant disincentive effects on 
investment. Thus it has been suggested that high property taxes have 
accelerated the decline of the depressed regions by inducing firms to relocate 
in lower taxed areas. It is clear that the argument once more relies on the 
assumption that the property tax cannot be profitably shifted by firms. This 
issue is investigated in greater detail in later chapters.
It is frequently suggested that local taxes should be levied in a way 
which promotes government accountability. The Layfield Committee asserted 
that: "The first requirements of a financial system for local government is
accountability: whoever is responsible for incurring expenditure should also
*
be responsible for raising the revenue." In so far as increases in local 
expenditure are financed from local rates, the property tax is seen to promote 
accountability. However, firms and businesses do not have votes, hence there 
is no direct accountability between non-domestic ratepayers and local 
authorities. Thus critics of the rating system have argued that non-domestic 
property taxes weaken the link between voters, taxpayers and expenditure, 
thereby eroding local government accountability. However, the argument 
assumes that firms cannot pass the burden of property taxes on to consumers, 
or other agents. Clearly, in the extreme case where tke tax is fu lly shifted to 
households who form part of the electorate, the link between voters and 
taxpayers w ill once again be restabiished.3
In contrast, supporters of the rating system/have argued that the
property tax is particularly well suited to provide revenues for local 
government since its base (property) is immobile, and hence the tax cannot 
be easily evaded. It is clear that this argument is valid only in the short run, 
since although existing property is spatially immobile, additions may well 
respond to tax differentials between areas. Thus, differentially higher tax 
rates may in the long run erode the tax base of an area.
A second reason why property taxes are favoured at the local level is thatt
the tax base is properly recorded so that in a formal sense yields are 
completely predictable and stable. However, as noted earlier, this has also 
been regarded as a drawback, for unlike other taxes, there is no automatic 
increase in yields in response to changes in money incomes. Where 
revaluations are infrequent, rate poundages must be explicitly increased to 
meet increasing expenditure requirements. It has been suggested that 
increases in tax rates are more easily perceived than automatic tax increases 
resulting from inflation, and hence-the lack of buoyancy of the property ta i 
serves to promote accountability.
A further advantage of rates as a local tax is seen to stem from the ease 
with which tax yields can be allocated to particular authorities. Since
i
property taxes depends on the location of property, the yield is payable' to 
the authority where the property is situated.
Finally, supporters of the rating system have suggested that the cost of
/
j
administering the property tax system is low relative to yields. The collection
costs are estimated at approximately 2% of yields, which is considerably less 
than for other taxes such as the wealth tax (Prest [1978]).
Having reviewed the purported merits and disadvantages of the rating 
system, it is apparent that in the absence of a full investigation of the 
effective incidence of the property tax, it is impossible to evaluate the 
system. This, as noted earlier, is the main objective of the current endeavour. 
However, before proceeding with the analysis of the effective ihcidence, it 
would seem useful to begin with a brief description of the quantitative 
significance of the non-domestic property tax, and its formal incidence.
i
1.3 THE FORMAL INCIDENCE
"The A rt o f Taxation consists in  so plucking the goose as to obtain the
iargest amount offeathers with the smallest amount o f hissing
. ----
Jean Baptiste Colbert
From 1963 to 1983 the estimated income from non-domestic rates has 
risen from £422.2 million to £6,069.3 million in nbminal terms. Thus, as 
shown in Table 1.3, the rate burden on commerce and industry is high and 
has been constantly rising.4 If we compare non-domestic rates to other taxes 
as in Table 1.4, it can be seen that rate yields constitute approximately 10% of
TABLE 1.3
POTENTIAL ROTE INCOME 1963-1905
Vear Commerce Industry Utilities Total
1963 235.5 159.2 47.5 442.2
1964 248.6 167.4 51.1 467.1
1965 279.6 186.0 57.7 523.3
1966 323.5 207.2 64.5 595.2
1967 344.0 217.6 68.1 629.7
1968 368.7 230.3 72.0 671.0
1969 406.0 252.3 78.2 736.5
1970 450.9 275.8 97.8 824.5
1971 519.1 315.8 112.4 947.3
1972 588.1 353.2 124.9 1066.2
1973 748.7 361.0 140.8 1250.5
1974 952.4 459.8 184.3 1596.5
1975 1250.6 599.3 246.1 2096.0
1976 1346.5 636.1 264.9 2247.5
1977 1497.5 697.2 329.2 2523.9
1978 1640.1 745.8 360.0 2745.9
1979 1913.4 847.7 410.6 3171.7
1980 2517.3 1049.2 515.2 4081.7
1981 3147.6 1280.2 639.7 5067.5
1982 3547.0 1434.6 719.9 5701.5
1983 3784.5 1525.3 759.5 6069.3
(Note: Potential Rate Income -  Rateable Ualue h Ruerage Rate 
Poundage. This may be greater than rate yields, since some rates are 
not collected.)
Source: Birdseye and Ulebb (1984)
TABLE 1,4
Major Taxes: Percentage Contribution
TflH 1974 1978 1980 1982
Income Taw 31.3 31.3 27.5 26.5 25.0
Corporation Tax 9.0 6.0 5.5 4.6 5.2
URT 8.9 8.7 13.4 12.4 13.7
National Insurance 15.9 19.7 19.9 18.4 17.9
Rates: 9.8 9.4 9.4 10.4 9.9
of which Non-domestic 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.3 5.1
OtherTaxes 25.3 24.1 20.9 21.9 21.2
Petroleum Reuenue 0.8 3.4 5.8 7.1
Source : National Income and Expenditure Blue Books
the total tax bill in the UK, and the non-domestic component around 5% of 
total taxes. Hence, rates are a major tax with a yield which is second only to 
the income tax and national insurance charges. It is instructive to compare 
the yield of rates with property tax yields in other OECD countries. Table 1.5 
reveals that property taxes tend to be most important in English speaking 
countries, where tax yields as a fraction of GDP are on average higher. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the UK and Ireland are the only two 
countries where property taxes are the sole source of local tax revenue. 
These figures therefore suggest that rates are a major tax in Britain, with 
yields which have been rising over the years.
However, aggregate figures conceal much of the variation in non-domestic 
rate burdens across both sectors and regions of the economy. Differences in 
property tax burdens may derive either from variations in rateable values 
(i.e. the tax base), the amount of exempted property, or the rate poundage 
(i.e. the tax rate). Tables 1.6 and4.7-show the average rateable value pef 
hereditament in England and Wales, and Scotland respectively. In England 
and Wales, non-domestic rateable values vary over a range of 1:2.25, and in 
Scotland 1:1.9. Not surprisingly, the figures reveal that higher rateable
i
values are concentrated in London, the metropolitan areas, and the major 
cities of Scotland (shown in parantheses in Table 1.7).
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 disaggregate rateable values by broad industrial
t
sectors for the major classes of local authorities in Ei^land and Wales, and the
TABLE 1.5
VIELD OF PROPERTY TRHES IN OECO COUNTRIES
1970
COUNTRY
Yield as % 
TRH ofGDP
Yield as %of 
total tax 
reuenues
Yield as %of 
tax revenue 
local government
Australia Land 0.27 0.80 6
Rates 1.19 3.99 97
Denmark Land 1.24 2.82 n.a.
Seruice 0.18 0.42 n.a.
France Building 0.15 0.94
i
0.96
Land 0.39 0.36 0.34
Property 0.60 1.45 1.47
Germany Property 0.37 1.00 12.6
Ireland Rates 1.16 3.47 100.0
Japan Fixed Assets 1.15 4.58 33.9
City Planning 0.19 0.77 5.7
Land Holding 0.03 0.12 0.9
Netherlands Municipal
Polder
0.61 1.28 92.0
Contributions 0.J3__ 0.27 43.0
New Zealand Land 0.05 0.16 0.01
Rates 2.22 7.12 92.7
Spain Rural Land 0.02 0.08 1.48
Urban Land 0.11 0.45 7.89
Sweden Municipal 0.40
i
0.80 n.a.
Switzerland Recurrent 0.25 1.20 n.a.
UK Rates 3.30 9.51 100
USA Property 3.60
9
9.29/ 35.46
Source: OECD (1983)
RATEABLE 0RLBE PER HEREDITRMENT BY CLRSS BF LOCAL RBTHORITY 
IN ENGLRNB RNB SALES IN 1982
Inner Outer 
London London
Metropolitan 
District and 
Counties
Non-
Metropolitan 
Districts and 
Counties Wales
Oomestlc 302.6 273.9 165.4 193.9 123.2
Non-
Domestic 1.02 0.95 0.84 0.01
Source: Bennett (1986a);
CIPFfl Financial General and Rating Statistics
TABLE 1 ,7
RATEABLE UALUE PER HEREDITAMENT BV REGIONS IN SCOTLRND IN 1982
Domestic Non-Domestic
Borders 202.8 336.8
Central 238.3 670.4
(Stirling) (Stirling)
(263.2) (503.2)
Dumfries 222.9 398.4
Fife 250.7 523.6
Grampian 221.1 540.01
(Aberdeen) (Aberdeen)
(229.0) (690.7)
Highland 196.1 451.3
Lothian 270.9 620.2
(Edinburgh) (Edinburgh)
(272.9) (700.5)
Strathclyde 244.8 560.11
(Glasgow) (Glasgow)
(204.8) (601.0)
i
Tayside 221.8 480.2
(Dundee) (Dundee)
(225.1) (563.9)
Source: CIPFfl SCOTLRND; Rating Reuieui
regions in Scotland. The figures reveal that the variability over both sectors 
and local authorities increases with the level of disaggregation. Once again, 
the figures show that the more urbanised areas of England and Wales have 
the highest proportion of non-domestic rateable values.
However, non-domestic rate burdens may vary across sectors and regions 
not only as a result of difference in rateable values, but also because of 
variations in rate poundages. Tables 1.10 and 1.11 show the average rate 
poundages in England and Wales, and Scotland respectively. A distinct 
pattern appears to have emerged over this period; namely higher rate 
poundages in the more urbanised areas of Scotland, Inner London, and the 
metropolitan districts. In Scotland the divergence is most marked in Lothian 
and Strathclyde. Overall, these figures suggest that high rate poundages and 
rateable values are concentrated in the older industrial centres in 
metropolitan England and the cities of Scotland. Thus, critics of the rating 
system have argued that property taxes are highly distortionary in their 
impact, inducing firms to migrate to lower taxed regions, and thereby 
accelerating the decline of the depressed urban areas.
In response it has been suggested that the disincentive effects of the
t
property tax are negligible since rate burdens are quantitatively insignificant 
when compared with total costs. Table 1.12 presents data on the major costs 
in UK manufacturing industry. Non-domestic rates constitute a mere 5% of 
total costs in the aggregate. However, simple comparisons based on observed
M L L I
PROPORTION OF RATEABLE URLUE BY CLRSS OF PROPERTY AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
IN ENGLAND RND UIRLES 1982
Hereditament London
Metropolitan 
Districts 0  
Counties
Non-
Metropolitan 
Districts 0 
Counties
Ulales
Domestic 0.38 0.49 0.53 0.47
Commercial 0.79 0.46 0.32 0.44 .
Industrial 0.11 0.28 0.22 0.21
Utilities 0.38 0.05 0.09 0.05
Entertainment 0.008 0.01 0.015 0.01
Education 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
Other 0.08 ~ 0.04 0.05 0.06
(Note: Totals may not sum to unity because of rounding errors) 
Source: Inland Reuenue Statistics
MBtEJLtg
PROPORTION OF RRTERRLE URLUE BY CLRSS OF PROPERTY RND REGION
IN SCOTLAND 1902
Domestic Commercial Industrial Utilities Other
Borders 0.48 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.19
Central 0.31 0.19 0.30 0.05 0.16
Dumfries O' 
Galloway 0.47 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.22
Fife 0.39 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.19
Grampian 0.35 0.29 0.11 0.03 0.22
Highland 0.35 0.26 0.15 0.05 0.18
Lothian 0.37 0.31 0.07 0.03 0.21
Strathclyde 0.38 0.29 0.09 0.04 0.18
Tayside 0.39 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.22
Source: CIPFfl SCOTLRND; Rating Reuieui
TflBLE J J P
RATE POUNDAGES (i.e. pence per pound)
BY CLASS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY IN ENGLAND RNO lilRLES
1978 - 1985
Inner
London
Outer
London
Metropolitan 
Districts and 
Counties
Non-
Metropolitan 
Districts and 
Counties
i
Ulales
1978 78.30 78.69 89.88 86.00 100.39
1979 85.27 90.97 103.12 98.15 116.93
1980 108.24 110.91 128.10 118.19 140.88
1981 144.87 139.97 162.66 132.64 162.11
1982 159.32 154.71 185.25 151.75 167.11
1983 177.32 167.32 193.64 159.23 169.65
1984 187.15 174.28 203.22 168.88 178.92
1985 190.97 189.53 226.81 180.53
i
196.15
Source: Bennett (1986a)
« RATE POUNDAGES BV REGION IN SCOTLAND
1970 -  1983
REGION 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Border 48.65 55.48 71.8 86.2 99.5 103.25
Central 54.0
(Stirling)
(54.0)
62.33
(Stirling)
(62.0)
73.33
(Stirling)
(72.0)
98.0
(Stirling)
(93.0)
118.3
(Stirling)
(112.9)
123.6
(stinino)
(130.0)
Dumfries 44.25 51.5 64.0 77.75 102.6 101.25
Fife 42.0 51.6 69.5 87.0 105.0 121.16
Grampian 53.4
(Rberdeen)
155.0)
62.5
(Rberdeen)
(66.5)
72.75 79.9 95.4 100.9 
(Rberdeen) (Rberdeen) (Rberdeen) (Rberdeen) 
(80.25) (96.5) (116.0) . (119.5)
Highlands 50.5 59.8 77.5
«. - - —
95.0 116.13 116.13
Lothian 57.63
(Edinburgh)
(58.0)
68.37
(Edinburgh)
(68.5)
94.25
(Edinburgh)
(94.5)
134.25 139.9 124.75 
(Edinburgh) (Edlnburgh)(Edinburgh 
(134.8) (140.0) (125.0)
Strathclyde 54.21
(Glasgow)
(63.5)
78.5
(6lasgow)
(68.0)
80.52
(Glasgow)
(93.0)
110.2 126.84 136.56 
(Glasgow) (Glasgow) (Glasgow) 
(128.0) (150.0) (156.0)
Tayslde 48.3 54.6 66.8 95 110.33 119.0
(Note: Rote Poundages In the major cities of Scotland shown In parentheses)
Source: CIPFR SCOTLAND; Rating Reuieui
TABLE 1.12
COSTS IN MANUFACTURING 1980
Cost S % of gross output in Manufacturing
Purchases: energy
non-energy
TOTAL:
3.6
53.6
57.2
Reduction in stocks
Labour Costs
Industrial Seruice
Rent
Rates
Transport
Hire of Uehicles
Insurance
Bank Charges
Other
TOTAL:
0.3
23.0
2.7
0.3
0.6
1.3
0.5
0.04
0.4
3.24
6*4
All Other Costs 10.5
Gross Output 100.0
Source: Bennett (1986a)
costs appear to be of questionable value, if not totally misleading: First, the 
figures conceal much of the variability in costs and rate burdens across 
different sectors and areas. Furthermore, they take no account of the 
possible response of firms to the tax. For example, if differentially higher tax 
burdens in one area induce firms to migrate to lower taxed regions, a 
comparison based on aggregate e i post cost data w ill considerably 
understate the importance of the tax. Finally, for the figures to provide an
i
indication of the actual burden of rates, it must be implicitly assumed that 
the tax is neither shifted forward into prices, or back into costs. Thus, in 
order to measure the actual burden of the property tax, it becomes necessary 
to analyse its effective incidence.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the local authorities have argued that 
rates do not constitute a serious problem for business since the increase in 
rate burdens has been less than that of inflation (A.M.A. 1983). In contrast, 
representatives of commerce and industry claim that the ". . .rates paid by 
industry rose around 1.6 to 1.9 times more than other costs and prices”. 
(BirdsEye and Webb [19841 ). However, as noted by Bennett (1986a), these 
conflicting conclusions derive from the use of different base years in
i
calculating property tax and cost increases. As shown in Table 1.13, setting 
1979 as the base year validates the claims of the businessmen, and with 
1975 as the base year, rate increases approximately equal the rise in other 
costs and inflation. /
TBBLE 1,15
RATE, COST AND PRICE INCREASES
Rates
Costs of Materials 
and Fuels
Retail Price 
Index
1975 100 100 100
1976 110 127 117
1977 113 146 135
1978 123 145 146
1979 141 168 166
1980 176 281 196
1981 214 228 219
1982 248 244 238
1979 100 108 100
1980 125 128 118
1981 152 136 132
1982 176 145 143
Source: RMA(1983); Birdseye and LUebb (1984)
Having reviewed the main features of the non-domestic property tax, it 
seems not unreasonable to suggest that it is impossible to discern its 
distributional impact by focusing on the formal incidence alone. Thus 
subsequent chapters seek to provide theory based measures and empirical 
estimates of the effective incidence of the non-domestic property tax. 
However, in view of the wide variations in property tax burdens, it is 
difficult, if not hazardous, to make generalisations about its effective 
incidence. Despite this diversity, the analysis in subsequent chapters 
proceeds at a high level of aggregation. In part, this reflects the paucity of 
spatially disaggregated data on costs, prices and profits, and in part the fact 
that the central features of the rating system exhibit several common 
characteristics.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
Royal Commission on Local Taxation (1901)
CMND 638
Final Report on the Departmental Committee on Local Taxation 
(1914) CMND 7316
/
Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in England 
(1969) CMND 4741
The Future Shape of Local Government Finance (1971) CMND 4741 
Local Government Finance (1977) CMND 6813
These were Camden. Greenwich. Hackney, Islington, Lambeth. 
Lewisham, Southwark. Brent, Haringay, Basildon. Leicester. 
Sheffield, Tamesdown.
The argument clearly assumes that voters are well informed, and 
aware that non-domestic property taxes are shifted into prices.
These figures may partly exaggerate the importance of the 
non-domestic property tax, since they are treated as a deductable 
expense from corporation taxes.
CHAPTER TWO 
NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY TAX INCIDENCE
One of the most valuable insights that economic analysis has provided in
public finance is that the person who bears the ultimate burden of a tax is not
necessarily the person upon whom the tax is levied. Associated with a tax are
a milieu of secondary interrelated effects, as market agents adjust their
behaviour to the introduction of a tax. and these influence the distribution of
/
income and hence the eventual impact of the tax. Thus, in a survey of tax 
incidence theory Mieszkowski (1969) asserted that: "The analysis of tax 
incidence is the investigation of the distributive effects of taxes. In a general 
way incidence theory is applied distribution theory".
Given the widespread distributional and allocative impacts of taxes, it 
would seem natural to expect incidence theory to take a fairly policy oriented 
shape. This, however, has not happened and much of the incidence literature is 
enunciated within abstract models which are concerned with rather esoteric 
issues. Nevertheless, even in these studies, the analysis has yielded insights 
that are of more than theoretical interest. In part, the abstract nature of the 
models reflect the innate complexities of the problem being analysed. As noted 
earlier, the incidence of a tax is the result of a profusion of interacting effects. 
It is clearly impossible to investigate each and every effect and hence 
theoretical analysis necessitates the use of simplifying assumptions. At one 
extreme lie the traditional partial equilibrium models which focus primarily on
the allocative and distributive effects of a tax on one market in isolation. The 
most pervasive deficiency of this approach is its failure to take account of the 
interdependence of markets, and the changes in factor and product markets 
that occur simultaneously when a tax is levied. At the other extreme lie the 
comprehensive general equilibrium models pioneered by Meade (1955) and 
Harberger (1962). In principle, these models attempt to incorporate all the 
complex linkages between markets. However, in practice, the analysis is more 
restricted in scope and considerations of analytical tractability necessitate the 
use of a formidable array of stringent assumptions. These assumptions are 
based on the conventional marginal productivity theory of distribution, and 
appear to bear little relation to the 'real world’. In general, there is little 
disagreement on the fact that the assumptions are unrealistic; what is at issue 
is whether they serve as useful simplifications which make analysis tractable, 
without grossly misleading.
This chapter attempts to survey the voluminous literature on the 
incidence of the non-domestic property tax. The models described in this 
survey have been chosen to clarify the main analytical issues encountered in 
the analysis of property tax incidence. Thus section 2.1 reviews the traditional
i
theory of property tax incidence, and traces the development of the general 
equilibrium approach. Section 2.2 deals with the 'dynamic incidence’ of the 
property tax in a growing economy, and section 2.3 discusses the implications
t
of introducing monopolistic competition and oligopoly in the standard general
equilibrium framework.
2.1 The 'Traditional View' versus the ‘New View' of Tax Incidence:
The most significant features of the property tax which confound 
incidence theory derive from the fact that the property tax is a levy on both 
the value of structures, and the land on which they are erected. While land is
spatially fixed in location, capital is in the long run mobile, both spatially and
/
between sectors of the economy. In much of the incidence literature, 
recognition of these ’stylised' facts plays an important role in analysing tax 
burdens.
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW' OF THE PROPERTY TAX
The 'traditional view' of the property tax is based on conclusions deduced 
from the Marshallian partial equilibrium framework. Accepting the dichotomy 
between the land and capital components of the property tax, the traditional 
view' asserts that since land is location specific and inelastic in supply, that 
proportion of the property tax falling on land is borne entirely by its owners. 
This simple result derives entirely from the inelasticity of the supply of land.
In Diagram 2.1 below, prior to the imposition of the tax the price of land is Pj
A tax of 'x' per unit of land, ceteris paribus, lowers the demand curve so that
the net-of-tax price received by land-owners is P2.
DIAGRAM 2,1
^ Q land
However, by far the greater part of property-tax revenue arises from the
levy on structures (and hence capital). Since capital is assumed to be mobile in 
the long run, its supply is perfectly elastic. It follows that this portion of the 
tax w ill be shifted forward to users of property or their customers. This 
conclusion stems from the fact that a tax on a perfectly elastic factor 
(commodity) is borne entirely by those who demand the factor (commodity).
t
Thus, combining the two components of the tax, it is argued by proponents of 
the 'traditional view* that consumers bear the levy on structures in proportion 
to their expenditures, while the tax on land is borne by land-owners.
This conclusion is perfectly valid under certain stringent assumptions,
which appear to rule out important behavioural responses to the tax. In 
general, the response of the taxed sector w ill affect the relative price of other 
commodities and factors of production, as firms attempt to substitute cheaper 
untaxed inputs for the taxed factor. These equilibriating adjustments w ill in 
turn have secondary impacts in ail sectors of the economy. Thus, unless it is 
implicitly assumed that the tax applies to a jurisdiction or sector that is ’small' 
in relation to the economy, the analysis is incomplete. Second, and allied to this 
omission/income effects’ that alter labour supplies are ignored. If land owners 
provided labour services, the incentive effects of the land tax might induce 
them to work harder thereby raising gross land rents. Even if this effect were 
ignored, input prices w ill change if the tax revenue is redistributed as lump 
sum payments to other factors of production. For example, labourers who 
receive lump sum transfers are likely to reduce their labour supply, causing a 
fall in pre-tax land rents.
Finally, the conclusions which, are arrived at from the analysis of one 
market, cannot be generalised to the case of the economy at large. If only one 
'small' jurisdiction levies a property tax, the long run return to capital (the 
mobile and perfectly elastic factor) w ill be unaffected. However, if the tax is
i
national in its application, capital cannot escape the tax burden by migrating 
out of the high taxed region. Thus the overall return to capital w ill decline. 
Hence, generalising the incidence effects from the case of a single region to the
t
economy as a whole is seen to be an example of the ’fallacy of composition’.
THE NEW VIEW OF THE PROPERTY TAX
The analytical inadequacies of the partial-equilibrium model were partly 
overcome in the general equilibrium analysis of Mieszkowski (1971). The 
origins of the general equilibrium theory of property tax incidence, lie in 
Harberger's (1962) model of coporation taxes which provided the theoretical 
constructs necessary to analyse property tax incidence in an economy-wide
i
context.1 The conclusions of the general equilibrium approach have now 
become accepted doctrine, embodying what is termed the 'new-view' of the 
property tax.2
i
The 'new view' models are based on marginal productivity theory and 
hence employ the familiar stringent assumptions of neoclassical distribution 
theory. Thus the models typically assume that:
1. All factor and product markets are perfectly competitive
2. Factor supplies are homogenous and fixed
3. Technology is described by linearly homogenous and quasi-concave 
production functions
4. The models abstract from the demand effects of taxes and government
i
expenditures. It therefore becomes necessary to neutralise any policy induced 
changes in income distribution which may affect the pattern of demand. Hence 
it is implicitly assumed that all consumers have identical marginal and average 
propensities to consume. Consequently, a redistribution of income between
consumers w ill have no effect on either the level or the pattern of demand in 
the economy. If, however, tax revenues are expended on goods which increase 
consumer utility, the distortionary impact of a tax may be offset by the 
corresponding benefits of government expenditure. More specifically, if 
property tax burdens are distributed so that the incremental tax costs equal 
the marginal benefits of government expenditure on goods and services, the 
tax would approximate to a user charge for government services with no
t
distortionary impact.3 Thus, in order to analyse the incidence of property 
taxes, it is typically assumed that government expenditure is on 'onerous' or 
'useless' goods which have no effect on consumer utility.
Finally, Mieszkowski's analysis is based on two further special 
assumptions:
5. The property-tax is viewed as a tax levied on reproducible, malleable, 
capital. The model therefore ignores the levy on the value of land. .
6. There are three factors of .production; malleable capital which is perfectly 
mobile between sectors and regions, labour which is imperfectly mobile and 
land which is completely immobile.
Given this formidable list of assumptions, it follows that when all 
jurisdictions in the nation levy a uniform tax on the stock of capital, the tax 
burden falls entirely on capital owners. This crucially important result cannot 
be questioned given the stringent assumptions of marginal productivity theory.
9
Since factor supplies are fixed, and all markets/perfectly competitive, fu ll
employment is reached through price adjustments. Furthermore, the demand 
effects of government spending are neutralised in the model. Consequently, a 
tax can only be shifted in this framework by reducing the supply of the taxed 
factor (activity). Clearly, if the level of the taxed factor (activity) does not 
change, the original configuration of relative prices continue to define the 
solution to the general equilibrium system, and hence the tax is borne
passively by the factor owners. In this case, since the supply of capital is fixed
/
by assumption, a uniform property tax levied on reproducible capital w ill fall 
on its legal base (i.e. property).
However, in general, property tax rates are not uniform and vary between 
sectors and regions. Thus, given perfect capital mobility, a differentially higher 
tax rate w ill induce an outward flight of capital to the lower taxed regions. The 
increased supply of capital in these regions serves to lower after-tax returns, 
while the reduced supply of capital in the higher-taxed areas raises 
net-returns. Equilibrium is eventually reached when sufficient capital has 
migrated from the taxed regions to equalise the net-of-tax returns to capital. 
Compared with the original equilibrium; the net- returns of the immobile and 
imperfectly mobile factors (land and labour) w ill be lower in the taxed 
jurisdictions, while the price of non-traded’ goods (i.e. locally produced and 
sold goods) w ill be higher. The analysis and conclusions relating to differential 
tax burdens in the general equilibrium framework are thus broadly analogous 
to those of the traditional view’. However, the important result that
distinguishes the 'new view' from partial equilibrium analysis, is the insight 
that while a uniform property tax across all jurisdictions lowers the after-tax 
returns to capital throughout the economy; tax rate differentials lead to 
differences in the net-returns to immobile factors and non-traded commodities. 
The precise distribution of burdens remains one of the most important 
unresolved issues in the 'new view' literature.
While Mieszkowski's view has generated a considerable , amount of
i
disagreement over the issue of differential property tax shifting, the important 
conclusion relating to a uniform tax remains unassailable, regardless of 
assumptions about factor mobility, the number of traded goods, etc. A uniform 
property tax as specified in the model is merely a tax on a fixed factor, and is 
consequently borne by capital owners. The remainder of this section attempts 
to survey what appear to be the more important and illuminating theoretical 
extensions of the basic Mieskowski model. In particular, attention is focused 
on the consequences of amendingihe plethora of stringent assumptions. It is 
argued that dissenting views on differential tax shifting arise from differences 
in the formal structures of models, as well as different definitions of ttip 
commodity to be taxed.
i
Variable Tax Rates and Mobile Land;
In an interesting development of the Mieszkowski model, Sonstellie 
(1979) investigates the consequences of varying the tax rate levied on
9
different classes of property within a given jurisdiction. This assumption
clearly brings the analysis more in line with actual practice, for in most 
developed economies, certain sectors are exempted from property taxes, while 
others (such as industry and housing) are taxed at different rates. This,
however, implies that land can no longer be viewed as an immobile factor, for
in the long run land, like other factor inputs, is clearly mobile between sectors 
and classes of property. This feature serves to distinguish the Sonstellie model 
from much of the existing literature.
t
More specifically, the analysis is based on the standard two-sector general 
equilibrium model and focuses on the impact of varying tax rates in a single 
'small’ jurisdiction. All markets are perfectly competitive and it is assumed 
that the supply of property in the two sectors (denoted X and Y) are described 
by the constant returns production function:
(1) Zi= f i (Ki, Ni)
i = X, Y.
where: Ki - capital input in sector i  (i * X, Y.)
Ni » land input in sector i (i = X, Y.)
Supplies of both land and capital are assumed to be perfectly mobile 
between sectors. Thus, in equilibrium net factor returns w ill be equal in the
two sectors:
34
(2a) Pi - PK [i - X, Y,)
(2b) Pi -P n [i-X.Y.1
where: Pi - price of property in sector i [i - X, Y,]
[afi/aK] - marginal product of capital in sector i [i = X, Y.)
[dfi/dN] - marginal product of labour in sector i [i - X, Y,] '
Pk - price of capital
Pn - price of land
Furthermore, in equilibrium the demand for structures (denoted Di) w ill 
equal its supply as determined by the production function:
where: Di - demand for property in sector i [i - X, Y,]
Finally, a tax is levied at rates tx and ty on the value of property in sectors
 ____
X and Y respectively. It is, however, well established that a tax on the value of 
output of a constant returns industry is equivalent in its effects to a tax at 
equal rates on the value of all factor inputs. Thus, in the present model, the 
property tax is in essence a tax at equal rates on the'value of land and capital 
employed by each sector. This definition contrasts with that of the 
Mieszkowski model where the tax levy on the value of land is ignored. With 
the introduction of the tax, the gross rental on land and capital may be defined
(3) Di - fi [Ki, Nil [i-X.Y.1
/
35
as:
(4) - [1 + ti ] Pk, and G-* * I 1 + ti ] Pn
These equations are assumed to describe the main features of the 
economy. There are, however, a number of assumptions implicit in this 
framework which seem worth noting. First, the model focuses solely on the 
property market, to the neglect of other products. Second, and allied to this, 
the model ignores the existence of other factors of production - chief among 
these is labour. Thus, despite its claim to 'generality', the model is in fact 
highly restrictive and incomplete. Following Grieson (1974) the framework 
may thus be termed 'partial general equilibrium'.
The solution to the above system of equations is obtained by using one 
input or product as the numeraire and solving for the relative factor returns. 
This procedure is well documented in Harberger (1962) and much of the 
general equilibrium literature. Consequently, we ignore the formal results of 
the model, and provide an intuitive explanation of the tax induced allocative 
distortions.
It w ill be recalled that the property tax is levied at the rates tx and ty oni
the value of property in sectors X and Y respectively. In addition, the two 
factors of production (i.e. land and capital) are assumed to be perfectly mobile 
between sectors. Thus, in equilibrium, the net after-tax returns to both land
9
I
and capital must be equal. /
Consider first a tax increase in one sector (say X). The tax w ill initially 
discourage investment in property in X, and hence decrease the demand for 
land. The reduced supply of property in X therefore raises property prices, 
while the lower demand for land depresses the net rent of land in X. However, 
land is assumed to be mobile between sectors: consequently as land rents 
decline in X, some land w ill flowT into sector Y. The migration of land from
sector X to Y therefore lowers gross land rents in Y. and raises gross, rents in X.
/
This process w ill continue until net land rents are equalised in both sectors.
It w ill be recalled that the tax initially discourages investment in property 
in sector X. Hence, capital flows from X to Y, and investment in property in Y 
increases and hence property prices fall in Y (and rise in X). Thus, in the new 
equilibrium, the gross rent of land w ill be higher in X and lower in Y, while net 
rents are equal across both sectors. At the same time, property prices are 
higher in X and lower in sector Y. and net after-tax returns to capital are 
equalised.
In contrast, a uniform tax on ail property within the jurisdiction, w ill 
discourage investment and lead to an outmigration of capital to lower taxed 
regions. As a consequence, the supply of property in the jurisdiction falls, and 
land rents decrease. Thus, the tax burden is shared between consumers of 
property who pay higher prices for structures, and land owners who receive 
lower rents. This conclusion is thus analogous to that of the Mieszkowski 
model.
The Public Sector:
A striking feature in much of the general equilibrium literature lies in its 
neglect of the public sector. This omission is, arguably, not wholly 
unreasonable for the models describe perfectly competitive auction markets, 
while much of the allocative decision making in the public sector is guided by 
political fiat rather than market forces.
In a recent development of the basic Harberger framework, Henderson
i
(1985) explicitly introduces the public sector into the standard two sector 
general equilibrium model.
This innovation complicates property tax incidence analysis in two related 
ways. First, in the model, the public sector is assumed to be tax free. Thus, the 
public sector provides a 'shelter' into which taxed capital can escape.4 In 
addition, the public sector grows directly with the level of taxation5, and this 
feature complicates the formal analysis considerably. Thus, in discussing this 
model we ignore the more technical-issues and instead provide an informal 
description, focusing on the mechanisms of tax shifting.
The model assumes that there are three goods: housing (H), public goods 
(G), and private goods (X). It is assumed that a tax is levied on the housing
t
sector. Each good is produced under constant returns, and perfect competition 
prevails in sectors X and H. In addition, it is assumed that public sector 
decision making is guided by cost minimising considerations6, and 
consequently the opportunity cost of capital is the het rental for all sectors in
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the economy. There are two mobile factors; capital (K) and labour (L) whose 
total supplies are fixed. Sectors X and G employ both capital and labour, while 
sector H employs only capital. These production relations can therefore be 
described as follows:
(1) H - fH (Kjjj
(2) G - fGlKG.LGl
Full employment of factors implies that:
(4) Lc + Lx - L
(5) Kg ♦ K* ♦ - K
Perfect competition implies that prices reflect marginal costs:
( 6 )  P jj *  IP j, + 1]
(7 ' PG ’  aKCPK + aLGPL
(8) Pj( - aK)[PK + aLXPL
where: PH PG Px - price of final goods H, G, and X respectively
a^ . - amount of input i required to produce a unit of output J
PK - price of capital 
PL * price of labour
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The model is solved by the well established procedure of differentiating 
the above system of equations and solving for the relative price of capital PR.
The typically complex and "unwieldy" solution for PR reveals that the tax
induced change in the price of capital depends on the interaction of a number 
of key technological parameters. Particularly critical among these are
the relative factor intensities in the public sector (i.e. Lg - Lg ).
L K 1
Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows: It w ill be recalled that the 
public sector (G) is tax exempt and hence provides a 'tax-shelter' into which 
taxed capital can escape. Thus, an increase in taxes serves in the first instance 
to lower the demand for capital and hence its price. In Mieszkowski’s parlance, 
this is termed the ‘substitution effect'. However, there are two additional 
forces at work which may either reinforce or offset this effect. It w ill be noted
from equation (6), that increased taxation raises marginal costs and hence the
-----
price of goods in the taxed housing sector, thus demand for housing decreases, 
while demand for the untaxed and relatively cheaper public goods increase. 
Now, if the public sector is capital intensive, the increased demand for public 
goods w ill lead to a proportionately greater increase in the demand for capital 
relative to labour. Hence, the price of capital w ill rise, i.e. tax increases are 
shifted to labour.
However, it w ill be recalled that the public sector grows directly with the
level of taxes. Hence, at low tax rates the proportion of capital and labour 
employed in the public sector w ill be small relative to the other sectors and 
consequently the increased demand for capital in the public sector may not be 
sufficient to outweigh the reduced private sector demand for capital. Thus, it is 
possible that at low levels of taxation capital bears the entire tax burden, but 
as tax rates increase and public sector demand for capital grows, the burden is 
shifted to labour. Hence, tax incidence in this model depends not only on 
technical parameters such as capital intensity, but in addition the level of 
taxation and the size of the public sector. These conflicting forces have the
troubling consequence of precluding any qualitative predictions regarding tax
»
shifting.
Despite this obvious weakness, the model does appear to represent an 
interesting development of the two-sector general equilibrium framework. 
The major innovation lies not so much in the inclusion of a tax free public 
sector, but the assumption that tax,revenues monotonically increase the size-of 
the untaxed sector. Hence, ceteris paribus, the opportunities to escape the tax 
b urden increases directly with taxation.
i
Endogenous 'Capital':
The models discussed thus far have assumed that the stock of capital is 
fixed, and its supply exogenously determined. In contrast to these studies,
f
Breuckner (1981) has developed a model in which capital is endogenously
4 i
determined as an intermediate good in the production process. This 
assumption serves to complicate the structure of the conventional general 
equilibrium framework, and represents a departure from previous work.
Specifically, it is assumed that there are two communities (denoted X and 
Y) with ’primary' factors of production, land (N) and labour (L), and an 
’impure-intermediate' good, capital (K). The supply of land in each community - 
is fixed while labour is perfectly mobile between communities. Capital - the 
intermediate good, is produced using land and labour under constant returns. 
There are two consumption goods produced by each community; the first is 
capital, and the second housing or property. Housing services are produced 
using land and capital in a constant returns production function. This stylised 
economic structure is illustrated in Diagram 2.3 below;
DIAGRAM 2.3
"1 .........  >
ErUnaryJflpute Final Demand
Land (N )^ ... --------------------> Housing/Property (H)
\
*  y ^ ^Capital <T ,
Labour (L) Final Consumption
Finally, it is assumed that a property tax is levied on the value of
$
>
/
»
housing/property.
Before discussing incidence effects in this framework, it would seem 
important to note that capital in this model represents a pure flow of services 
derived from the primary inputs land and labour, rather than a flow emanating 
from a fixed durable stock. Consequently, the question of the incidence of the 
tax on the owners of a durable capital stock, does not arise in the analysis. 
Stated differently, capital owners, as conventionally defined, do not exist in this 
framework. Thus, despite the advantages of endogenising the capital stock, the 
model ignores an issue which is crucial to incidence analysis.
Consider first the impact of a uniform property tax on the stock of housing 
in both communities. An increase in the tax levy on housing will, in the first 
instance, induce firms to transfer production from housing to the untaxed 
consumption good - capital. Thus, the supply of capital in the economy 
increases, while the supply of housing decreases. However, this shift in 
production can only be achieved by Jransfering primary factor inputs to the 
capital sector. Thus, the supply of land used in capital production rises and 
hence the marginal product of land and net rents decline while the marginal 
product of labour, and hence wages, rise.7 Compared with the old equilibrium,
i
housing prices and wages are higher, while net land rents are lower. Clearly, 
while higher house prices decrease workers' utility, higher wages, in contrast, 
raise real incomes. Thus the net change in workers' utility remains ambiguous.
9
In contrast, the lower rents lead to an unambiguous decline in land-owners'
utility.8
We now consider the impact of a tax on one community (say X) in 
isolation. A tax on housing in community X serves initially to raise house 
prices, and hence worker utility in X declines. Since labour is mobile between 
communities, workers w ill migrate to the untaxed community Y, and hence the 
supply of housing and capital increase in Y, and their prices decrease. The - 
increased supply of labour in Y lowers the marginal productivity of labour and 
wages, while the marginal product of land, and hence rents, increase.
At the same time, in sector X, land w ill be transferred from the production 
of (taxed) housing to capital. Hence the marginal product of land and net rents 
decline in X, while the decreased supply of labour in X raises wage rates.
Compared with the original pre-tax equilibrium, wage rates and house 
prices are higher while land rents are lower in community X. Thus, land-owner 
utility in X declines. In contrast, wages and house prices are all lower in Y, . 
hence the change in workers' utilityjevels is ambiguous.
It is evident that the introduction of an endogenous capital stock 
represents a useful development of the basic two-sector model. However, ttije 
incidence of the property tax on capital owners cannot be discerned from the
i
model. Furthermore, it would appear that 'capital' in this model is merely an 
intermediate good, rather than the durable, malleable asset of the conventional 
general equilibrium models.
t
Finally, it would seem worth noting that the conclusions of the model are
inextricably tied to the assumed structure of the economy. Thus, a uniform 
property tax lowers land rents, as in the 'new-view', but the consequent 
increase in wages results from the 'escape hatches' created by the assumed 
production hierarchy. Hence, incidence depends crucially on the structure of 
the economy, and it seems difficult to justify the ad-hoc assumptions regarding 
production flows, and the nature of capital.10
Risk and Factor Variability:
The fundamental conclusion of the Harberger-Mieszkowski framework, 
that a uniform factor tax is borne by the factor owners, has endured despite 
the numerous theoretical developments and modifications to the basic model. 
This is not surprising, for given the entourage of assumptions in the model, a 
tax can only be shifted by reducing the supply of the taxed activity. A general 
tax on a fixed factor such as land or capital is a clear case where the taxed 
activity cannot be varied, and hence ihe entire burden of the tax is borne by 
the factor owners. None of the models discussed above permit primary factor 
supplies to vary, and hence shifting of a general factor tax is precluded by 
definition. In an innovative and illuminating paper, Feldstein (1977) analyses
i
the conditions under which this conclusion holds. It is shown that even if 
factor supplies are fixed, considerations of risk and uncertainty may lead to 
partial shifting of a general factor tax.
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The formal analysis is based on the more restrictive one-sector
neoclassical model. Thus, all markets are assumed to be perfect, and there are 
three factors of production: land (N), labour (L) and capital (X). A uniform 
national tax is levied on land. In addition, it is assumed that factor supplies are 
fixed in the short-run. Factor inputs are used to produce a composite 
commodity (X) described by a constant returns aggregate production function:
(1) X = F [X, L, N,1
As there is only one good in the economy, the community’s stock of capital 
(X) takes the form of an accumulation of the composite commodity. The price 
of this commodity (and hence the price of capital) is assumed to be the 
numeraire. Following Samuelson (1958), it is assumed that workers live for 
two periods: in the first period they work and save. Savings are held in the 
form of assets X and N. In the second period individuals retire and sell their 
assets.
Under the assumptions of marginal productivity theory, the wage rate 
earned in the first period is: -  —
(2) W - Fl
where: FL - diF/dL - marginal product of labour
The fraction of wage income saved is assumed to depend on the rate of 
interest:
(3) s - a [Fk1
where: s = saving rate = average propensity to save
4b
Fk - dfi./dK - rate of interest - marginal product of capital
Since all savings are held in the form of assets (i.e. K and N), we have by 
definition:
(4) sW L s K + Pn N
where: PN * price of land
In a non-stochastic deterministic world the returns to land and capital 
w ill be known with certainty, and hence both assets w ill be held by savers if 
and only if net returns are equal, i.e.
(5) E l  -  M .
1 Pn
However, in a non-deterministic world, asset yields canot be known with 
certainty and hence derived portfolio holdings w ill depend partly on the risks 
associated with each asset. Since asset supplies are assumed to be fixed, 
relative yields must reflect the risk differentials in order to induce investors to 
hold the available quantities.
Within this framework, a uniform tax on land w ill initially lower net
i
yields by the full amount of the tax:
[ i - tl fn
where: t » tax rate
/
i
/
»
4 /
The tax w ill thus be capitalised into lower land values, and investors' 
wealth declines. Now, the riskiness of land is determined by the standard 
deviation of net rental income relative to the price of land. Given lower land 
values, tax capitalisation clearly serves to reduce the riskiness of land vis-a-vis 
capital.11 Thus, ceteris paribus, the demand for land relative to capital rises, 
and since asset supplies are fixed, the price of land is bid up. That is part of - 
the uniform tax is shifted. Hence the analysis reveals that a uniform land tax 
w ill only be borne fully by land owners in a riskless, deterministic world in 
which assets are perfect substitutes.
The analysis thus far has been restricted to the short run where asset 
supplies were fixed. This assumption is now relaxed, and the capital stock is 
allowed to vary while supplies of land and labour are held constant. However, 
the long-run analysis abstracts from considerations of risk.
A uniform tax on land lowers the net rent and hence equation (5) can be . 
expressed as:_______________ ____
(6) IL « Ji^iLFN
1 Pn
Using equations (4), (2) and (3) to eliminate PN in (6) and rearranging we 
obtain the fundamental equilibrium savings relationship:
(7) K - Dk - a [Fk] Fl L - II - tl Fn.N
Fk /
/
where: DK - demand for capital 
Equation (7) states that in equilibrium the demand for capital (Dj,) must
equal savings (a [FK ] FL L) minus the net value of land ([1-t] FN N/FK). Clearly
(7) is stable only if an increase in savings or reduction in land values does not 
induce a proportionately greater increase in the demand for capital i.e.
8DK/dK<l.
i
Differentiating (7) with respect to taxes (t):
(8) slK - -N Fn/Fk
dt jaPx- i] > 0
LdK J
Thus, an increase in land taxes induces an increase in the equilibrium 
stock of capital. This result is clearly not implausible, for a tax on land lowers 
its net yield and consequently increases the desirability of capital vis-a-vis 
land. Thus, the equilibrium ratio of capital to land rises. Changes in gross 
factor yields follow directly from this basic result. Since supplies of land and 
labour are fixed, an increase in the stock of capital raises the marginal product
i
of land and labour, and hence rents and wages rise. At the same time, the 
marginal product of capital and hence returns to capital fall. Part of the tax on
land is therefore shifted in the form of a lower net yield on capital - the
$
increase in wage rates is a by-product of these tax induced changes.
49
The analysis therefore suggests that the long run incidence of the tax will
reflect a combination of; risk induced portfolio changes, and the long period
marginal productivity changes resulting from the increases in the stock of
capital. Clearly a major shortcoming of the model lies in its failure to
incorporate risk into the long run analysis. However, this is unlikely to alter
the fundamental result that a uniform factor tax can be shifted in the long run.
/
Despite this apparent weakness, the analysis demonstrates the sensitivity 
of the 'new-view' results to plausible and minor changes in the assumptions. 
Thus, the general equilibrium conclusions have been shown to depend crucially 
on the assumption of fixed factor supplies and certainty. Solow's (1956) views 
on model evaluation seem apposite in this respect: "when the results of a 
theory seem to flow specifically from a special assumption that is dubious, the 
results are suspect".
In so far as the "new-view" conclusions rely primarily on the ad-hoc 
assumptions of fixed factor supplies and a riskless world, it is perhaps not 
unreasonable to suggest that the results are "suspect". This conclusion clearly 
emphasises the importance of analysing incidence in the context of a growing 
economy, with variable factor supplies. The following section attempts to 
survey the literature in this field.
2.2 Tax Incidence in a Growing Economy:
The analysis of the growth affects of a tax or 'dynamic incidence', is
primarily an investigation of the effects of a tax on the level of savings and
the growth rate in the economy. While there is no single well-defined
approach to dynamic incidence', much of the literature is based on
conventional neoclassical growth models.12 Thus, in contrast to the static
general equilibrium framework, factor supplies are allowed to vary, and the
/
models emphasise the interdependence between changes in the supply of 
labour and of capital. Hence, labour is typically treated as a primary factor 
of production, while the stock of capital is assumed to depend on savings out 
of labour and capital income. The current stock of capital is therefore 
influenced by labour in two distinct ways: directly through savings out of 
labour income, and indirectly through the effect of changes in the supply of 
labour on capital income and hence savings out of capital income. The 
dependence of capital accumulation on past labour supply and savings implies 
that taxes affect the growth path of the economy through their impact on the 
supply of labour and aggregate savings.
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, Chapter 8) this section analyses the 
'dynamic incidence' of property taxes within the Solow (1956) one-sector 
neoclassical growth model. Thus, it is assumed that there is only one 
'composite commodity' (denoted Y), which is produced using malleable capital 
and homogenous labour. Technology is described by a linearly-homogenous
aggregate production function of the form:
( 1) Y « F K. L,1
where: K = capital 
L = labour
Y = composite commodity 
Since the production function embodies the assumption of constant 
returns, it can be written in intensive form as follows:
where: k = * capital-labour ratio
L
y = _Y = output-labour ratio 
L
It is assumed that equilibrium prevails and hence equation (2) satisfies 
the following Inada conditions:
f ' [0] = cx> ; f [oo) = o
The assumption of a single composite commodity implies that ex-ante
savings and investment are always equal. Clearly, in a one good economy, that 
fraction of the good that is not consumed is saved, and what is saved forms 
part of the capital stock. Hence, the assumption obviates the need to
9
distinguish between ex-ante savings and investment.%
(2a) Y - L f  [k]
or
(2b) y - fIk ]
Savings are assumed to depend on income, and the capital-labour ratio 
since workers and capitalists are assumed to save at different rates:
(3) S - s [k] Y
where: s - the average propensity to save 
Since savings necessarily equal investment, we have:
(4) k - s [k] Y
where: [*) = rate of change (i.e. derivative of K with respect to time.)
Eliminating Y using [2):
K = a [kj, f j kl 
K k
(5) or:
gK = s Ikl f [kl 
k
t
where: gK = K = rate of growth of the capital stock L 
K
In addition, it is assumed that the labour force grows at the constant
 ----
exogenously determined rate n:
(6) gL = L = n
L
i
In perfect competition factors receive the value of their marginal 
products:
(7) w = 8Y/8L = f [k] - k f' [k]
(8) r = 8Y/8K = f'[k]
where: w = wage rate
r = rate of return on capital
By definition, in steady-state growth capital and labour grow at equal 
rates:
(9) gK - gL - n
Hence, by implication the capital-labour ratio (k) remains constant in the 
♦
steady-state (i.e. k = 0).
Substituting for gK and gL in (.4) and rearranging:
(10) k = s [k] f [k] - n k = 0
Equation (10) describes the “fundamental growth equation" which reveals 
that the rate of change of the capital-labour ratio [k] is determined by the 
difference between saving per worker (s [k] f [k]) and the amount required to 
keep the capital-labour ratio [k] constant as the labour force grows at rate n 
(this is termed capital-widening ). This equilibrium relationship is portrayed 
in Diagram 2.4 below. The s f curve depicts the level of savings per worker 
for given levels of the capital-labour ratio Ik]. The n.k. curve reflects the 
constant rate of increase in the labour force (i.e. "capital-widening").
Equilibrium is determined by the intersection of these two curves. In
/
equilibrium, the quantity of saving (and investment) per person is just 
sufficient to keep the growing labour force equipped at a constant 
capital-labour ratio [k*].
DIAGRAM 2.4
nk
k*
K
I
This basic model has been extended in a variety of ways to include 
depreciation , technical progress *and money. However, we ignore these 
developments and focus instead on the consequences of introducing a 
property tax.
Within this simplified framework, a property tax is equivalent to a tax oni
the stock of capital. Since all assets earn the same rate of return, a tax on 
capital, and a levy on capital income are also equivalent. Furthermore, since
there is only one commodity in the model, there can be no partial factor taxes
*
(such as a differential property tax). /
JJ
Consider a tax on capital at the rate t per unit. In the first instance, the 
tax lowers the net returns to capital:
(84) rn = f' [kl - 1
• where: rn = net returns to capital 
t * property tax
The decline in net income from capital implies that savings per person
will be lower. Thus, the savings function in equation (3) may be expressed as:
(3‘) S = s [k, t] Y
Substituting equation (3*) into the fundamental equation’ (10) we obtain:
(11) k = s [k,t] f [k] - n k ,
Equation (11) reveals that the tax affects the growth path of the economy
through its influence on the savings function. Thus differentiating (11) with 
respect to t yields:
(12) d i - -st f___
dt s [k, t] f  + sk f [k] - n
where: st - ds
at
sk -  as 
dk
The steady-state is dynamically stable if the denominator of (12) is
negative (see Gandolfo [1979, Ch.3l). Thus, the sign pf (12) depends crucially
>
/
»
on that of st. Consider the case where an increase in taxes lowers the
propensity to save (Le. st « &  <0). In this case (12) is negative, and
at
the equilibrium capital-labour ratio (k) falls. Thus, the marginal product of 
capital increases and hence the returns to capital rise, while the marginal 
product of labour and wages fall. This is portrayed in Diagram 2.5. The tax
lowers the sf curve to sf2, and the steady-state capital labour ratio f^lis to k**,
and income per worker to y *\
T
L
Clearly, the tax w ill be fully shifted to labour if gross returns to capital rise by 
the full amount of the tax. This depends primarily on the response of savings 
to the tax. In terms of Diagram 2.5, ceteris paribus the greater the decline in
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the sf curve (i.e. the fall in savings), the lower w ill be the equilibrium level of
income per worker. Thus, to obtain more definitive results, it becomes
necessary to explicitly specify the form of the savings function.
Like much else in growth theory, the savings function has been at the
centre of considerable controversy (see Meade and Hahn 119651. Kaldor [19661,
Pasinetti [1962], Samueison and Modigliani [1966]). Thus. ’Keynesian” growth
theorists such as Kaldor [1966] distinguish between the propensity to save out
/
of labour and capital income i.e.
(13) S -Sw(f  [ k ] - k f ' [ k ] ) L  + S r [ l - t ] f  Ik]K
where: Sw = propensity to save out of labour income (i.e. wages)
Sr = propensity to save out of capital income 
Consider the extreme case where there are no savings out of wages. The 
savings function (13) therefore simplifies to :
(14) S = Sr [1 - t l fMkl .K 
substituting into (11) we obtain
(15a) S = Sr [ l - t ] f ‘ [ k ] . k -nk  = D
or
(15b) Sr [1 - 1] f ’ [k] .k * nk
It w ill be noted that 3s < 0, and hence the tax reduces savings per person
3t
and capital accumulation.
Rearranging (15b):
(16) rn - f' [k] [1 - 1] = n
Sr
Equation (16) reveals that the net returns to capital (f* Ik] [1-t] ) are 
unaffected by the tax and depend only on the rate of population growth (n), 
and the propensity to save (Sr). Thus, the tax is fully shifted to labour.
In the more general savings function, withSw > 0 and Sr > Sw solving for rn 
yields:
a “ i '
.1 " i - t
where: a = labour’s share of output.
i
In this case, the degree of shifting depends on the relative propensities to 
save (Sr and Sw), and the shares of capital and labour in income (a, 1 -  a). In 
particular, the greater the propensity to save out of wages, the lower w ill be 
the degree of shifting.
In contrast, critics of this approach regard the distinction underlying the 
"class savings hypothesis" to be both unnecessary and misleading (see 
Samuelson and Modigliani [1966] ). Instead, savings are regarded as the’ 
outcome of a lifetime utility maximising exercise. , In terms of the "class 
savings function", this may be represented in terms of the propensities to 
save, by assuming that the dominant source of saving is through wage earners
making provision for retirement. Then Sw > Sr, and, the second term in the
>/
denominator of (17) dominates the expression, and’ there is little tax shifting.
Thus, despite the stringent assumptions which underlie the model, the 
conclusions remain highly sensitive to the assumed form of the savings 
function.
More generally, it has been argued that by confining attention to steady- 
state growth, the analysis abstracts from important features of the economy, 
such as the role of uncertainty, "animal spirits", disequilibrium, etc. To 
incorporate these features, it becomes necessary to introduce an investment 
function into the model, and as noted by Sen [1970], this in turn gives rise to 
the familiar "Harrod instability problem". Moreover, the time required to 
approach the steady-state has been shown to be excessively long. (See 
Atkinson [1971]). Thus key parameters may change in the transition thereby 
precluding convergence to steady-state equilibrium. In a sense, these 
criticisms reflect more fundamental objections to the neoclassical paradigm, 
and w ill be discussed in greater detail in the following section.
2.3 Property Tax, Incidence junder Monopolistic Competition and
Oligopoly:
Central to the standard two-sector general equilibrium model is the, 
assumption that product markets are perfectly competitive. While this
i
abstraction has the undoubted merit of simplifying the analysis, the need to 
eschew this questionable assumption is apparent. There are, however, a 
number of theoretical difficulties in analysing the incidence of taxes under
t
non-competitive conditions. In particular, the absence of a well-definedi
general equilibrium model of imperfect competition has meant that there is no 
obvious alternative analytical paradigm. Hence, much of the non-competitive 
incidence literature is based on minor extensions and modifications of the 
standard neoclassical general equilibrium model.
In the appendix to his seminal article, Harberger [1962] introduced into
his model a monopolistic corporate sector, and concluded that tax incidence
under alternative forms of competition "differs only in minute detail" from the
/
competitive case. It has since been noted that Harbergers analysis of 
monopoly was technically flawed and misleading,13 and there have been a 
number of attempts to extend and modify the basic two-sector model to allow 
for imperfect competition and oligopoly. Most notable among these studies 
are the models propounded by Anderson and Ballentine [1976], Atkinson and 
Stiglitz [1980, Ch.7], and Davidson and Martin [1985].
These papers provide considerable insight into the effects of taxation in 
the presence of substantial levels of imperfect competition. Following 
Harberger [Op cit.], it has frequently been suggested that tax incidence, like 
the conduct and performance of a firm, can be arrayed along a spectrum 
between the polar cases of monopoly and perfect competition. However, these 
recent papers revealed that this assertion is highly misleading. For example, 
in the Davidson-Martin model, for non-pathological cases, a general factor tax 
under oligopolistic competition raises after-tax profits - a result that can never 
arise under the polar extremes of either monopoly or perfect competition.
This conclusion is clearly of considerable importance and the remainder 
of this section attempts to review this literature. However, much of the work 
is concerned mainly with monopoly profits and corporation tax incidence. In 
what follows, we focus on the models of Atkinson and Stiglitz (Op cit.) and 
Davidson and Martin (Op cit.), where a tax is levied on the value of capital 
rather than capital income.
t
Monopolistic Competition:
Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980, Ch.7] analyse the incidence of a capital tax in 
a model where one sector of the economy is assumed to be monopolistically 
competitive. In essence, the authors seek to model an economy where there 
are a large number of firms in each industry, and where: "... although there
are strong competitive elements . . ., virtually every firm  has some
degree of monopoly power." (Atkinson and Stiglitz, [Op cit.] )
------
Specifically, firms in the monopolistic sector are assumed to produce 
differentiated products, and hence demand curves are relatively inelastic. The 
existence of a "large" number of firms further implies that group
i
interdependence can be ignored, and consequently strategic behaviour is 
assumed to be Cournot-Nash.
This model of monopolistic competition is imbedded into the standard
/
general equilibrium framework. Thus it is assumed that there are two sectors
»
(denoted X and Y). While perfect competition prevails in sector Y, sector X is 
assumed to be imperfectly competitive. Both sectors employ homogenous 
malleable capital (K), and labour (L). Factors are assumed to be fixed in 
supply, and perfectly mobile between sectors.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977], market imperfections in sector X are 
assumed to stem from consumers’ desire for differentiated products (denoted
Xi). For computational ease, the sub-utility function r (Xi) is assumed to have 
the constant elasticity form:
(la) rP = 2XPt <•
Where p = 1, products are perfect substitutes, and competition in X w ill ,be 
perfect. In what follows, we therefore assume that 0 < p < 1.
In addition, the aggregate utility function is assumed to be Cobb Douglas: 
(lb) U = ( l -5) logY + 61ogr(Xi)
Consumers therefore maximise (lb) subject to the budget constraint:
,  ----
(2) M = Py Y +2 Pi Xi
where:
M - income
(
Py m price of good Y
Pi = price of differentiated product Xi.
The first-order maximising conditions are given by:
(3a) MI -  1 - i  - o i P j -  0
dY Y
(3b) M L - 8X P '1-  a Pi - 0
dY
(3c) dU - M - PVY - 2 PiXi - 01 i
da
where: a = the Lagrangean Multiplier.
Rearranging (3), we obtain the demand functions:
(4a)
(4b) Xi =
In Chamberlinian parlance, the parameter ( 1 ) in equation (4b)
represents the elasticity of the dd curve - i.e. the "firm" demand curve which 
relates each differentiated product to its own price, assuming that ail other 
firms hold their prices constant. In addition, it is assumed that firms have 
identical fixed and marginal costs, and that there are no barriers to entry. 
Thus, in equilibrium marginal costs and revenues are equalised, and entry 
occurs until the marginal firm earns zero profits. Diagramatically, equilibrium 
is therefore described by the familiar case of Chamberlinian monopolistic 
competition, where the dd curve is tangential to a downward sloping 
average-cost curve. Furthermore, the equal cost condition implies that all
firms produce the same level of output, and w etcan define the number of
1 -p
firms as: n - X, where: X is firm output and X is total industry output.
X
More formally equilibrium in sector X is described by the following 
conditions:
From equation (4) we obtain marginal revenue and hence:
where: Cx - CLX W + Cj,x. r - marginal costs in X.
CLX - amount of labour required to produce a unit of X
- amount of capital required to produce a unit of X
W - wage rate 
r ■ rate of return to capital 
The zero profit condition can be expressed as:
substituting (5) and (6) into (7), the scale of each firm is given by:
(5) pP - CK X X
(6) Px X - cx X - Co - 0
where: Cx - marginal costs in X
C0 - fixed costs in X
X - firm output
From the demand equation (4) we have:
(7)
(8) X -  j l _ _£o
1 -p Cx
From (8), it can be seen that output per firm is larger, the higher are 
fixed costs (Co), the lower the elasticity _ ]__, and the lower are marginal
1-p
costs (Cx).
Turning now to sector Y, perfect competition implies that prices reflect 
marginal costs:
(9) Py - Cy
where: Cy - CLy.W + C^-. r ■ marginal costs in Y.
- amount of labour required to produce a unit of Y
Cj,y - amount of capital required to produce a unit of Y.
Since both capital and labour are fully employed:
(10a) C^ x. X + n. C^q + C^y.Y - L
(10b) CKyX + n.Cj,0 + C^.Y = K
where: C^ - fixed labour inputs in sector X
Cjr0 - fixed capital inputs in sector X
Having outlined the basic model, Atkinson and Stiglitz examine the 
effects of a tax on capital employed in the monopolistic sector (X). In what
i
follows, we formally extend the model to explore the effects of a uniform tax 
on both sectors. To facilitate comparison with the original model, we adopt the 
notation and analytical procedures employed by Atkinson and Stiglitz, and
t
present the formal results in somewhat greater detail:
%
A Uniform Property Tax:
Consider first a uniform tax (denoted tj,) on the value of capital employed 
in both sectors of the economy. Thus, total tax revenue is given by:
T " lK ^ X . X + ^KY'X + n CK0^
The tax raises costs in both sectors and hence the price equations (5) and
(9) are amended to:
(5) pPx - ^lx.^  + ^KX^ f + tK^
where: tK - uniform property tax.
t
and
(9*) Py « CLy.W + Cjjy (r + tj, )
With this modification, the above system can now be solved as follows: 
Totally differentiating the demand equations (4a and b) and subtracting 
we obtain the familiar result: "
(11) X - Y v - o D(Pr PY)
A A
- - (P, -Py)
I
( v oD * 1 for the utility function is Cobb-Douglas).
A
where: (A) denotes proportionate changes e.g. X - dX
Xf
>
oD - 1 - income compensated elasticity of demand
Totally differentiating the price equations (5) and (9 ), and subtracting:
(12) Px - P Y -  ( 0 LX - eLY) ( w - r - t K)
where: 0LX = Clx.W = labour s share in the cost of producing X
Px
eLY = Cly.W = labour's share in the cost of producing Y 
Py
Substituting (12) into (11) we obtain the demand side expression for the 
tax induced relative shifts in the demand for X and Y.
(13) X - Y - - 9* (w - r - tR)
t
where: 0* - (0LX- 0LY)
Equation (13) is frequently referred to as the "output effects" of a tax. 
Totally differentiating the full employment condition (10) yields:
(14a) Xky.Y + Xkx.X + Xky.Cky + Xkx.Ckx +XKon + Xko. Cko=K = 0 ‘
A  A  A  A A  A
(14b) Xly.Y + Xlx .X + Xly. Cly + Xlx.Ckx + ^Lo.n + Xlo.Clo = L = 0
where:
Xij - Cij. 1 (i = K, L) = Fraction of input i used in the production of J. 
i
i
Solving for the Cij terms in (14) we obtain:14 
(15a) ax ■ - 8kx ox ( w- r - t k )
t
(15b) a x  = 0lx ox ( w - r - t k )  /
(15d) Cky = 8ly cy ( w - r - t K )
where Oj -  partial elasticity of substitution as defined in footnotefl 4) .
Substituting into equation (14) and subtracting:
(16) X * *  (X-Y)  = ( w - r - t K )  (axox + ayoy + aoOo) + n (Xlo-Xko)
where:
X * *  -  (Xky - Xly) - relative capital intensity of sector Y '
axOx -  X.KX -  0 i  x Cx ♦ XLX 0 /fx Cx
aycy -  XKY -  eL i  Cy ♦ ^LY 0 ky O r
aoCo - XK0 - 0LO Co + XL0 Qko. Co
Solving for n from (16) and using the fact that n -  X :
X
(17) X = ( 0 to- e:fcJ  (w -F-Tk)
Finally substituting (1^) into (17 ), and using the wage rate as the
numeraire (i.e. w = 0), we obtain:  ____
A A A A
(18) X * *  (X - Y) = ( -  r -tK) (axox + aycy + aoOo)
+ (0LO-0LX) (7.L0-A.K0) ( - ? - & )
Equation (18) embodies what might be termed the “substitution" and
i
"scale effects" of the tax. The first term on the right hand side of (18) 
describes the "substitution effects". The tax induces firms to substitute 
cheaper labour for capital, and as a result the demand for capital and gross
f
>
returns decline across all sectors of the economy.,7The second term in (18)
describes the tax induced changes in the structure of the economy i.e. the 
"scale effects". An increase in taxes on fixed capital, initially raises fixed costs 
and firms suffer losses. This leads to exit from the industry, and the 
equilibrium level of output produced by each firm increases. Thus 
concentration levels and entry barriers are raised by the tax. At the same 
time, firms attempt to substitute fixed labour inputs for taxed capital, and the 
demand for fixed capital declines. Since the tax applies uniformly to all
t
sectors of the economy this serves only to lower gross returns.
More formally, we solve the system by equating the demand side "output 
eflbcts" in (13) with the supply side expression (18):
(19) 0* ( r UK)=(axOx + axoy + aoOo) ( -  r -tK)
+ (0LO - ©lx) (Xlo - A.ko) ( - r -tK)
Rearranging (19) we obtain :
(20) f = - tK
Thus, capital bears the full Burden of a uniform property tax in an 
imperfectly competitive economy. In a sense, this result is not surprising for 
the introduction of a monopolistic sector does little to alter the basic shifting 
mechanism of the standard neoclassical model. A tax; in this framework can 
only be shifted by varying the supply of the taxed product/factor. Given the 
assumption that the supply of capital is fixed and fully employed, a uniform
tax on capital is necessarily borne by its owners. However, the model does
/
reveal that taxation increases the level of concentration in imperfectly
competitive sectors of the economy.
A Differential Property Tax :
We consider next the effect of a tax (denoted tKx) on the value of capital 
employed in the imperfectly competitive sector (X). The tax applies at equal 
rates to both fixed and variable capital in X. Thus tax revenue is given b y :
T  = tKX (Ckx X + n. Ck o )
Since the tax raises marginal costs, price equation (5) is modified to:
(5") p P x  = Clx . w  + Ckx ( r  + tKx)
With this amendment, the above system can now be solved in a manner 
analogous to that described above. The solution has been derived in detail by 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (Op. cit., p. 209-16), and hence we merely present the 
final result:
(21) r -  - laxox *  aoco) + (©lq - qlx) (Xlo - A.ko) - Qkx X * *  1 tKx
[ X * *  0* + axox + ayoy + aoOo 1
. —
The first term describes the "substitution effects", while the second and 
third terms embody the "scale" and "output" effects respectively. Consider
i
first the "substitution" effects. It is clear that these are unambiguously 
negative and hence serve to lower r. In contrast, the sign of the "scale" and 
"output" effects" depend on relative factor intensities. Consider first the "scale 
effects". These will be negative if fixed costs are capital intensive relative to
(a) variable costs (i.e. (0 lo  - 9 lx ) < 0 ), and (b) the rest of the economy (i.e.
(A.lo - A,ko) < 0 ). Turning to the "output effects", these w ill be positive if the
taxed sector is labour intensive (i.e. X** = & ky - Xu) > 0). If in addition, the 
"output effects" are greater in absolute value than the negative "scale1 and 
” substitution effects", then r rises and hence part of the tax is shifted to labour. 
Compared with the pre-tax equilibrium; the relative returns to capital will be 
higher, the number of firms lower, and hence fewer differentiated products 
w ill be produced. Since the utility function (see equation (lb ) ) embodies the 
assumption that consumers demand a variety of products, overall consumer 
welfare falls. Hence, part of the tax burden is shifted to labour (through lower 
wages) and a part to consumers (via lower utility levels). Furthermore, the 
overall level of concentration in sector X has increased.
Thus, the distinguishing feature of the postulated model lies in the 
introduction of "scale effects", and the conclusion that property taxes may 
increase the level of industrial concentration on the one hand, and decrease 
consumer welfare on the other. However, as noted by Dixit and Stiglitz (Op. 
cit.) these results depend crucially on the assumed form of the utility function. ’ 
Thus, little generality can be claimed for the conclusions. Furthermore, the 
assumption of Cournot-Nash behaviour is clearly restrictive, and serves to 
detract attention from problems of group interdependence and the 
concomitant collusive strategies which may arise. We turn now to these issues
i/
within the context of an oligopolistic market.
Oligopolistic Competition
The quintessential feature of an oligopoly is interdependence : the actions 
of individual firms in an industry are affected by the actions of their rivals. It 
is this interdependence which gives rise to the problems in modelling 
oligopolistic behaviour, and hence discerning the incidence of taxes in these 
markets. In a general sense, the solution to an oligopoly problem depends 
crucially on the assumed behavioural strategies. Thus, there is no definite 
"model of oligopoly", and perhaps as a result there has been a tendency to 
ignore tax incidence in oligopolistic markets.15 However, recent work by Katz 
and Rosen (1985) and Davidson and Martin (1985) has revealed that the 
mechanisms of tax shifting in oligopolistic markets, differ fundamentally from 
those under either monopoly or perfect competition. In what follows, we 
attempt to review this work focusing on the Davidson-Martin model, rather 
than the Katz-Rosen study which is concerned with corporation tax incidence. *
In the Davidson-Martin model, there are assumed to be two sectors in the 
economy; one perfectly competitive and the other oligopolistic. It is further , 
assumed that firm behaviour in the oligopolistic sector is governed by
i
non-Cournot tacit collusion16 in the form of output quotas.
However, it has long been recognised (see Stigler 11964], Osborne [1976]) 
that the fundamental problem in colluding to raise profits stems from the fact
f
i
that when all other firms observe the agreement, it/pays any one of them to
cheat by making secret price cuts. In essence, the problem is that of the 
familiar prisoners' dilemma in which the pay offs are such that for each player 
cheating is the "dominant strategy". Thus, the collusive agreement collapses 
and firm behaviour once more reverts back to Cournot-Nash strategies. Stigler 
(Op. cit.) argued that an agreement can only be enforced if (a) breaches can be 
detected, and (b) firms can retaliate by imposing losses on the "cheat" which 
outweigh the higher profits from cheating.17 The problem of detection has 
been debated at considerable length (see inter alia Stigler (Op. cit.), Friedman 
(1977), Spence (1978), Rees (1985) ). In the Davidson-Martin model, 
however, it is assumed that cheating can be detected costlessly. Thus, the
i
study focuses on the second problem - that of formulating an effective 
retaliatory strategy which deters cheating.
In general, retaliation is only theoretically feasible and effective if the 
oligopoly problem is defined in terms of an infinite period game - termed a 
"supergame" (see Waterson (19841 L__ Thus, consider a two-period cartel 
agreement (or game) involving three firms (or players). Let one firm (player) 
cheat in both periods. Given that one player cheats, and that the game ends in , 
the second period, no retaliation is possible in subsequent periods. Hence, the
i
best move for non-cheaters in period 2 is the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash 
strategy. However, since the play in period 2 has been decided, there can be 
no retaliation if cheating occurs in period 1. Hence the best strategy for
9
non-cheaters is once more the Cournot-Nash move:' The argument can be
extended to any finite number of periods. To obtain non-Cournot strategies, it 
becomes necessary to consider an infinite period game (i.e. a "supergame") in 
which retaliation next period is possible.
Thus the Davidson-Martin model is based upon an infinite period 
"supergame" in which the retaliatory actions of non-cheaters are of the 
Friedman (1977) "Grim Trigger" form. Specifically, it is assumed that all firms 
adhere to the cartel only if, there is no cheating. If any firm cheats, the cartel 
dissolves and each firm reverts back to the output level it produces in a 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.18
Hence, a potential cheat must compare the current higher profits of
t
cheating, with the discounted future lower profits resulting from the 
dissolution of the cartel. Formally, we express the gains/losses from cheating 
(denoted Z) as follows:
(la) z  = (n ch- n c) -  r <nc " n ”)
where: —
n ch - cheating profits 
I f  - cartel profits
n n - Nash-equilibrium profits 1
r - discount rate
The first term in (la) defines the immediate increase in profits from 
cheating. The second term is the present value /of future lower profits
resulting from the collapse of the cartel. It follows that collusion is feasible if,
for a given discount rate (r), output is at a level such that the present value of
\
the future loss of profits [r (IIC -  l l rt) ] exceeds the immediate gains from 
cheating (IIch " nc), - (i.e. no cheating occurs if Z i  0).19 Thus, setting Z - 0 and
rearranging (1 a), we can define a discount rate ro:
(lb) ro - n c - n n
i f h “ n c
and define a set:
(lc) R * ( r 6 R | r < * )
Cheating is thus unprofitable if the discount rate r 6 R (Rees [19851,).
This is termed a "balanced temptation equilibrium" and defines a situation 
where, although each firm may be tempted to defect, it pays none to do so. 
Hence, price/output may settle down at its collusive level even though firms 
are NOT explicitly colluding.
We can now define a set of feasible sustainable output levels in a cartel 
(denoted 0) as follows:
(2) n -  (Qc |z i  0, Q° 2 0 )
where: Q5 - cartel output 1
Thus, cartel prices and profits will be given by the solution to the 
optimising problem:
(3) Maximise 11°
subject to 0*6 fl
Solving (3) yields price as a function of the basic parameters of the model 
(i.e. unit costs (c) and the discount rate ( r ) ). Thus:
(4) Px - fx ( c, r)
where: c - unit costs, r « discount rate - net returns to capital.
Now, for a cost minimising firm, the rate at which future profits (losses)
are discounted is given by the net returns to capital. Consequently, the
returns to capital affects price through two channels: First through its
influence on the sustainable cartel output (0°), and in addition, as a component 
of unit costs (c). Hence, differentiating (4) with respect to r, we obtain:
(5) sLEx - dEx . d s _  ♦ dEx
dr dc ar dr
Thus, an increase in r raises costs and hence prices (i.e. £Px d£_> 0 ). At
dc dr
  —
same time, increases in r lower the present value of future losses from
defection. Hence, cartel output must be increased towards its Nash
equilibrium level to deter cheating, and prices tend to decline (i.e.
dEx < 0 ). The net effect is therefore ambiguous. > 
dr
At this point an important caveat is in order. The model assumes that 
cheating is detected costlessly. Thus it must be implicitly assumed that firms
t
know either the output of each player or the total output of the industry. In
I (
addition, information on the game and associated pay offs should be 
"complete" in the sense that forecasts of future profits are compatible.
We now consider the effects of both uniform and differential property 
taxes. More specifically, the oligopolistic sector is embedded into the Atkinson 
- Stiglitz model described in the preceeding subsection. It is assumed that 
sector Y is perfectly competitive, while sector X is oligopolistic in the sense 
defined above. Once more the utility function is given by :
(6) ' U - (1 -8) log Y + 5 log X
and the budget constraint:
(7) M - Px.X + Py.Y
The full employment condition expressed as :
(8a) Clx X + Cly Y = I
(8b) Ckx X + Cky Y = I
From equations (6) and (7) we obtain the demand functions and hence :
(9a) Py - (1 -8) M -  —
Y
(9b) Px - 8M
X
Output in sector X is obtained from the cartel( maximisation problem 
(equation (3)), and substituting for X in (9b) yields (see Davidson-Martin (Op 
cit.) p. 1218):
9
/
/o
(10) Px « n ( r n + 1 )2
(n - 1) (r n - 1) 2
where: n = number of firms
A Uniform Property Tax:
Consider first a uniform tax on all capital. In the standard neoclassical 
model a tax can only be shifted by reducing the supply of the taxed factor. 
Since factor supplies are fixed and fully employed by assumption, a uniform 
capital tax is borne entirely by its owners. This result was shown to endure 
the introduction of monopolistic competition. However, in the present model, 
the returns to capital provide an additional tax shifting mechanism. Thus, a 
uniform capital tax which lowers net returns also serves to reduce the 
inducement to cheat (by raising the present value of future losses from 
retaliation.) This permits the cartel to further restrict its output, and hence 
profits and prices rise.
More formally solving the above system in the manner described earlier 
we obtain:
(11) r - - f6* X** + axox + avov )
[axox + axoy + X** (8* + ¥ ]
where: 0* = (0 lx- 0 kx) '
X** - U k y - X l y )  
aid are as defined earlier
f
>
/
¥ = 4r n = the "discount rate effect”
( lr n]2 - 1)
It is assumed that the system is dynamically stable, and hence the 
denominator is positive. Consider the case where X is labour intensive (i.e. X**
= Xky - Xly > 0 ). This implies that the numerator is unambiguously negative 
and the tax initially lowers r. However, the reduction in r reduces the 
incentive to cheat thereby permitting the cartel to further restrict its output. 
Hence, the demand for both capital and labour declines in sector X. Since X is 
assumed to be labour intensive, the demand for labour falls relative to that of 
capital. Hence, the wage rate falls relative to the returns to capital (i.e.^ > 0 ), 
and part of the burden is shifted to labour. It is worth noting that this result 
depends crucially on the assumption that the oligopoly is labour intensive (i.e. 
X**> 0).
A. Differential Property Tax :
Consider now a partial tax on capital employed in the oligopolistic sector
 ---
(X). The solution is given b y :
r - - [QkxX** -  axoxl £kx
axOx + ayOy + X** (0* + ¥]
i
Once again consider the case where X is labour intensive (i.e. X** < 0). 
The first term is therefore positive. If in addition it is greater in absolute
t
value than the second term, then r w ill tend to increase. However, an increase
r, raises the incentive to cheat and hence cartel output must be increased to 
deter cheating. Thus, the demand for labour rises relative to that of capital 
and this serves to mitigate the increase in r and the degree of tax shifting.
More generally, the returns to capital play a dual role in this model. 
While the gross returns affect the costs of production, the net returns 
influence the ability of the cartel to restrict output below the Nash 
equilibrium. This permits firms to shift part of the burden of a general 
property tax - a result that can never arise under either monopolistic 
competition or monopoly. However, the model does appear to be incomplete 
in several important respects. Thus the conclusions depend upon the assumed 
form of the supergame, and the model ignores important informational 
problems in detecting cheating. Despite these inadequacies, the results 
suggest that group interdependence plays a crucial role in determining the 
degree of shifting in highly concentrated markets. Hence, the fact that there is 
no unique solution to the oligopoly problem would appear to provide a reason 
for further research, rather than an excuse for ignoring tax incidence under 
oligopoly on the grounds th a t" it is difficult to arrive at any decisive result" , 
(Break 1974).
i
Objections to General Equilibrium Theory :
While the introduction of market imperfections represents a useful 
extension of the standard general equilibrium framework, the models 
described so far are characteristic of the neoclassical paradigm. Thus, it is
assumed that resources are fully employed, factor markets are perfect, 
production functions are linearly homogenous and there is instantaneous price 
adjustment. It is evident that these assumptions are not intended to mirror 
reality; rather their role is that of rendering the analysis tractable. From the 
neoclassical perspective, theories are not be judged by the relevance of their 
assumptions, but the sensitivity of the conclusions to changes in the structure 
and assumptions of the model. In this and earlier sections it has been shown
i
that considerations of risk, variable factor supplies, growth and firm 
interdependence all serve to invalidate the basic neoclassical result that a 
uniform factor tax is borne by its owners. It may therefore be argued that the 
general equilibrium models are highly sensitive to minor, and not 
unreasonable modifications, and that the results are consequently misleading.
At a more fundamental level, it has been suggested that the neoclassical 
conception of "capital" as a malleable asset is invalid, thereby vitiating any 
conclusions based on these models.^ Proponents of this view include a number 
of the more resourceful and eminent theoreticians such as Kaldor (1972), 
Robinson (1953) and Sraffa (1960). Stated briefly and at the cost of 
considerable simplification their objections may be stated as follows: The
i
assumption that capital is "malleable" implies that it can be transferred 
costlessly from one form to another. Hence two crucial features of capital, its 
specificity and heterogeneity are ignored. In the present context, the central
f
question that must be confronted is whether the/existence of historically
determined heterogeneous capital goods invalidates the conclusions of the 
general equilibrium models. In part, the answer depends on whether any unit 
or scalar value can be found for aggregating and measuring heterogeneous 
capital goods. Critics of the neoclassical paradigm deny the possibility of 
deriving such a measure. Thus, for example, Robinson (Op cit.) points to a 
logical inconsistency in the conventional present value measure of capital:
“ . . .  we have to begin by taking the rate of interest as given, whereas the 
main purpose of the production function is to show how wages and the rate of 
interest. . . .  are determined". Clearly, if capital cannot be aggregated into a 
single unit then a uniform marginal product of capital: " . . .  would not merely 
be hard to find - it would not be there to be found". (Sraffa (Op cit.) It then 
follows, that if the marginal product of capital cannot be defined, the notion of 
a uniform return to capital is meaningless and hence the conclusions of 
neoclassical incidence theory would appear to be highly misleading if not
completely invalid.________________
A further implication of "malleable" capital is that expectations can never 
be disappointed. Thus, typically, "Keynesian difficulties" associated with long 
run expectations and the discrepancy between ez-ante savings and
i
investment cannot arise in the standard general equilibrium models. The 
models appear to implicitly assume perfect foresight and, as a result, there is 
no role for money, liquidity preference, "animal spirits" and other 
imperfections which mar the real world. Markets* operate to ensure that
prices and marginal products are equalised, even if the latter cannot be shown 
to exist. Clearly, once an independent investment function is introduced into 
the model, long run expectations may be disappointed, thus driving a wedge 
between demand and full employment output. Tax incidence w ill then depend 
not merely on policy induced supply-side shifts (i.e. "output" and "substitution 
effects"), but also on changes in aggregate demand.
More generally, eschewing any one of the plethora of assumptions
i
underlying the standard general equilibrium model is sufficient to preclude 
the existence, and uniqueness, of general equilibrium. Among these, the 
assumption of constant returns has recently been accorded considerable 
attention (see Worswick and Trevithick (1983) ). In the general equilibrium 
paradigm, the assumption of linearly homogenous production functions plays 
the crucial role of ensuring that the assumptions of perfect competition and 
profit maximisation remain consistent with one another (Kaldor (1974) ). 
However, once increasing returns .greJntroduced into the system the mere 
existence of competition w ill not in itself ensure the full utilisation of 
resources. Hence, the aggregate demand effects of a tax w ill once again play a 
critical role in determining tax incidence. Furthermore, exogenous shocks are
f
liable to lead to "cumulative changes" (Kaldor Op cit.), rather than convergence 
on a static equilibrium.
These criticisms would appear to suggest that an alternative theoretical
t
paradigm may be required in order to capture the/combined impact of tax
induced supply-side shifts, together with the income-expenditure effects. A 
useful, though much neglected, body of theory which partly meets these 
criticisms has been developed by Asmikopulos and Burbidge (1974) in the 
Post-Keynesian - Kaleckian tradition. The following chapter thus discusses 
property tax incidence within this framework.
f
85
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. It has seldom been recognised that in Harberger's model, the 
corporation tax is equivalent to a property tax levied on one sector 
in the economy.
2. While Mieszkowski’s analysis is largely non-technical, the issues 
are more rigorously investigated in a later study by Courant 
(1977).
3. In this case, property tax burdens are analgous to prices set in 
efficient perfectly competitive markets where resources are 
allocated in a Pareto optimal manner. It follows that tax burdens, 
like prices in perfect markets, can have no distortionary effects.
4. Thus the tax induced shifts in factor supplies w ill be similar to 
those described in the Sonsteilie (1979) model.
5. Since tax revenues are used directly to fund expenditures on state 
provision of goods and services.
6. Cost minimisation in the public sector implies that the government 
consider as their price the PRIVATE cost of capital, rather than 
some shadow price based on (say) social criteria.
7. Assuming positive cross partial derivatives.
8. However, the change in the price of capital is ambiguous since the 
demand for capital as an Inter mediate input rises, while the supply 
of capital as a final good also increases.
9. This issue is dealt with in the following sections where the nature 
of "capital" in neoclassical theory is discussed briefly.
10. This is discussed in Chapter 5, where a model is developed in 
which the hierarchical structure of production closely accords with 
empirical magnitudes.
11. It is implicitly assumed here that the standard deviation of rental 
income is negatively related to land values.
12. For alternative approaches, see Kryzaniak 0968), Diamond (1970),
Feldstein (1974a, b,). /
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13. Ballentine and Erise (1975) showed that Harberger's calculations
were incorect since he did not allow for income effects in his 
demand equation. In addition, Anderson and Ballentine (1976) 
argue that Harberger’s analysis was incomplete since he failed to 
take account of that part of a corporation tax that falls on pure 
monopoly profits.
14. We can define factor demand curves as follows:
(i) Clx  - f  (w, r  + tK)
(ii) .-. d Clx  -  M ix  + SCLX ( r  + tK )
a w  a ( r  + tK ) 4
(iii) £ lx  - d Clx  * _w 8Clx  dw + (r + tK ) 8Clx  d (r + tK)
Clx  Clx  dw w Clx  a ( r  + tK ) ( r  + tK )
or
C lx  = w _  eCLX w  + ( r  + tK) 8C lx d (r + t k )
Clx  dw Clx  a (r  + tK ) ( r  + tK )
Define the weighted partial elasticities of substitution as follows:
Ql x o x  ■ Ql x u  dCLX an d  Gk x o x  -  0 k x  r  8Clx
Clx  dw Clx  a r
Substituting in (iii)
(iv) Clx  = Gl x o x  w + Qk x o x  ( r  + tk )
Allen (1959) has shown tha t:
(v) 0LX Ox « - 0KX Ox 
Substituting into (v) yields:
(15a) Clx  -  -  8 k x o x  (w - r  - ?k )
By similar reasoning, we obtain (15b) - (15c) in the text.
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15. A notable exception, however, is Musgrave who has consistently 
stressed the importance of rivalry and interdependence (see his 
theoretical work Musgrave (1959), and pioneering econometric
— 5 study Kyrzaniak & Musgrave (1963)).
16. In what follows, it w ill be evident that the results of the model rely 
crucially on the assumed form of collusive behaviour.
17. It seems not unreasonable to suggest that in addition to these two 
conditions an enforcible agreement requires that such retaliation 
be considered credible by potential cheats.
18. It may be argued that the model is somewhat restrictive since the 
form of output retaliation is assumed, rather than derived from the 
model. Thus, for example, firms may respond to the "cheat" by 
pushing output beyond the Nash level, thereby imposing negative 
profits on the cheat. (This appears to have been the response of ’ 
the established national airlines to Laker Airways' cheap flights to 
the USA).
19. In essence, this is a dynamic problem cast in static terms, for not 
only do we define whether Z> 0 (i.e. whether cheating is 
profitable), but also the time period over which Z> 0 is at a 
maximum (assuming appropriate values for r which ensure that 
Z> 0 for some finite period).
20. The standard public finance text books make no reference to this 
literature (see for instance Musgrave and Musgrave (1978), Brown 
and Jackson (1980). In Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) Post- 
Keynesian incidence analysis is relegated to a mere footnote on 
Page 222.
9
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CHAPTER THREE 
POST-KEYNESIAN TAX INCIDENCE THEORY
The Post-Keynesian approach to tax incidence is based on a theoretical
paradigm which difers fundamentally from its neoclassical counterpart. While
there is no formal unified "Post-Keynesian Theory", exponents of this school
share certain common propositions developed from the work of Keynes and
Kalecki. In a sense, the distinguishing feature of Post-Keynesian analysis lies
/
in the emphasis given to particular aspects of the General Theory and the 
rejection of certain features of the prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy.
Perhaps central to the Post-Keynesian vision, is the notion that the 
General Theory represents a radical departure from the neoclassical paradigm. 
Accordingly, the "neoclassical synthesis" of Keynes is viewed as a reassertion 
of the Walrasian general equilibrium framework, with the addition of some 
"Keynesian" macro variables. For Post-Keynesians, the "neoclassical synthesis", 
eschews the essential logic of the General Theory, while retaining some of its 
specific policy recommendations. The framework is thus inextricably linked to 
Keynes, and its origins lie in the controversies surrounding the interpretation 
of the General Theory. Hence, this chapter begins with a brief discussion of 
the various elements of the General Theory which distinguish the 
Post-Keynesian approach from the "neoclassical synthesis". To begin with 
Keynes, however, is not symptomatic of the ritualistic genuflexion to the 
General Theory. It is instead, a reflection of the Post-Keynesian view that
89
Keynes' ideas remain poignant and relevant today, even if not universally 
accepted.
3.1 "Chapter 12 Keynesians"
Economic activities are, as a rule, directed towards the future. This is 
obviously true for durable goods and financial instruments of long maturity. 
It is equally important for perishable goods, for production and consumption 
may be differed from one period to the next. It therefore follows that it is 
impossible to describe or explain the state of the economy today, unless we 
can do so for all future time. Within the confines of Walrasian general 
equilibrium, this difficulty is circumvented by assuming that there exists 
intertemporal and contingent future markets for all commodities. Thus, for 
example, goods to be produced for future delivery w ill be sold in contingent 
future markets, and inputs purchased from the proceeds of the sale. Similarly, 
savers sell their claims for the purchase of commodities to be delivered in the 
future. The existence of future markets therefore serves to collapse the future 
into the present, and as a result expectational errors are ruled out by 
assumption. This scenario may be attacked on grounds of realism and 
relevance (see Walsh and Gram [1979]). However, as noted by Arrow [1981], 
there are more fundamental theoretical reasons which preclude the existence 
of future markets. First, it has been shown that if information is imperfect, 
Arrow-Debreu future markets cannot exist. Second, if exchange is costly, it 
w ill no longer be profitable to operate such markets.
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Accordingly, Post-Keynesians forcefully reject the Arrow-Debreu general 
equilibrium system, and attempt to meet the problem by analysing the future 
in irreversible "historical time"1 The essential feature of an economy that 
functions in historical time is that the past is given and cannot be changed, 
while the future remains unknown and uncertain. Post-Keynesians insist that 
"historical time" and uncertainty are central to both the real world, and the 
General Theory. Though doctrinal matters are not the concern of this chapter, 
we note that exponents of the "neoclassical synthesis" have regarded them as 
peripheral.
If the future is unknown and uncertain, it follows that agents must form 
expectations. Post-Keynesians emphasise the essential heterogeneity of long 
run expectations. In both Chapter 12 of the General Theory, and his 1937 
article, Keynes argued that long-term expectations are formed not merely in 
the context of risk to which a probability can be assigned, but also in uncertain 
circumstances for which there i s" . . .  no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever". (Keynes 1937).
Post-Keynesians have extended and developed Keynes' views on 
uncertainty (see Shackle [1968] ). Thus in Davidson's [1978] parlance, 
uncertainty stems from the fact that economic decisions are "crucial" in nature. 
A "crucial decision" is defined as one where the very choice of a course of 
action may alter the existing circumstances in a manner which makes it 
impossible to restore the original situation. Thus, each decision is in a sense
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unique, since repetition is by definition impossible. This implies that 
frequency ratios of possible outcomes cannot be defined, and numerical 
probability statements assigned to future events are essentially meaningless.
Since uncertainties cannot be reduced to probability statements, agents 
must resort to alternative sources of guidance. Keynes argued that past 
experience,2 the state of confidence, and general opinion, play an important 
role in determining expectations:
"We assume that the present is a much more servicabie guide to the 
future ... (and) we endeavour to fail back on the judgement of the rest of the 
world which is perhaps better informed". (Keynes [1937] ). Expectations 
based on such fickle foundations w ill clearly be subject to sudden and violent 
fluctuations.
It is perhaps worth emphasising that expectations thus formed are not 
necessarily irrational, in the sense of being based on a subset of all available 
information. For Keynes, "rational" calculating action is severely limited by 
uncertainty, i.e. the information required to form probability statements 
simply do not exist3
Time and uncertainty introduce further complications in the 
Post-Keynesian paradigm. In a world of historical uncertainty, transactions 
neither occur instantaneously nor simultaneously: individuals who sell goods 
hold money for some period of time before purchasing other commodities. 
Thus, both uncertainty, and the lack of synchronisation between receipts and
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payments give rise to a demand for liquidity and money. Consider, for 
example, the production process in historical time. The time consuming nature 
of production implies that factor inputs must be hired and paid before the sale 
of the finished product. Firms therefore require liquidity in order to discharge 
their contractual obligations and hence they hold money which serves as a 
"link between the present and the future". (Keynes [1936]).
In contrast, a neoclassical world of perfect certainty with Arrow-Debreu 
future markets, means that ail future prices are known. A decision to sell 
involves a concomitant purchase, and hence all goods are in a sense perfectly 
liquid. Money therefore loses its special status as a stored of value and 
"temporary abode for purchasing power".
Time and liquidity further permit Keynes to define an "underemployment 
equilibrium" - a seemingly contradictory concept in the classical paradigm. 
Consider a reduction in investment resulting from an exogenous shift in 
expectations. The lower level of investment implies that agents postpone 
current expenditure and move into liquid assets. The reduction in the demand 
for investment goods lowers output and employment, while the increased 
demand for liquid assets raises their price. However, since liquid assets such 
as money are not "produced" by labour (i.e. they have a zero elasticity of 
production), unemployed workers cannot be re-employed in the production of 
liquidity. Keynes further assumed that the elasticity of substitution between 
liquid assets and real producable goods is zero. Consequently, an increase in
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the price of liquid assets does not divert demand back to the real sector, and 
unemployment persists. Hence, we observe that:
“Unemployment develops, that is to say, because people want the moon; - 
men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e. money) is something 
which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be readily 
choked off". (Keynes [1936]).
Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that equilibrium as defined by Keynes 
and the Post-Keynesians merely denotes a state in which the prevailing price 
is such that agents neither have the incentive nor the power to alter their 
market offers. In contrast, neoclassical theory adopts a rather more 
restrictive definition of equilibrium - i.e. that markets clear and hence 
demand and supply are equalised at the prevailing price. Clearly, the 
Post-Keynesian definition is more general in the sense that market clearing is 
a sufficient but not necessary condition for Post-Keynesian equilibrium. Thus 
conceptualised, disequilibrium in the Post-Keynesian framework occurs if 
agents' expectations are falsified, and there is a desire to alter market offers 
together with the power to effect such change.4
3.2 Post-Keynesian Tax Incidence Theory
The Post-Keynesian Theory of tax incidence has its genesis in Kalecki s 
[1937], much neglected, pioneering study on the impact of commodity, profit 
and capital taxes. Kalecki's analysis has recently been extended and restated
94
in contemporary Keynesian nomenclature by Eatwell [1971] and Asimakopulos 
and Burbridge [1974] (A-B hereafter). The A-B model was applied to a study 
of property tax incidence by Mair [1985], and in what follows, we describe the 
A-B model and Mair's extension in some detail. It is shown that Mair's 
conclusions are either erroneous or incompatible with the fundamental tenets 
of Keynesian economics. In the following section we therefore propose an 
amendment to the model, and provide a test of its MKaleckian“ nature by 
comparing the results to Kalecki's (Op cit.) conclusions.
Post-Keynesian incidence analysis is based on a theory of distribution 
that combines both microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of the 
economy. Income shares are determined partly by the level of effective 
demand, and in part by the degree of monopoly enjoyed by firms. Moreover, 
the analysis focuses on the short run equilibrium distribution of income, for it 
is argued that the "long run is but a slowly changing component of a chain of 
short period situations : it has no independent entity". (Kalecki [1971] ). 
Investment in any short period is thus assumed to be exogenously fixed, being 
determined by decisions taken in earlier time periods. Income distribution 
and tax incidence are therefore determined by the Keynesian equilibrium 
condition that desired savings be equal to the exogenously given level of 
investment.
More specifically, the A-B model distinguishes three groups in the 
economy on the basis of the source of their incomes, and their savings
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behaviour. There are assumed to be a category of agents termed "workers" 
who receive only earned wage income and undertake no net saving. In 
addition, production is undertaken by "firms" who earn profits and retain a
proportion of the net profits (1 - (3) as savings. Finally a group of "rentiers" 
receive a fraction (p) of firms net profits by virtue of their share holdings, 
and save a proportion (sr) of their net-income. The assumed form of saving 
behaviour thus reflects the organisation of capitalist production, where control 
and ownership of the means of production is vested in fewer hands than those - 
who engage in production. The critical assumption is not the absence of 
workers saving, but the difference in saving propensities out of wages and 
profit income.5
Output and Production :
For expository convenience, A-B assume that output consists of a single 
multi-purpose good which can either be consumed, invested, or used by the 
government. The output is produced in plants in which labour is the only 
variable factor input. Moreover, costs are assumed to be constant over a 
substantial range of output, and then to rise sharply beyond a certain normal’ 
level of capacity. With these assumptions average output per man w ill be 
constant up to normal capacity utilisation, and hence total output may be 
expressed as -
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0 = a L ; L < L  
0 - Total Output 
a « Average output per man 
L « Level of employment
L = Level of employment at "normal capacity".
Pricing and Market Structure:
A-B develop two versions of their model. In the first, markets are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive, and hence the mark-up over unit costs is 
determined by the market price which equates demand to capacity output.
Thus, by implication, under perfect competition, price flexibility ensures that
resources are fully employed.
In the second version, markets are assumed to be oligopolistic, and price 
is set by leaders who adopt some fixed mark-up over their costs. The 
mark-up chosen by price leaders is assumed to cover both overhead costs and 
profits. Its precise value would thus be dependent on the standard or 
"normal" rate of capacity utilisation used to calculate costs, as well as the rate 
of return which is considered "normal" in the particular sector of the economy. 
The "normal" rate of return in Kalecki's approach is "rooted in past economic, 
social and technological developments". (Kalecki [1968] ). Thus, industries
(1)
where:
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which enjoy a high degree of monopoly will, on average, earn higher "normal" 
rates of profit.
More formally the price equation is given by:
(2) P - (1 + JI) w
a
where: P - Factor-cost price of output
X - Mark-up 
w = Money wage rate
There are thus three elements in the determination of the price level, the
mark-up U), average output per man (a), and the money wage rate (w). In
what follows, the money wage is assumed to be fixed, being determined by 
contracts negotiated at the beginning of the period under consideration. In 
the competitive version of the model, the mark-up, prices and hence real 
wages are assumed to be variable, while output and employment are fixed at 
their full employment levels; In contrast, under oligopoly, prices and the 
mark-up are fixed by price leaders, and output is permited to vary.
A-B's attempt to allow for the interdependence of firms' pricing 
decisions is commendable, and represents a useful development over the 
neoclassical flex price approach. At a technical level, the assumption that 
prices are fixed by leaders, merely serves as a device for introducing into the 
model quantity rather than price adjustments. Theoretically, however, it may
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be argued that this is much too simplified a presentation of the forces 
determining prices in oligopolistic markets. Price leadership, it w ill be 
recalled, is one of several possible solutions to the oligopoly problem. In the 
absence of explicit collusion, rigid prices may be generated for a variety of 
reasons. Theoretically, price leadership thus appears to be a somewhat 
restrictive and limiting assumption which may, in addition, be criticised on 
grounds of its empirical relevance.
Firm interdependence raises further problems of aggregation. The A-B 
theory of distribution is concerned with aggregates i.e. total output, savings, 
etc. The analysis thus proceeds at a high level of aggregation which is far 
removed from the actions of individual firms. Aggregation, though a powerful 
simplifying device, is only valid if members within an aggregate display more 
similarity than differences, (see Chick [1983] ), and Weintraub [1979] ). In 
the present model, problems arise from potential rivalry between firms, for 
clearly the behaviour of the aggregate w ill depend on the manner in which the 
conflicts are resolved. In order to aggregate across firms, it therefore becomes 
necessary to assume that differences between sectors (such as investment and 
consumer goods producers) are minor, and that all firms have similar 
objectives and respond in a similar way to the same stimulus. By implication, 
the central features of oligopoly such as product variations, advertising costs, 
price differences, etc. must therefore be ignored.
99
Aggregate Equilibrium Relations :
The market price of the multipurpose good can be obtained from its 
factor-cost price (i.e. equation 2) by adjusting for the tax on consumption :
(3) P1 - (1 + t c ) P
where: P* - market price of the mult purpose good
tc« tax on output used for consumption
From the expenditure side of the national accounts, output (or real
/
income) may be defined as:
(4) 0 - C + I + G + U
where: C - consumption in real terms
I - investment in real terms (assumed fixed)
G « government expenditure in real terms 
U s unintended inventory accumulation/decumulation 
Expressed in nominal values, we have:
(5) y  -  p ' c + p i  + p g  + p u
where: Y - nominal income
From the income side, nominal output (income) is given by:
(6) Y - wL + n + t c P O P D
where: n - gross profits in nominal terms
D » depreciation in real terms 
Combining equations (1) - (6), we obtain an equation relating the
mark-up to employment and profits:
(7) X_ a.L = JL+ D 
P
Rearranging equation (7) and differentiating partially, we find that 
8P/8II > 0 and 8L/8n > 0. Thus we note that an increase in profits is either 
accompanied by an increase in prices (in the competitive version), or an 
increase in employment (in the oligopolistic version). /
Finally, there is assumed to be a wage tax, a profits tax, a consumption 
tax, and a property tax in the system. The property tax is levied at a uniform
rate on the value of domestic property owned by workers and rentiers
(denoted Vw and V , respectively), and the value of all fixed assets owned by 
firms (denoted K). Thus, total tax revenue is given by :
(8) T = tw.wL ♦ tj.II + tr (1 - tj) pn -^ PC + tp (K+ Vr + Vw)
where: tw = Tax on wage incomes
tj = Tax on profits
tr = Tax on rentiers incomes
P - Proportion of after-tax profits paid to rentiers 
tp = Property Tax
K = Value of fixed assets owned by firms 
Vr = Value of property owned by rentiers 
Vw = Value of property owned by workers
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To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the budget is balanced :
(9) T - PG
By definition, gross private saving must be equal to the value of
investment and the government deficit:
(10) S - P i + PG + P U - P D - T
The analysis focuses on situations of short run equilibrium in which 
ex-ante savings and investment are equal. Thus P U: (i.e. unintended 
inventory accumulation) is zero, and from equation (9) we know that the 
budget is balanced. Hence in short-period equilibrium, desired savings equal 
net investment:
(11) S = P i - PD
Both the distribution of income and its level are determined by this 
equilibrium condition. Consider, for example, an increase in property taxes; 
disposable income initially falls, and this alters spending flows and hence 
savings. The equilibrium level of savings in equation (11) may either be 
restored by (a) an increase in output, the distributive composition of income 
being constant, or (b) a redistribution of income between differential saving 
groups, such that the required equilibrium volume of saving is attained. In 
practice, the tax will induce a combination of the two effects - the relative 
emphasis of each being dependent on the level of capacity utilisation. Clearly, 
where resources are fully employed (as in the competitive case) the 
redistributive effects dominate the adjustment process.
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However, we have assumed that the government budget is balanced. 
Hence, in the absence of compensating reductions in other taxes, a property 
tax increase will be accompanied by an increase in government expenditure. 
It will be recalled, that in Keynesian income-expenditure analysis, balanced 
tax and government expenditure increases, raise, aggregate demand, and 
hence employment and output, or prices. The fiscal expansion derives from 
the transfer of income from net savers in the private sector (who pay taxes 
partly out of savings), to the government which spends all the revenue raised 
through taxes. The increase in government expenditure therefore exceeds the 
reduction in private consumption and aggregate demand rises.
In striking contrast, Mair (Op cit.) in his extension of the A-B model 
argues that balanced property tax and government expenditure increases 
have no effect on either employment, output or profits. This peculiar 
conclusion seems difficult to explain in a Keynesian model of an employment 
equilibrium. Hence, in what follows, we attempt to locate the source of this 
anomalous result. There are, however, a number of difficulties in identifying 
the error in Mair's analysis. The formal structure of the extended A-B model 
receives scant attention and there is no discussion of either the property tax 
shifting mechanisms or the economic implications of this aberrant conclusion. 
Much of the discussion is concerned with institutional features, and the article 
merely presents three equations which appear to be based on a number of 
unsubstantiated assumptions. The paucity of formal anlysis is somewhat
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regrettable since it obscures the contradictions implicit in the postulated 
equations. Hence in the remainder of this section, we explicate the model and 
results in some detail, emphasising the theoretical inconsistencies implicit in 
the analysis
The short-period distribution of income is determined by the equilibrium 
condition that desired saving be equal to the exogenously fixed level of net 
investment. Hence, the tax induced changes in income distribution depend 
crucially on the variation in consumption and saving necessary to restore this 
equilibrium condition. Mair (Op cit.) defines, without explanation, rentiers 
consumption as follows:
(12) Cr - (1 - Sr) (1 - tr) (1 - tj) JJ1 -  tpVr
P(l+tc)
where: Sr * rentiers propensity to save
p - proportion of after-tax profits paid to rentiers 
From equation (12) we can infer rentiers after-tax income:
(13) Yf - (1 - tr) (1 - tj) _£n_ -  tpVr
P (1 + tc)
subtracting (12) from (13), rentiers net savings are given by :
(14) 5 r( l - tr) (1 - tj) fin
P ( l t t c )
There are, however, two unsubstantiated assumptions implicit in the 
consumption function which appear to contradict the fundamental postulates
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of Keynesian and Kaieckian theory. First, it will be noted from equation (12) 
that the tax on rentiers property (i.e. tp Vr) is treated as a (negative) 
component of autonomous consumption. The property tax burden is thus met 
entirely out of consumption expenditures, leaving net rentier savings 
(equation [14]) unaffected. This contrasts with the conventional treatment of 
taxation in income-expenditure models where taxes are paid out of income 
prior to its distribution between consumption expenditures and savings. 
Hence, the tax burden is apportioned between consumption and savings in 
proportion to the propensities to consume and save. Consequently, balanced 
tax and government expenditure increases, augment aggregate demand, 
raising employment and output. In contrast, Mair's peculiar formulation of 
the consumption function implies that the reduction in rentiers' expenditure is 
exactly counterbalanced by higher government spending, and hence aggregate 
demand and output are unaffected.
Furthermore, the consumption function embodies two mutually 
contradictory behavioural assumptions. Thus, while taxes on rentiers' incomes 
are partially absorbed by savings, property taxes are paid wholly out of 
consumption expenditures. Hence, income taxes in Mair's model induce 
Keynesian behaviour in the sense that taxes are apportioned between 
consumption expenditures and savings, while property taxes induce 
neoclassical behaviour based on a simple two-period consumption-saving 
model (see Samuelson [1958] ) where individuals save a given amount for
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future consumption.6 It therefore appears reasonable to suggest that Mair's 
consumption function is theoretically inconsistent embodying two 
diametrically opposed theories of consumer behaviour.
It will be recalled that firms in the model pay both profits and property 
taxes. However, equations (12) and (13) reveal that while profit taxes are 
apportioned between retained and distributed profits (i.e. rentiers incomes), 
firms property tax payments have no effect on distributed profits By default, 
this therefore implies that non-domestic property taxes are either (a) paid 
entirely out of retained profits, or (b) that taxable distributed profits (i.e. n/P) 
in equations (12) and (13) are implicitly defined net of of firms property tax 
payments and that the marginal rate of profits tax is unity (i.e. tj = 1).
If non-domestic property taxes are paid entirely out of retained profits, it
follows that the property tax is equivalent in its impact to a tax on retentions,
and net retained profits may then be defined as:
(13a) ( [1 - p] [1 - tj) _n_) - tPK
P
where: [ 1 - p] = proportion of profits retained.
On the other hand, if profits in equation (12) are implicitly defined to 
include firms property tax payments and the marginal rate of profits tax is 
unity, it follows that increases in non-domestic property taxes lower taxable 
gross profits and hence the profits tax liability^ by an amount equal to the
10b
property tax levy. Thus, non-domestic property taxes are fully integrated into
the profits tax schedule. More formally, le t j l1 denote real gross profits
P
PRIOR to property tax payments (i.e. as conventionally defined), and let n
P
be "gross” taxable profits AFTER property tax payments. Then, it follows that:
H  = ( n 1 -  tpK )
P P
and hence firms total tax liability is given by:
tj ( JL ) = t j ( _ n M p K ) .
P P
That is, non-domestic property taxes are fully integrated into the profits 
tax schedule. If we further assume that the marginal profits tax rate is unity, 
it follows that an increase in non-domestic property taxes will lead to a 
corresponding and equivalent decrease in the profits tax liability. Net 
retained profits may then be defined as:
(1 - p) (1 - tj) (H 1 -  tPK)
P
or equivalently
(15b) (1 -p ) (1 - t j ) H
P
It is perhaps worth noting that this peculiar definition of "gross" taxable 
profits contradicts both accounting practice and economic convention.7 
However, the consumption function reveals that non-domestic property taxes
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have no effect on distributed profits, and this necessarily implies that
property taxes are either paid out of retained profits, or directly lowers firms
profit tax payments.8
Where property taxes are paid wholly out of retained profits, total
private savings may be obtained by combining equations (14) and (15a):
(16a) Si - ([1 -p ] [1 - tj] J L - t p K )  + ( Sr [1 - tr] 11 - tj] HU )
P P
= 11 - t j ]  n  (11 -p ] + S r l l  - t r ip )  - tpK 
p
Alternatively, with full integration combining equations (14) and (15b), 
total private savings are given by :
(16b) S, -  ([1 -p ] [ n1 -  tpK ] [1 - t j ] ) + ( p Sr [ 1 - t r i l l  - tj] [ n1 -  tpK ])
p p
■= t l  - tj] [J I1 - tpK] ( [1 -p ] + pS r[ l - tr] )
P
In equilibrium, savings and investment are equal, hence substituting 
equations (16a and b) respectively for S in equilibrium relation (11), we 
obtain:
(17a) S - [1 - tj] J l ( [1 - p] + Sr [1 - tr] p ) - t PK - I - D
P
and
(17b) S = 11 - t j ]  I n 1 - tpK] ( [1 -p l  + S r l l - t r ip  ) = I - D
p
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The equilibrium tax induced changes in income distribution can be
inferred from equation (17). Thus, if a tax initially lowers either retained
profits or rentier savings, gross profits must increase to restore the
equilibrium level of savings. From equation (7), this implies that either output
and employment, or prices rise. In the competitive version of the model,
prices are flexible and employment is fixed, hence prices rise. In the
oligopolistic version, on the other hand, the mark-up is constant, and hence
employment increases.
Consider the case where an increase in any one tax is accompanied by
higher government expenditure, the other taxes being held constant.
Following A-B, we assume for computational ease that the distributional
impact of government spending can be ignored. We consider first the case
where non-domestic property taxes are paid out of retained profits.
Rearranging equation (17a) we define equilibrium gross profits (i.e. n ) as
P
follows :
(18) J J -   I - D + toK _________
P [1 - til ( [1 -p ] + Sr [1 - tr ip  )
The impact of various taxes on equilibrium gross profits can be inferred
from the sign of the partial derivative of H with respect to the tax under
P
consideration. Thus it can be seen that:
(18a) a(n/P) > 0
d tj
(18b) a (it/ p ) > 0
a tr
109
(18c) a (n/P) > o
d tp
(l8d) e(n/P) = o
d tc
(18e) a fn/P) -  o
d tw
Furthermore, from equation (7) we observe that an increase in gross 
profits raises prices in the competitive version, and employment in the 
oligopolistic model. Table 3.1 overleaf presents Mair's results for the 
non-competitive version. It will be noted that an increase in property taxes 
(row 5) has no effect on either gross real profits, or employment. In contrast, 
the partial derivative in equation (18c) is positive, implying that gross profits 
are higher, and hence either employment or prices increase. We therefore 
conclude that Mair's saving function does not embody the assumption that 
non-domestic property taxes are paid entirely out of retained profits. It 
would seem worth noting that it is algebraically impossible to derive
equilibrium net profits from equation (17a) (i.e. [1 - tj] H-tpK ). This therefore
f
further reinforces our conclusion that non-domestic property taxes in Mair’s 
model cannot be paid wholly out of retained profits.
TBBLE 5.1 
NON COMPETITIUE UERSION
Change in
Employment
After Tok Rentiers Post Tow end
Profits Profits Consumption Wage Rate Output
1. Atj > 0 0 + 0
Atiu ■ Atr = Atc“ 0
2. At j  > 0 O O O
Atj  *  Atr *  0
3. Atr > 0 + +
Atj  ■ Ate “Atm ■ 0
4. Ate > 0 0 0
Atj *  Atr “Atm - 0
5. Atp > 0 0 0
Atj *  Atr “Atm
- Ate “ 0
Source : Mafir (Op. c it .  pg.126)
Rows 1-4 ca lcu la ted  by R-B, Row 5 ca lcu la ted  by M a ir
We consider next the equilibrium saving function in equation (17b) which 
assumes that non-domestic property taxes are fully integrated into the profits 
tax schedule and the marginal profits tax rate is unity. Equilibrium taxable
“gross" profits (i.e. _n = [_n- -tpK] ) can be obtained by rearranging equation 
P p
(18b) as follows:
(20) n =  [H1 - tpK] - 7 - D_________
P P [1 - tj] ([1 - p ]  + p S r [ l  - tr] )
From equation (20) we obtain the following partial derivatives:
8 (nVP - toK) > 0 
atj 
a (nVP - toK ) > o
d tr
a (n1 /p  - toK ) = o
dtp
a (n1 /p  - toK ) = o
d  tc
a (n1 /p  - toK ) = o
d tv
From equation (20c) it will be observed that balanced property tai and 
government expenditure increases have no impact on "gross" taxable profits
(20a)
(20b)
(20c)
(20d)
(20e)
and hence our results accord with Mair's conclusions, (see Table 3.1, row 3). 
Rearranging equation (17b) we further define equilibrium net profits
(i.e. [1 - tj] Ln'-tpK] ) as follows:
P
(21) ZNn = [l - tjl Ln1 - tpK] ) = I -D________
P ( [1 -p ] + p [ 1 - tr] Sr )
Hence it can be seen that:
8ZnIL = 0 
atj
azNn > o
atr
azMi = o
dtp
azNn = o 
a tw
azNn = o
ate
Once more the results accord with Mair's conclusions (see Table 3.1 row
Rearranging (17b), we further define equilibrium net rentier income as 
follows:
yr - [ i  - tj] Ln1 - tpK] p [ i  - tr] - 7 - r i - i i  - p i n  - n in /p - t n K  
P Sr
Consumption is a fraction [1 - Sr] of net income, minus rentiers property 
tax burden. Hence:
(21a) 
(21b) 
(21c) 
(21 d) 
(21e)
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(22) CR = ( T - D - [1 - ()] [1 - tj] [ H-tpK] ) ( [1 - Sr] ) - tpVr
Pff-tj Sr
It follows that:
(22a) aCr = azNn aCr = o
atj atj azNn
From (22) we observe that aCr /  dZNlI < 0, and from (21a) we know that 
bZNfl /  btj - 0. Hence equation (22a) is zero. Similarly:
(22b) aCr = azNn aCr < o
dtr dtr dZNn
From equation (21b) we know that dZNlI/dtr > 0, and from (22)
aCr/ dZNn < 0, hence the overall expression in (22b) is negative. Next we
define:
(22c) aCr = azNn aCr + aCr < o
dtp dtp dZNn dtp
From equation (21c) we observe that dZNn =0. and hence the first term
dtp
in (22c) is zero. However, from equation (22) we know that aCr < 0, and
dtp
hence equation (22c) is negative. Finally, we note that:
(22d) aCr = 0
atv
and
(22e) dCr = 0
ate
The signs of the partial derivatives are thus congruent with Mair’s
conclusions.
Consider next the equilibrium change in real wages. It will be recalled 
that workers consume all their after-tax incomes. We therefore derive the 
equilibrium real wage as follows:
From equation (6) we have:
(6a) I  - wL + n + D + tcC 
p p p
(6b) n*= i  ~ vL - D - tc c
p p p
From equation (20) we know that equilibrium profits are:
(20) n = I —_D_________
P ( [1 - tj] ( [1 - P ] + P Sr [1 - tr] )
Eliminating H  and rearranging:
P
(23) xL = J. -  D - tc C - 
P P
I - JP>
[1 - tj] ([1 - p ] +'P S r[ l  - tr] )
Now define equilibrium workers consumption as:
(24) Cw rfjuL (1 - twj- tpVv] -  3L- D - tcC - 
l t  ' P
I -  D
[1 - tj] ([1 - p ]  + p S r [ l  - tr] 
f.[ 1 - tv] - tpVwJ
It will be recalled that nominal wages are fixed in the model. 
Consequently real wages and hence workers consumption can only be varied
either by direct taxation, or through changes in the price level. We present 
below the results for the non-competitive version where prices are assumed 
to be fixed. Thus:
(24a) dCw = d P aCv = 0 (Since dP = 0 under oligopoly)
dtj dtj dP dtj
(24b) dCw = dP dCw = 0 (Since dP = 0 under oligopoly)
dtr dtr dP dtj
(24c) dCv * dP dCw 4 - dCw < 0 (Since dCv < 0 in (24)}
dtp dtp dP dtp dtp
(24d) dCw < 0
dtv
(24e) dCv < 0
dtc
These results accord with Mair's conclusions in Table 3.1.
We have thus shown by contradiction and verification that Mair's results 
are based on the implicit and unsubstantiated assumptions that rentiers pay 
property taxes entirely out of consumption expenditures and that
non-domestic property taxes are fully integrated into the profits tax schedule. 
These combine to ensure that balanced increases in property taxes and 
government expenditure have no effect on aggregate demand, and hence 
employment and output are unaffected. Specifically, since domestic property 
taxes are absorbed wholly by consumption expenditures, the decline in
private sector spending is exactly counterbalanced by government 
expenditures. Furthermore, since non-domestic property taxes are integrated 
into the profits tax schedule, increase in the former are automatically offset by 
a lower profits tax burden. Hence, aggregate demand is unaffected and 
the short period incidence of the property tax (Table 3.1. row 5) is equivalent 
 to the incidence of the tax on the consumption good (Table 3.1, row 4)".
Mair (Op cit.). Mair’s results are thus broadly analogous to those of the partial
/
equilibrium framework (see Section 2.2). This is not surprising, for the 
combination of theoretically incompatible assumptions embodied in the 
consumption function serve to neutralise demand effects. In the following 
section we therefore amend Mair’s model, and provide a test of its "Post 
Keynesian" nature by comparing the results with Kalecki’s [1937] study 
entitled "A Theory of Commodity, Income and Capital Taxation".
3.3 The Amended Model:
In this section, we eschew the theoretically inconsistent assumptions 
embodied in Mair’s model, and reintroduce "Keynesian" features into the 
consumption and profit functions. Thus, following Keynes [1936] we assume 
that consumption is a function of current net income, and hence taxes are 
absorbed partly by savings and in part by consumption expenditure. 
Analogously, we assume that non-domestic taxes are paid out of gross profits 
(conventionally defined) PRIOR to its division between retentions and
1 10
distributions. Thus, taxes are shared between rentiers and firms in proportion 
to the fraction (p) of profits which are distributed. Total net profits can 
therefore be defined as :
(23) ZNII = [1 - tj] J L -  tpK
P
Thus non-domestic property taxes are not accorded tax allowance status, 
and net profits are given by:
(26) [1 - p] ([1 - t j ]  J L -  tPK)
P
Subtracting (26) from (25) we obtain net distributed profits (or gross 
rentier incomes.):
(27) p ( [1 - tj] J L -  tPK )
P
Net rentier incomes (Yr) and savings (Sr) may therefore be defined as:
(28) Yr - [1 - tr] (11 - tj] J J L  -  P tpK ) - tpVr
P
and
(29) Sr -*<[1 - t r l d l  - t i l  _EJL -  p tp K )-  tpVr)
P
In short-period equilibrium aggregate savings and investment are equal. 
Hence, combining (26) and (29) we define equilibrium as:
(30) S - ( [1 - t j ]  JL- tpK) ([1 -p] + Srp[l  ■ tr] ) - Sr tpVr = I - D
P
Rearranging (30) equilibrium gross profits (n) are given by:
P
(31) 11 *  I - D + Sr toVr_________  + toK
P (11 - t j ]  ([1 -p ] + Sr p [1 - t r ]  ) [1 - tj]
and it follows from (31) that:
(31a) a (n/P) > 0
a tj
(31b) a(n/P) > 0
a tr
(31c) a (n/P) > o
a tp
(3 id) a(n/P) = o
a tw
(31 e) a (n/P) = 0
a tc
Thus from (31c) it can be seen that balanced property tax and 
government expenditure increases raise gross profits, and hence in the 
competitive case prices rise, while under oligopoly output and employment 
increase.
Analogously, we define equilibrium net profits from (31):
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(32) ZNll = 11 - t j ]  LH -tpK) ) -  1 -D+SrtoVr
P ( [1 - p] + Sr p [1 - tr] )
and it follows that:
(32a) azNn = o
atj
(32b) aznlL > 0
d tr
(32c) azNn > o
a tp
(32d) azNn = o
a tw
C32e) dZNTL = 0
a tc
Following the procedure outlined earlier, equilibrium net rentiers
consumption is given by:
(33) Cr *  [1 - Sr] ( It - tjl EL - tpK ) p l i - t r l  -  tpVf )
P
= ( I -  D [1 - p]([1 - t j ] .
y  n - tpK H - Sr]
<-P[ l - tc]  J Sr
and hence:
(33a) aCr = azNn aCr = 0
atj atj aznn
(33b) aCi - azNn aCr < o
atr atr azNn
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(33c) aCr -  a z jjiL  «Cr < o
atp atp aznn
(33d) aCr
atv
o
(33e)
ate
Finally, equilibrium workers consumption is given by:
(34) Cv - wL [1 - tv] - tpVv; -f  D - tcC - 
P c p
1 -  D + toVrSr
J1 - tj] ([1 -p ] + S rP [l - tr] .
* tpK (  [ 1 - tv] - tpVr
[1 - t j ]J
Hence in the non competitive case we find that:
(34a) aCv « aP dCv = 0 (Since aP - 0 under oligopoly) 
atj atj aP atj
(34b) aCv - dP aCv - 0 (Since 0 under oligopoly) 
atr atr aP atr
(34c) aCv ■ aP aCv + aCv < 0 (Since aCv < 0 in (24)
atp atp aP atp atp
(34d) aCv < 0
atv
(24e) dCv < 0
ate
The results for the competitive and oligopolistic versions are summarised
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in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below. Contrary to Mair’s conclusions, in the present 
model balance property and government expenditure increases augment 
aggregate demand, raising employment and output, or prices. Specifically, 
property taxes initially lower retained profits and rentiers savings. With 
investment exogenously given, equilibrium can only be restored by increasing 
savings, via a rise in profits. However, since rentiers consumption falls 
(i.e. aCr < 0 see equation (33c), and the propensity to save (Sr) is constant,
dtp
rentiers net savings decline. Thus the burden of restoring equilibrium falls 
entirely on net retained profits. In the competitive version output is fixed 
and consequently prices rise. In contrast, in the oligopolistic version, prices 
are fixed and hence output and employment increase via the multiplier effects 
of higher aggregate demand.
The "Kaleckian” nature of these results can be illustrated bv comparing 
these conclusions to Kalecki’s 11937] analysis of tax incidence. Kalecki 
examined the incidence of income, commodity and capital taxes in a model of 
underemployment equilibrium. Capital taxes are defined as ” . . .  a tax on 
every type of owned capital. . . "  (Kaiecki (Op. cit.). A capital tax, thus defined, 
is broadly analogous to a uniform property tax in the A-B model.
Kalecki assumed for simplicity that capitalists consumption is fixed in the 
short period, and unaffected by taxes. The Kaleckian consumption function is 
thus wholly incompatible with Mair’s treatment of consumption. In the
TRBLE 5.2
THE RMENDED MODEL 
COMPETITIDE UERSION
Change In
After Ta« Rentiers Post Ton
Profits Profits Consumption Wage Rote Mark-Up
1. Atj > 0 0 + 0
Atm ■ Atr = Ate® 0
2. Atj > 0 0 0 0 -  0
Atj *  Atr = 0
3. Atr > 0  + + “ +
Atj = Atm =Atc ■ 0
4. Ate > 0 0 0 0
Atj “ Atm=Atr- 0
5. Atp > 0
Atj = Atm =Atr 
- Ate *  0
TABLE 5.5
THE AMENDED MODEL 
NON-CQMPETITIUE DERSION
Change In
Employment
After Tan Rentiers PostTeH end
Profits Profits Consumption Wage Rate Output
1. Atj > 0 0
Atm ■ Atr = Atc= 0
2. Atm > 0 0 0 0 -  0
Atj *  Atr ■ Ate *  0
3. Atr > 0 + + " 0 +
Atj = Ate =Atm ■ 0
4. Ate > 0 0 0 -  -  0
Atj = Atm=Atr - 0
5. Atp > 0
Atj *  Atm =Atr 
■ Ate *  0
amended model, we have assumed that the property tax burden is 
apportioned between consumption and savings. This assumption, however, 
merely alters the details of Kalecki's results rather than the main thrust of his 
conclusions.
Since current consumption in Kalecki’s model is unaffected by taxes, it 
follows that equivalent increases in capital taxes and government expenditure 
raise aggregate demand, thereby increasing gross profits and employment. 
Kalecki's conclusions are thus congruent with the results of the amended 
model. However, the analysis does not end with this mechanical result, as 
Kalecki further explores the long run impact of capital taxes.
The tax is levied uniformly across all sectors of the economy. Hence, 
firms neither have the incentive or opportunity to escape the tax by migrating 
into lower taxed sectors (or regions).9 Instead, since gross and net profits are 
higher, investors are likely to be more optimistic and hence investment, 
employment and output will increase in the long run.
However, as a practical matter Kalecki (Op cit.) believed that capital taxes 
were unlikely to be used extensively "for it may seem to undermine the 
principle of private property". The article thus concludes with a quotation 
from Robinson: " . . .  any government which had both the power and the will 
to remedy the major defects of the capitalist system, would have the will and 
the power to abolish it altogether."
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3.4 A Comparison with Neoclassical Theory
'The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers In a non-Euclldean 
world who, discovering that In experience straight lines apparently parallel 
often meet, rebuke the lines fo r not keeping straight.
Keynes[1936]
The general equilibrium models are based on the assumption that wages 
and prices are flexible, and resources fully employed. Given these stringent 
assumptions, taxes can only be shifted by reducing the supply of the taxed 
activity. A general factor, or product tax, represents a clear case where the 
taxed activity cannot be varied, and hence the economic incidence of the tax is 
equivalent to its legal incidence. In contrast, discriminatory or partial taxes, 
divert resources from taxed to untaxed activities, thereby inducing allocative 
distortions within the system. Central to these conclusions is the assumption 
that resources are fully employed . Hence ’notional' and ’effective’ demands 
(and supplies) are equal, and taxes merely alter the DISTRIBUTION of income, 
rather than its LEVEL. In essence, the assumption of full employment serves 
to neutralise the demand effects of taxation, and consequently the incidence 
problem is reduced to one of inferring the allocative effects of taxes, to the 
neglect of the macro-stabilisation consequences.
In contrast, in the Keynesian framework, "effective" and "notional"
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demands (and supplies) diverge, and hence taxes which affect the distribution 
of income between differential spending groups, alter the level of effective 
demand and hence output. Thus, the total LEVEL of income is a function of the 
DISTRIBUTION of income, and incidence depends crucially on the interaction 
between the "demand" and "allocative" effects of taxation.
It will be recalled, that for "notional" and "effective" demands to diverge, 
it is sufficient to assume that agents transact at "false" (i.e. non-market 
clearing) prices. Hence, the A-B model discards the assumption of price and 
wage flexibility, together with the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution. The relationship which is central to their analysis is the 
Keynesian equilibrium condition that ex-ante savings equals investment. With 
investment fixed by decisions taken in the past, and saving a fixed proportion 
of net profits, it follows that in the short run the equilibrium value of net 
profits is unaffected by tax changes. Thus, none of the burden of a general 
property tax falls on firms.
In contrast, in the general equilibrium framework, investment is 
endogenously determined, and hence tax increases lower private consumption 
and investment by an amount equivalent to the increase in government 
expenditure. Aggregate demand is therefore unchanged and hence output and 
employment are unaffected. Fixed investment in the A-B model thus serves 
to enhance the expansionary demand effects of balanced tax and government 
expenditure increases.
However, the distinguishing feature of the property tax system is its 
discriminatory nature. Thus, property taxes are neither uniform between or 
within sectors (and regions). In the long run, tax differentials therefore 
induce allocative distortions as factors migrate from high to low taxed sectors 
(and regions). However, in the A-B model, output is aggregated into a single 
multi-purpose good and hence tax differentials between sectors are ignored. 
The A-B analysis thus focuses on the short run demand effects of taxation, to 
the neglect of the long run allocative distortions. Arguably, in the 
Post-Keynesian framework, the extent to which variations in tax rates induce 
variations in after-tax profits will depend on the "degree of monopoly" 
enjoyed by firms (see Mair [19851). Ceteris paribus, the greater the monopoly 
power of a firm vis-a-vis its lower taxed rivals, the greater will be its ability 
to shift the differential tax burden into prices.10
However, unless it is assumed that differential taxes are fully shifted into 
prices, discriminatory taxation will cause some variation in net profits thereby 
inducing capital flows between sectors in the long run. It may therefore be 
argued that both the A-B, and general equilibrium models are incomplete; for 
while the A-B analysis focuses on aggregate demand to the neglect of the 
"substitution effects", the general equilibrium models concentrate on the 
allocative distortions and supply-side consequences. In general, tax incidence 
will depend on the interaction of both the demand and substitution effects.12
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the Austrian School also 
places considerable emphasis on time and uncertainty, but their 
analytical results differ considerably.
2. In the logical extreme where all decisions are "crucial" and hence 
unique, past experience can offer no guidance about the future. Keynes’ 
expectation formation process therefore, not unrealistically, assumes 
some regularity or broad pattern/trend.
3. In a sence, the Post-Keynesian view appears to be broadly analogous to 
that of the American institutionalist such as Williamson. In the 
institutionalist approach "bounded rationality" limits forecasting 
abilities, while in the Post-Keynesian approach, informational 
inadequacies preclude accurate long run forecasting.
4. There are other differences between the Post-Keynesian neoclassical 
schools which have not been mentioned in this section. Perhaps most 
important among these are the Post-Keynesian view of capital 
(discussed in Ch.2), pricing (see section 3.2), and market clearing (see 
section 3.4)
5. Differences in saving propensities were ignored by Keynes in his later 
work. However, they do figure in the Treatise on Money. According to 
Robinson [1969], Keynes' neglect of differential saving groups resulted 
from his ideological views of " social harmony, which slurs over class 
differences. . .  .Kalecki was not brought up so. The only economics he 
had studied was in Marx.. . But starting from Marx would have saved 
him a lot of trouble." (Robinson [1969]).
6. The postulated consumption function is also incompatible with the 
Friedman "permanent income hypothesis", where consumption is a 
function of permanent net income. Hence, current tax increases, which 
have little effect on permanent income, will leave consumption 
unaffected.
7. The practice of treating property taxes as a tax expenditure or 
allowance deductable from other sources of income is not unusual. 
What is being criticised here is the peculiar, implicit and unconventional 
definition of gross profits.
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8. Since the economics of deceipt is as yet in a nascent stage, we have 
discounted the possibility of a "capitalist conspiracy" in which property 
taxes are covertly returned to firms. We further neglect the possibility 
that taxes mystically vanish from the system.
9. Assuming a closed economy.
10. We retain the assumption that government expenditure is uniformly 
distributed across firms.
11. This result, conditional on the degree of monopoly, is rather vague when 
compared with the more deterministic results of neoclassical theory.
12. The Barro and Grossman [1971] model appears to provide a useful 
framework for combining the two effect  ^ in a disequilibrium system. 
The extension of this model, however, would involve a considerable 
amount of algebraic manipulation requiring the introduction of an 
additional sector with two factor inputs.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The non-domestic property tax has been the focus of much attention in 
recent years. Many hold it responsible for the low level of business 
investment in the UK, and it has been criticised as an illogical and unfair tax 
because it imposes a levy on firms on the basis of their location, rather than 
profits or economic performance. More recently, the emphasis has shifted 
towards the impact of the non-domestic property tax on regional 
unemployment. Critics of the tax have alleged that high property taxes have 
accelerated the decline of the depressed regions, and undermined the 
economic base of these communities by inducing firms to relocate in lower 
taxed areas. This chapter reviews the empirical literature on the economic 
effects of the non-domestic property tax in the UK. The next section 
introduces the background to the debate, and the following three sections 
review the empirical studies on the effects of the tax on regional employment, 
profitability and prices respectively.
4.1 The Background
Any analysis of the economic impact of the non-domestic property tax 
should begin with a consideration of what has happened over the years to the 
tax. Put simply, the general trajectory of property tax burdens has been rising 
steadily upwards.1 The estimated property tax revenue from industry and 
commerce in England and Wales increased in nominal terms from a total of
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£360 million in 1963/4 to over £4.6 billion in 1983/4 (Birsdeye &. Webb 
[19851 ). Similarly, the tax burden has increased from 21% of profits in 1978 
to 42% in 1982. (see Bennett [1986]). The property tax thus represents a 
major tax on business, and constitutes half of the non-oil business tax bill. It 
is no surprise therefore that representatives of commerce and industry have 
called for its abolition, (see Davidson [1985] ), and the present government is 
considering reform of the rating system.
However, supporters of the rating system, in particular the local 
authority associations, have claimed that non-domstic property taxes do not 
constitute a serious problem for businesses. Four widely differing views seem 
to be responsible for this conclusion. One is that other costs w ill adjust to 
offset the influence of a higher property tax in any area. The most obvious 
adjustment would be the price of land and property.2 Clearly, if differentially 
higher property taxes are capitalised into lower land and property prices, no 
impact on business location decisions would occur. Firms in high tax areas 
would enjoy lower land and property costs and visa-versa, so that total costs 
and net profits would be unaffected by variations in property taxes. It may, 
however, be argued that in practice capitalisation of tax differentials is likely 
to be limited because firms cannot generally respond by varying land usage, 
and the costs of re-location may outweigh the potential tax savings. However, 
even if land prices do fall, this merely implies that the property tax burden 
has been shifted from firms to land owners (i.e. a different category of capital
129
owner). Hence, the overall returns to capital in the high taxed areas w ill still 
be lower than in the lower taxed regions.
A second argument in favour of the rating system is that the burden of 
property taxes is shifted forward into higher prices, and hence has no impact 
on profitability and firm location. The extent to which business rates can be 
passed onto consumers is extremely controversial. In general, three 
conditions must be met if forward shifting is to be profitable. First, demand 
for the firms product must be relatively inelastic so that an increase in prices 
raises total revenue. Second, profitable forward shifting implies that firms set 
prices below the optimum profit maximising level. Clearly, if prices are at the 
profit maximising level, a further increase intended to recoup the tax would 
merely serve to depress profits. Even if full cost pricing were the dominant 
practice, it would not necessarily ensure successful short run shifting. Finally, 
the conditions necessary to support the hypothesis of full forward shifting at 
the macro-level are similar to those which allow a cost push inflation. When 
prices rise, ceteris paribus, money expenditures and hence the demand for 
cash balances increase. If real output is to be unaffected, the authorities must 
passively accommodate the increase in the demand for money. There has 
been little empirical work in this field. A recent study by Mair (see Section 
4.4) suggests that there is little evidence of forward shifting, and this general 
conclusion is confirmed in the econometric analysis presented in Chapter 7.
A third argument in favour of the existing rating system is based on the
observation that non-domestic property taxes represent only a small fraction 
of total costs: 2% to 5% on average (Bennett [1986b] ). However, as noted in 
Chapter 1. a comparison of tax burdens based on ex-post cost data is likely to 
be misleading, since no account is taken of the possible response of firms to 
the tax. For instance, if differentially higher property taxes induce firms to 
migrate to lower taxed areas, a measure of tax burdens based on actual
ex-post costs w ill considerably understate the importance of the tax.
/
Arguably, the impact of the property tax w ill in general depend at least partly 
on how firms perceive the tax. If the property tax is viewed as a levy on the 
use of capital in a particular location, it w ill be equivalent in its effects to a 
local profits tax. Thus, for example, if the after-tax profits of a firm expressed 
as a fraction of its assets are 10%, a property tax differential of 1% would 
correspond to the imposition of a 10% tax on the profits of firms in high taxed 
areas. Since actual tax differentials are considerably greater than this (see 
section 4.3), it is possible that profit maximising firms w ill take account of the 
differential tax burdens across locations.
Finally, it has been argued that non-domestic property taxes are a 
rightful burden on firms for the services they receive from local authorities. 
There has. however, been no empirical work to support this assertion. The 
North American econometric studies suggest that non-domestic property tax 
revenues are typically used to finance domestic services such as education and 
health (see Inter alia Ballentine and Thirsk [1982], Feldstein [19751. Bowman
[1974], McLure [1962]). Without confronting the issue in full, Bennett [1986b] 
has noted that in 1981/82 businesses paid 46% of the total rate bill. In 
contrast, 52% of local authority expenditure was directed towards education, 
5% on environmental services, and 15% on law and order. Thus, businesses 
appear to have gained little direct benefit from local services. It can, however, 
be argued that part of the expenditure on domestic services results from the 
negative externalities generated by firms. For example, expenditure on 
environmental services and housing might increase with a larer business base. 
Thus interpreted the non-domestic property tax may be viewed as a levy 
necessary to offset the external costs imposed on the residents of a 
jurisdiction. However, in the absence of a more comprehensive empirical 
study which takes account of both the direct and indirect benefits of 
government expenditure, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions.
4.2 The Impact of Property Taxes on Regional Unemployment
Despite the controversy surrounding the property tax, little systematic 
analysis of its economic impact has been undertaken. This section reviews the 
existing empirical studies on the effect of the tax on regional employment. It 
is argued that much of this work is based on theoretically misspecified and 
econometrically flawed models. Consequently, these studies do little to dispel 
doubts about either the impact of property taxes on employment, or the 
related issue of its incidence.
There have been four published statistical investigations on the effect of
property taxes on regional employment. The first by Straw [1981] compares 
the increase in unemployment in each county with the increase in propety 
taxes. No statistical association between the two could be found and hence it 
was concluded that no such link exists. The second study undertaken by 
Hughes [1981] compared the level of unemployment in each region with the 
level of property taxes. Once again, no statistical relationship could be 
identified.
However, these results appear to be somewhat misleading, for both 
studies assume that the relationship between property taxes and 
unemployment is linear. Moreover, no attempt is made to test for the impact 
of lagged values of the property tax variable, or control for other non-fiscal 
factors on regional unemployment. Furthermore, at the regional level, the link 
between property taxes and unemployment is likely to be highly tenuous. 
Thus if labour is mobile between regions, the loss of a job in one area may 
lead to an increase in unemployment in some other region if the worker either 
commutes to work or migrates. It is therefore hardly surprising that neither 
study finds a link between property taxes and regional unemployment.
In contrast, the other two econometric studies by Gripaios and Brooks 
[1982] and Crawford, Fothergill and Monk [19851 [CFM hereafter] examine the 
relationship between property taxes and regional employment. However, 
while Gripaios and Brooks find the evidence consistent with the view that 
property taxes "crowd out" employment, CFM assert that the tax has no effect
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on regional employment. In the remainder of this section, attention is focused 
on these two studies and it is argued that the conflicting conclusions derive 
from a combination of theoretically misspecified models and econometric 
deficiencies.
Both studies distinguish between the determinants of employment in 
the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy. However, while CFM 
estimate separate single equation models for the different sectors, Gripaios 
and Brooks utilise a simultaneous equation approach. Furthermore, the 
Gripaios and Brooks model is restricted to a cross-sectional study using 1974 
data, while CFM's analysis is based on pooled cross-section/time series data 
from 1974 to 1981. In what follows, we focus on the analysis of the 
manufacturing sector, but the general criticisms which w ill be made apply 
equally to the service sector.
Table 4.1 overleaf summarises the key explanatory variables used by 
the authors to explain the distribution of employment in the manufacturing 
sector. In the CFM model industrial structure is seen to be an important 
determinant of regional employment. Thus it is argued that employment w ill 
be lower in those areas dominated by declining industries. The impact of 
industrial structure on employment is measured using shift-share analysis. It 
w ill be recalled, that this is based on the difference between the "expected" 
employment growth in a region and the overall national employment growth 
rate. The "expected" growth rate is defined as the rate of growth of
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employment which would occur if each industry in the region grew at the 
same rate as its national counterpart. In addition, CFM include a measure of 
the size of firms in each region (i.e. the size structure variable). Specifically, it 
is argued that a disproportionately large number of new firms are founded by 
individuals who were previously employed in small firms. Hence, the size of 
existing firms in a region is held to influence the rate of new firm formation, 
and hence employment. The size structure variable is derived from the 
relationship between the size of establishments in an area and the rate of new 
firm formation. Furthermore, the degree of urbanisation is seen to influence 
the distribution of employment across regions. In general, the higher the level 
of urbanisation, the greater are held to be the difficulties involved in 
accommodating new and expanding firms, and hence the lower the level of 
employment. The impact of urban structure on employment is obtained by 
dividing each region into one of six urban categories on the basis of their 
degree of urbanisation. The measure of urban structure is based on the 
employment change which would have occurred if each category within a 
region had grown at the average rate for its type. The model further includes 
two dummy variables. The first encapsulates the impact of regional policy 
and the poor growth of peripheral regions, while the second is designed to 
capture the differential growth of New Towns. Finally, the impact of property 
taxes on employment is measured by the level and the change in each region.
In contrast in the Gripaios and Brooks model, the level of agglomeration
is seen to be an important determinant of regional employment. Thus 
agglomeration economies are measured by the spatial concentration of 
employment in each area, while the diseconomies of agglomeration are 
proxied by population density. Furthermore, the market potential of an area 
is held to influence employment, and is measured by the transport costs to 
major markets. The model further includes a dummy variable to capture the 
effects of regional policy in the assisted areas. Finally, Gripaios and Brooks
i
argue that property taxes tend to lower employment by raising costs, while 
local expenditures raise employment via the multiplier. The fiscal effects on 
employment are measured by the level of property taxes and government 
expenditure in each region.
TABLE 4.1
Determinants of regional employment in the manufacturing sector
Gripaios & Brooks CFM
Dependent Variables Level of employment Change In Employment
Explanatory Variables economies of 
agglomeration
Size Structure
Diseconomies of 
agglomeration
Urban Structure
Structure Marfcet Potential Industrial
Regional Dummy 
Uarloble
Regional Dummy 
Variable
Fiscal Uarlables Leuel of property 
taxes per employee
Leuel of local 
authority exoendlture
Leuel and change In 
property taxes
It w ill be noted from Table 4.1 that the CFM model ignores local authority 
expenditure. Hence, while the Gripaios and Brooks study is concerned with 
the overall budgetary consequences, CFM focus on the impact of the property 
tax is isolation. In the conventional parlance of public finance, this 
corresponds to the distinction between the "budget'' and the "absolute" 
incidence of a tax (see Musgrave 1959). More generally, however, the 
variables used to explain the distribution of employment in the two models 
differ considerably. Hence the conflicting results could readily be attributed 
to the inadequacies of the explanatory variables used in one of the models. In 
the remainder of this section it w ill be argued that the contradictory 
conclusions derive from more fundamental deficiencies - in particular 
theoretical misspecification.
The most striking feature of both papers lies in their neglect of 
theoretical issues. The authors make no reference to the well developed body 
of incidence theory which was described in earlier chapters. While Gripaios 
and Brooks define the tax burden in terms of absolute levels on the 
assumption that" . . .  higher taxation means higher costs and ceteris paribus 
lower profitability", CFM assert that "It is not necessary to take a specific 
view of the incidence of rates in order to analyse the impact on the location of 
jobs". Instead, the authors propound two ad hoc mechanisms through which 
property taxes are seen to influence employment. Thus, it is argued that the 
level of property taxes may affect employment if firms that are unable to pay
high taxes migrate to other regions. This mechanism is distinguished from the 
impact of an increase in property taxes since " . . .  business in an area where 
the increase is above average, for example, may be disadvantaged." Hence the 
CFM model uses the level and change in rates as a measure of the tax burden. 
However, as noted in earlier chapters, tax incidence theory suggests that 
employment responds neither to the level of property taxes nor the temporal 
change in property taxes, but tax differentials between sectors and regions. 
While this might not affect the statistical results, it does have important 
implications for both model specification and the interpretation of the 
conclusions. Furthermore, incidence theory reveals that property taxes affect 
the distribution of employment only in the long run. This therefore implies 
that lagged rather than contemporaneous values of the tax variable influence 
employment. However, neither study makes any allowance for lagged effects.
It w ill be recalled that property tax differentials influence the 
distribution of employment through movements of capital from high to low 
taxed regions. This therefore suggests that property taxes are likely to be 
correlated with the other structural explanatory variables in the model. Thus 
for example, the exit of firms from differentially higher taxed regions will, 
ceteris paribus, lead to changes in the urban structure and the level of 
agglomeration in a region. However, neither study adequately tests for the 
existence of multicollinearity between the property tax variables and the 
structural explanatory variables. CFM provide a matrix of correlation
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coefficients in their appendix, and assert that" . . .  neither measure of the rate 
burden variable is highly correlated with any of the structural variables." 
However, despite this claim their models do appear to suffer from severe 
collinearity. Farrar and Glauber (1967) describe an approximate test for 
diagnosing the impact of collinearity in a model. They suggest that 
multicollinearity distorts the parameter estimates substantially when the 
simple correlation coefficients exceed the coefficient of determination (i.e. the 
R2). The CFM matrix reveals correlation coefficients of 0.39 and -0.35 between 
the level of property taxes and the measures of industrial and urban structure 
respectively, and this exceeds the value of the coefficients of determination in 
the main regression equations. Thus, there are strong empirical and 
theoretical reasons to expect multicollinearity in the models, thereby casting 
doubt on the reliability of their conclusions. The point here is stronger than 
simply asserting that the results depend on the assumption that the 
explanatory variables are independent. As noted earlier, the migration of 
firms between regions w ill typically lead to changes in the industrial and 
urban structure of the affected areas. In a sense, the structural explanatory 
variables in the model represent the mechanism through which property taxes 
affect the distribution of employment. Thus the neglect of theoretical issues 
has meant that the studies ignore the crucial distinction between the final 
impact of the property tax on regional employment, and the mechanism 
through which taxes influence employment.
Having established the theoretical inadequacies of the tax measures 
used in the studies, it would seem appropriate to assess the validity of the 
econometric tests employed by the authors. CFM employ two procedures to 
assess the impact of property taxes on the distribution of employment. In the 
first the explanatory variables described in Table 4.1 are regressed on the 
change in employment in each region. Both measures of the property taxes 
burden are found to be statistically insignificant, while the . structural
i
explanatory variables are found to be highly significant. It is therefore argued 
that property taxes have no impact on the distribution of employment. 
However, it w ill be recalled that the structural explanatory variables are 
derived using techniques such as shift-share analysis. These variables 
therefore have as arguments elements of the dependent variable. That is, the 
measures of industrial structure, urban structure, and size structure are 
components of the change in employment (the dependent variable). It can 
easily be shown that this leads to biased parameter estimates. For ease of 
exposition we consider only the bias in the industrial structure variable, but 
the general criticisms apply equally to the other structural explanatory 
variables in the CFM model.
Consider the following simple regression model:
(1) Gr -  a o + I + €
where: Gr - change in regional employment
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I = measure of industrial structure (derived using shift-share analysis) 
£ - disturbance term
It w ill be recalled that shift-share analysis divides regional employment 
growth into three elements: the national (N), structural (I) and the differential 
(D) components.
Therefore:
(2) Gr = N + I + D
Equation (2) is simply an accounting identity. More generally, regional 
employment change may be subdivided in a number of ways. Thus for 
example, the size structure variable divides employment into the component 
due to new firm formation and the "unaccounted" remainder, while the urban 
structure term divides employment into the average change in each urban 
category and the "residual".
However, rearranging equation (2)
(3) I - Gr - N - D
Substituting in equation (1), we obtain the following "reduced form" 
expressions for Gr and I:
(4) Gr = ao - Qi (D + N)+ &
1 - ojj 1 - (Xj 1 - ax
and
(5) I - ao - _J   (D + N) + £
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From equation (1) we know that the OLS estimator is given by
(6) a, - 2 Gr I 
2 I2
Substituting for Gr from equation (1):
Sj = 2 (ao + a i I»S ) I
2 I2
“ Oj + 2 ao.I + 2 C. I 
2 I2
To find the bias in estimator $ lt we calculate the expected value of the
second term on the right hand side of equation (7) after substituting for I 
using equation-(fj. It is clear that this expected value is non-zero, and it follows
that the estimator (x± is biased3. It is well established that in such cases the
difficulty can be circumvented by employing a simultaneous equation model.
However, CFM attempt to buttress their conclusions with a further 
single equation regression "test", in which the structural explanatory variables 
are subtracted from the change in employment, and the resulting difference is 
used as the dependent variable. More formally, let U denote the urban 
structure variable, I the measure of industrial structure, and S the measure of 
size structure. Then, the CFM regression procedure is given by:
(8) [Gr - [U+I  + S j -  po+ piT + p2R +£
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where:
Gr - change in regional employment 
T « measure of the property tax burden 
R - regional policy dummy variable 
t  = disturbance term
This technique is seen as removing the influence of urban structure (U), 
industrial structure (I) and size structure (S). Once again, the property tax 
variables are found to be statistically insignificant, and the authors conclude 
that property taxes have no impact on the distribution of employment in the 
manufacturing sector. However, as noted earlier, the impact of property taxes 
on employment is likely to obtain through changes in the structural variables, 
and the measures of industrial structure and urban structure were found to be 
correlated with the level of property taxes. This technique, while perhaps 
removing the impact of the structural variables on employment, therefore 
fails to separate out the tax effects from the structural effects. Indeed, in this 
case it is not clear that this separation can be meaningfully undertaken, for 
the migration of firms from high taxed regions w ill inevitably lead to 
structural changes. Thus, by removing the impact of the structural variables 
on employment, this technique automatically eliminates the tax dfects. The 
conditions under which such a procedure would be valid seem to be far more 
stringent than might first appear. It requires the tax induced migration of 
firms to have no effect on either the industrial structure, urban structure or
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size structure.4 Furthermore, the impact of taxes on employment must be 
instantaneous, for the model ignores lagged variables. It is perhaps not 
unreasonable to suggest that none of these conditions are likely to hold in 
practice. Consequently, the CFM results appear to be highly misleading.
Arguably, choices among econometric explanations of economic 
behaviour should be made not merely with reference to statistical criteria, but 
by considering their economic implications. The Gripaios and Brooks study 
revealed that while local authority expenditure had a positive and significant 
effect on employment, property taxation had a negative impact, and the 
overall tax-expenditure effect of the budget was found to be positive. Thus, 
their results appear to vindicate a broadly Keynesian view of property 
taxation where, ceteris paribus, balanced tax and government expenditure 
increases have an expansionary effect on demand and hence employment. In 
contrast, the CFM model is based on the assumption that firms shift out of a 
region if either the level of property taxes is deemed to be too high, or the 
increase in taxes is regarded as excessive. Their analysis revealed that neither 
the level nor the change in taxes affect employment. The economic 
implications of these findings transcend in importance the narrow question of 
the tax burden. These results imply that the property tax has neither any 
effect on demand (as suggested by Keynesian analysis), nor the location of 
firms (via the mechanism described by neoclassical incidence theory). By 
default the CFM analysis thus suggests that the entire property tax burden is
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either profitably shifted forward into prices with the beneficient aid of an 
inelastic demand curve, or that the tax is shifted back into costs. Hence, the 
CFM mechanism in which firms respond to the level or change in taxes, 
require a world in which the absolute rather than the differential tax burden 
is shifted. This clearly contradicts the fundamental tenets of incidence theory. 
Furthermore, shifting the whole tax or even the bulk of it would imply that 
heavy and increasing property taxation itself has tended to raise profit 
margins, whereas margins have in fact experienced a secular decline in the UK 
over much of the post-war period.5 By implication these results therefore 
suggest that rising property taxes through the recent recession have served to 
increase profitability. Thus, the theoretical and statistical deficiencies of CFM's 
model have resulted in a set of implausible conclusions which can neither be 
reconciled with the observed secular decline in margins nor incidence theory.
In conclusion, it therefore appears reasonable to suggest that the 
statistical tests used in both studies fail to establish conclusively the 
relationship between property taxes and the distribution of employment. 
However, while the results of Gripaios and Brooks were shown to be 
theoretically plausible, those of CFM were found to be untenable. This 
discrepancy it was argued resulted from a combination of theoretical 
inadequacies and statistical deficiencies. Thus, both studies failed to 
distinguish between the final impact of the property tax on employment, and 
the mechanism through which taxes influence employment. As a result, the
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structural explanatory variables in the CFM model were found to be correlated 
with the tax variable. Furthermore, the statistical procedures employed by 
CFM were shown to be inappropriate. Thus, the studies do little to dispel 
doubts about the impact of property taxes on employment.
4.3 The Impact of Property Taxes on Profits
The most comprehensive study of the impact of non-domestic property 
taxes on profits has been undertaken by Bennett (1986b) who uses the "cost 
of capital approach". This approach provides a measure of the fiscal wedge 
between post and pre-tax rates of return to an investment project discounted 
over its life span. The fiscal wedge can then be used to calculate effective tax 
rates on capital assets financed from different sources, in different sectors and 
local authority jurisdictions, (see Auerbach [1983a], [1983b], Feldstein and 
Summers [1978]).
However, an important limitation of the cost of capital approach lies in 
its partial equilibrium nature. Thus key parameters such as interest rates, 
wages, and prices are assumed to be exogenously given. Obviously, since the 
property tax is a broad-based tax, it w ill have non-trivial general equilibrium 
repercussions on these parameters. Hence, the "cost of capital approach" can 
be viewed as providing estimates of the direct impact of the non-domestic 
property tax, rather than the final general equilibrium incidence effects of the 
tax.
146
The Cost of Capital Approach:
Profit maximising firms, it w ill be recalled, attempt to adjust their 
capital inputs so that the marginal revenue product of capital equals the 
marginal cost. Capital assets, however, are durable and hence it becomes 
necessary to impute to each period a cost associated with holding an asset. 
There are four components that make up the imputed cost. First, there is the 
cost of financing the purchase of an asset. There are three main sources of 
finance: debt issue, retained earnings, and new share issues. Second, the asset 
w ill depreciate due to wear and tear. Clearly, the rate of depreciation w ill 
depend on the type of asset under consideration. Following King and Fullerton 
[1984], Bennett distinguishes between three types of assets: machinery, 
buildings and inventories. Third, the value of a given asset may change due to 
obsolescence, changes in relative prices or inflation. The value of the asset 
w ill depend at least partly on the industry in which it is employed. Thus, the 
economy is divided into three main sectors: manufacturing, commerce, and 
others (excluding extractive industries). Finally, the tax system discriminates 
against certain types of investors in capital markets. Hence it becomes 
necessary to distinguish between: households, tax exempt institutions and 
non-exempt institutions. These four components of the cost of holding an 
asset can be aggregated to arrive at what is referred to as the user cost of 
capital. In the absence of time lags and adjustment costs, a profit maximising 
firm w ill invest until the marginal revenue product equals the user cost of
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capital. If the user cost increases, the inducement to invest falls and 
vice-versa.
The mathematical expression for the user cost of capital employed by 
Bennett is based on King and Fullerton’s [1984] comparative study of the tax 
system. The formula is given by:
(9) Pi- I(q> + 8-n) +(1 -T )T rK VK * d2 T V n ] (1 - A) -8
(1-T)
where:
<p - corporate rate of time preference
6 = book value depreciation rate
n - inflation rate
T - corporation tax rate
TrK " property tax in local authority r for property of type K
VK " value of property of type K
d2 - proportion of inventories in total assets
T = coporation tax rate
V = proportion of inventories taxed on historical cost principles
A = capital allowances against corporation tax
The first term on the right hand side of (9) represents the user cost of
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capital in the absence of taxes. Thus, <p represents the interest cost to the firm
of financing each unit of capital, and 8 the depreciation per unit of capital. The 
second term represents the non-domestic taxes paid per unit of capital. 
Following King and Fullerton (1984), the tax rate (TfK) is defined as the ratio
of the tax yield to the net stock of industrial and commercial buildings at 
replacement cost. The expression further allows for the deductability of 
property taxes from corporation taxes. The third term in (9) accounts for the 
tax paid on inventories valued on historical cost principles. Finally, the term 
(1 - A) accounts for tax deductable investment allowances. These four 
components provide an estimate of the cost of capital to the firm (i.e. the user) 
net of depreciation. The precise value w ill vary between sources of finance 
(through changes in <p), between incorporated and unincorporated firms (via 
T), and between different local authorities (through TfK). For simplicity
Bennett calculates the tax burden by comparing the maximum and minimum 
rate poundages across England and Wales. This approach thus gives the 
extremes between which all local authorities must lie.
The after-tax returns to investors in capital markets is given by the 
formula:
(10) Si = (1 -m)(r + n ) - n - T rK
where:
m = marginal income tax rate on interest income
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r = real rate of interest
Si represents the post-tax returns to the investor, and pi the pre-tax 
returns (or the user cost of capital to firms). The fiscal wedge is given by:
(11) Wi = Pi - Si
and the effective tax rate is defined as :
(12) Pi - Si
Pi
Effective tax rates are calculated for two cases. In the first, the cost of 
capital to firms (i.e. Pi) is held constant at 10%, and the effects of the tax are 
evaluated on Si. In the second case, Si is held constant at 5% and the effects of 
the tax are evaluated on Pi. The results are summarised in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
overleaf.
The most striking general feature revealed by the estimates are the 
higher effective tax rates on commercial investment. In the main, this stems 
from the subsidy to machinery as a result of the allowance against coporation 
taxes. A further notable feature are the lower tax rates paid by tax exempt 
institutions.
The burden of property taxes is assumed to be borne entirely by 
building assets. In Table 4.2, this leads to a variation in tax rates of 20.6 
percentage points. Compared with other assets, the property tax clearly raises 
the effective tax on buildings. In turn, this leads to a large variation in 
effective tax rates paid by the manufacturing and commercial sectors.
TABLE 4.2
Range of Efrectlue Tax Rales and Post-Tax Rate of Return Necessary to Earn a 10% Pre-Tax Real 
Rate of Return Net of Corporation Tax and Rates (Fixed-p Case, 1985 Tax System)
P
M inim um
s
M axim um M inim um
p-s
M axim um
100 x  (p -s)/p  
M inim um  M axim um
D ifference in 
(p -s)/p
Asset
M achinery 10.0 6.1 6.1 3.2 3.2 31.6 31.6 0.0
B u ild in p JO.O 6.1 4.0 3.9 6.0 39.0 59.6 20.6
Inventories 10.0 3.3 3.3 6.7 6.7 66.6 66.6 0.0
Industry
M anufacturing 10.0 6.7 ‘ 6.0 3.3 4.0 33.4 40.1 6.7
O ther 10.0 5.0 4.6 5.0 5.4 50.0 54.0 4.0
Com m erce 10.0 4.6 3.8 5.4 6.2 53.8 62.1 8.3
Source o f  finance  
Debt JO.O 9.0 8.2 1.0 1.8 9.9 18.2 8.3
S h a m 10.0 6.8 6.1 3.2 3.9 32.0 39.2 7.2
R etention! 10.0 \ 3.1 4.4 4.9 5.6 49.3 55.9 6.4
O w ner
H ouseho ld! . 10.0 ' 4.1 3-5 5.9
»
6.5 58.8 64.7 5.9
Tax-exem pt 10.0 9.0 8.1 IX 1.9 10.1 18.6 8.5
Insurance com panies 10.0 4.4 3.8 . 6.2 55.8 61.9 6.1
Total 10.0 5.9 5.2 . 4.1 . 4.8 41.1 47.9 6.8
T lx -c x h a u n e d  case’ 10.0 . 1.7 . 7.8 i S I . . 2 . 2  ■ 13.3 21.9 8.6
S o u rc e : B e n n e tt(1 9 8 6 b )
TABLE 4.3
Range e l E ffective Taw Rote* end rre-TaK Rale o f Relara Necessarg to Earn a 5% 
Post-Tax Real Rate o r Return Net of Corporation Tax and Bates (F ixed-r Case, 1985 Tae
Sgotem)
M inim um
P
M axim um
f
M inim um
P-*
M axim um
100 x  (p -s)/p  
M inim um  M axim um
D ifference in 
(p -sj/p
A sset
M achinery 6.1 6.1 3.9 2.9 2.9 42.4 42.4 0.0
Build in p 7.7 10.3 3.9 3.8 6.4 49.2 62.3 13.1
Inventories 11.1 11.1 3.9 7.2 7.2 65.0 65.0 0.0
Industry
45.3M anufac tu rin j 7.1 7.9 3.9 3.2 4.0 30.6 5.3
O ther 1.1 9.3 3.9 4.9 5.4 55.9 58.3 2.4
Commerce 9-3 10.6 3.9 5.4 6.7 58.2 63.4 3.2
Source o f  finance
Debt 4.7 3.5 J .6  . 1.0 1.9 21.7 34.2 12.5
Shares 6.2 7.7 4 .0 2.9 3.8 42.3 48.8 6.5
Retentions 1.1 9.7 4 .0 4.9 5.8 55.2 59.3 4.1
Owner
Households 7.6 8.4 2.0 3.6 6.5 73.8 76.5 2.7
Tax-exempt 1.4 9.3 7.1 1.4 2.2 16.2 24.1 7.9
Insurance com panies IJO 8.9 2.7 5-3 6.2 66.3 69.7 3.4
Total 7.9 8.8 3.9 4.0 4.9 50.9 55.8 4.9
’Tax-exhausted a x e ’ 5.2 6.1 3.9 1.3 2.2 25.3 36.1 10.8
Source : Bennett (1986)
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Turning to the fixed s case, Table 4.3 summarises the effective tax rates 
when firms earn a post-tax real return of 5%. The effective tax on buildings 
varies by 13% between localities. The major diference in tax rates are for debt 
financed investments and tax exempt institutions. In part this reflects the 
reduced benefits from corporation tax deductability of rates for tax exempt 
firms. These results thus confirm the overall conclusions of the fixed p case, 
that property taxes have a significant and distortionary impact on 
profitability. Moreover, the impact varies between types of assets, sources of 
finance, and ownership of assets. In general higher taxes are paid by the 
commercial sector, and debt financed investments. These conclusions 
therefore suggest that in the absence of any shifting, the property tax w ill lead 
to substantial allocative distortions in the economy.
4.4 Shifting of the Property Tax
In a recent, and as yet unpublished econometric study, Mair (1986) has 
attempted to infer the incidence of propety taxes in a Kaleckian model of 
income distribution (see KalecLi (1943 ), (1938), and Asimakopulus (1975) ), 
The critical step in adopting the Kaleckian approach is acceptance of the 
Post-Keynesian view of price determination. Kalecki (1943) distinguished 
between two types of price changes in the short run: “cost determined" and 
"demand determined". Changes in the price of raw materials and food, 
according to this view are governed primarily by demand conditions, for the 
supply of these products is fixed in the short run. In contrast, Kalecki saw the
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industries of the advanced capitalist economies as being essentially 
oligopolistic and normally operating under conditions of excess capacity. He 
further assumed that marginal costs can reasonably be assumed to be constant 
over the normal range of output, hence it follows that in: "The production of 
finished goods . . .  When demand increases it is met mainly by an increase in 
the volume of production while prices remain stable. The price changes which 
do occur results mainly from changes in costs of production". (Kalecki (1943)).
Thus the price of manufactured goods are assumed to be set according 
to a mark-up over unit prime costs (defined as direct labour and material 
costs). The size of the mark-up reflects the degree of monopoly enjoyed by 
the firm, and is assumed to be sufficient to cover profits and overhead costs. 
In general the higher the degree of monopoly, the higher w ill be the mark-up.
The Kaleckian theory of mark-up pricing, together with the familiar 
Keynesian theory of output, determine the distribution of income between 
wages and profits. In Keynesian theory, the level of real income is determined 
by the level of investment and autonomous consumption. Thus the level of 
profits depends on the level of autonomous expenditure in the economy. On 
the limiting assumption that workers consume all their income, workers’ 
autonomous consumption and their propensity to save w ill be zero, and hence 
the level of profits is uniquely related to the level of investment and 
capitalists' autonomous consumption. This conclusion is succinctly 
summarised in Kalecki's famour aphorism that" . . .  workers spend what they
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earn, while capitalists earn what they spend".
In contrast, the share of profits in national income depends primarily on 
the mark-up and hence the degree of monopoly. This result follows from the 
assumed form of pricing behaviour. It w ill be recalled that the mark-up is 
sufficient to cover profits and overhead costs. It follows that the ratio of price 
to prime costs w ill be related to the ratio of profits and overhead costs to 
prime costs, while the degree of monopoly (i.e. the ratio of price minus prime 
costs to price) w ill define the share of profits plus overheads in national 
income (see Cowling (1978) ). If there is assumed to be "overhead" or 
"indirect" labour 6 in the model, an increase in output w ill raise total (i.e. 
direct and indirect) labour productivity and hence the share of profits in 
income.7 Thus the share of profits depends on the degree of monopoly and 
the level of output (or autonomous expenditure).
Mair (1986) attempts to test the empirical validity of the Kaleckian 
approach. A basic hypothesis underlying Kalecki's theory is the notion that in 
the short run the mark-up is mainly influenced by changes in overhead costs 
relative to prime costs. During the downturn of a business cycle, demand falls 
and raw material prices and prime costs decrease. Thus the ratio of overhead 
costs to prime costs rises in a recession. In order to maintain net profits, firms 
are ; assumed to increase the mark-up. Kalecki therefore hypothesises an 
anti-cyclical movement in the mark-up. More specifically, it is argued that a 
recession " . . .  provides a background for tacit agreements not to reduce
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prices in the same proportion as prime costs. As a result there is a tendency 
for the degree of monopoly to rise in the slump, a tendency which is reversed 
in the boom.” (Kalecki (1943)).
The notion that firms colude in a recession is not wholly unreasonable, 
for in a slump the level of concentration may increase as smaller and less 
efficient firms close, thereby increasing both the ability and desire of existing 
firms to collude.
The cyclical movement of the mark-up is tested for the UK by the 
following simple regression model:
(13) Logk - po + pjlogS + e
where:
k = mark-up
S = ratio of salaries (used as a proxy for overheads) to prime costs
e = distrubance term
The coefficient of s is found to be statistically significant, and it is 
therefore concluded that the mark-up (k) is in the short run mainly influenced 
by overhead costs relative to prime costs in the short run. This result is seen 
to vindicate the use of the Kaleckian approach, which it w ill be recalled, relies 
critically on the assumption that profit shares are determined by the mark-up 
and hence the degree of monopoly. Following Cowling (1983) the degree of 
monopoly is measured as follows:
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(14) [t = Net output - Operatives Wages
Gross Output
where: ft = degree of monopoly
Thus Mair tests for the degree of tax shifting by using the following 
equation:
(15) log k - ao + log R + oyi + e
L PC 
where:
k = mark-up
R = non-domestic property taxes
PC = prime costs
e = disturbance term
The coefficient of the ratio of property taxes to prime costs is found to 
be positive and statistically significant, with a value ranging from 
approximately 0.05 to 0.19. These results therefore suggest that in the short 
run, only between 5% and 20% of property tax increase have been shifted into 
higher prices.
Interpreted in conjunction with Bennett’s (1986b) calculations of the 
effective tax rate, Mair’s results imply that the property tax burden falls 
mianly on firms, and hence the tax is likely to impede investment in the 
differentially higher taxed sectors (or regions) of the economy8. Given the
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wide variation in tax rates between different sources of finance, sectors, and 
regions, the allocative distortions can be expected to be substantial. This issue 
is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5 where a simple general equilibrium 
model is used to derive estimates of the impact of non-domestic property 
taxes.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. See Chapter One.
2. Since wages are typically determined at the national rather than the 
local level, it is unlikely that wage costs will adjust in response to a 
differentially higher tax. This assertion is supported by the econometric 
evidence presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
3. Specifically, the expected value of the second term on the right hand 
side of the equation (8) is given by:
ao_ (a o E (O )-X  [E(ZD£)+ E (Z N€) + E (Z D ) ao+ E (I N) ao ]
i-*, I-*,
+ _L [ E (Z i  ) ao + E (Z £ ) 1 *  0
l-ai
4. Thus for example, the size structure variable is derived from the 
relation between the rate of new firm formation and the number of 
large plants in the region. It seems somewhat contradictory for CFM to 
propound a mechanism in which the level or change in property taxes 
induces an outmigration of firms, and yet require the rate of new firm 
formation to be unaffected by the tax.
5. By analogous reasoning the CFM results imply that a fail in property 
taxes in a region will lead to a decline in profit margins.
6. Indirect or overhead labour may be defined as the number of worker 
necessary to operate a plant at any non-zero level of capacity. This 
number is independent of the degree of plant utilisation.
7. That is total labour costs per unit of output decrease, as output 
increases and ceteris paribus profits increase.
8. Assuming that we ignore the balanced multiplier impacts on 
investment.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE INCIDENCE OF THE NON-DOMESTIC PROPERTY TAX IN THE UX 
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSESSMENT
The incidence of the non-domestic property tax in the UK remains an 
inconclusive issue. This chapter endeavours to measure its distributional 
impact in a general equilibrium context. It will be recalled that the 
antecedents of general equilibrium incidence theory lie in Harberger's 
analysis of coporation taxes. Harberger (1962) introduced into public finance 
a two sector model which provided the theoretical breakthrough necessary to 
analyse incidence in a general, rather than a partial equilibrium framework. 
The analysis presented here seeks to extend the standard model by 
introducing a stylised production hierarchy based on the observed flows of 
intermediate goods in the economy. The approach thus contrasts with 
previous empirical work in attempting to discern the incidence of the 
non-domestic property tax in a theoretically derived general equilibrium 
framework. However, before proceeding with the analysis, it would appear 
useful to briefly summarise the main conclusions of general equilbrium 
analysis of property tax incidence.
General equilbrium theory focuses on the economy-wide consequences 
of a differentially higher property tax levied on a region. The typical 
neoclassical assumptions of perfect commodity and factor markets employed 
in the model ensure that net-of-tax returns to mobile factors are uniform
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across regions in equilibrium. Thus, a relatively higher property tax imposed 
on one area induces an outward flight of capital (the mobile factor) to the 
untaxed regions. The increased supply of capital in these areas lowers 
marginal productivity and hence the post-tax returns to capital, while the 
reduced supply of capital in the taxed region increases marginal productivity 
and after-tax returns.
Equilibrium is eventually attained when sufficient capital has migrated 
from the taxed region to equalise the net-of-tax returns to capital. However, 
while equilibrium ensures the uniformity of after-tax returns to mobile 
factors, differences in returns to imperfectly mobile factors persist in the long 
run. Thus for example,in a "new-view" equilibrium, rent differentials 
between regions may exist. The important conclusion that distinguishes the 
"new-view" general, from partial equilibrium analysis, is the insight that 
while a uniform property tax across all local authority jurisdictions depresses 
the after-tax returns to capital throughout the economy, property tax rate 
differentials between areas lead to differences in the returns to immobile and 
imperfectly mobile factors.
However, in contrast to the literature on corporation taxes, there have 
been no previous attempts to estimate the economy-wide incidence of 
property taxes in a theoretically derived general equilibrium model.1 Hence 
the analysis presented in this paper has been formulated with the primary 
objective of obtaining numerical estimates of the incidence of non-domestic
property taxes in the UK. However, the paucity of spatially disaggregated 
data has necessitated an important modification to the conventional general 
equilibrium approach. Instead of analysing the consequences of spatial 
movements of mobile factors induced by geographical variations in tax rates, 
the model focuses on movements of capital between sectors resulting from 
inter-sectoral propety tax rate differentials. The sectoral variations in tax
rates derive partly from the operation of the rating system, which tends to/
tax more heavily those sectors which are intensive in the use of land and 
structures. These differences are further accentuated by the fact that 
agricultural land and buildings are exempted from rates, and industry is 
partially derated in certain regions - notably Scotland. Thus, different sectors 
in the economy are distinguished in the model presented below, on the basis 
of the actual variation in effective tax rates. In addition, the analysis 
incorporates a hierarchical production process in which intermediate goods 
serve as factor inputs.
The model further departs from the standard literature on property 
tax incidence in its factor mobility assumptions. Much of the existing 
theoretical work is concerned with the spatial variation in property tax rates, 
and thence the geographical migration of factors. Consequently, while capital 
mobility is central to the "new-view" theories, labour mobility is not among 
its assumptions. Since the present model focuses on the sectoral variations in 
tax rates, there is little reason to retain this assumption, and hence it is
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assumed that all factors are perfectly mobile in the long run.
The analysis presented here thus seeks to augment the existing general 
equilibrium literature by introducing intermediate goods to the analysis of 
property tax incidence, and by examining the consequences of a differential 
tax levied on several sectors located at different points in the production 
hierarchy. Section 5.1 thus presents the basic model, while section 5.2 solves 
for the expressions and enumerates the theoretical conclusions. Finally, 
section 5.3 attempts to empirically estimate the economy-wide incidence of 
property taxes in the UK.
5.1 The Model
The model employs the typical entourage of neoclassical assumptions 
which are briefly restated here without further elaboration. Thus it is 
assumed that factor and product markets are perfect, and that resource 
endowments consisting of "primary" factors (i.e. labour and capital) are fixed 
and fully employed.2 In addition, production functions are assumed to be 
linearly homogeneous and quasi-concave.
The model, however, departs from the standard literature in 
attempting to encapsulate the more prominent features of the non-domestic 
property tax in the UK. It was noted earlier that the rating system is 
characterised by substantial inter-sectoral tax rate differentials and hence 
the model distinguishes between three sectors: the rate exempt agricultural 
sector (A), the partially derated manufacturing sector (M). and the
distribution sector (D). This division, however, closely corresponds to the 
hierarchical structure of production in the economy. (Thus the UK 
input-output tables for 1979 reveal that 75% of the agricultural sector s 
output is sold to the manufacturing sector, while 70% of the manufacturing 
sector's product is sold through the distribution sector.) Hence the model 
explicitly incorporates intermediate goods. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
the agricultural sector produces only intermediate goods which are sold to the 
manufacturing and distribution sectors. In contrast, the manufacturing sector 
is assumed to sell its homogeneous product partly as an intermediate good to 
the distribution sector and the remainder directly to final demand. The 
distribution sector on the other hand, produces and sells only final goods. 
Figure 5.1 below provides a schematic illustration of the assumed 
inter-sectoral flows. It is evident that the intermediate goods serve as 
additional factor inputs in the model.
FIGURE 5.1
^Agriculture
Distribution
Final
Demand
Manufacturing
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The Structural Equations:
The economy is initially assumed to be at a Pareto optimal point on its 
production possibility frontier. Thus, all resources are fully employed and 
the assumption of perfect markets serves to ensure that prices equal 
marginal costs. The full employment condition can be expressed as follows:
(Ia) au A ♦ aLMM* * aLDD - L
(lb) aKAA + aKMM‘ ♦ aKDD - K
(lc) aAMM* ♦ aADD - A
(Id) aMDD ♦ M - M* 
where:
M* - m + M = total output of the manufacturing sector
m - aMI)D - quantity of manufacturing sector s output sold to D as an
intermediate good.
M * quantity of manufacturing sector's output sold to final demand
a*A * quantity of input i requried to produce a unit of A
a-M - quantity of input i required to produce a unit of M
ajD - quantity of input i required to produce a unit of D
L - labour 
K - capital
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In Equations (la) and (lb) the intermediate goods (i.e. A and m) can 
usefully be decomposed into their "primary" factor components thereby 
simplifying the above system. Substituting (Id) into ( lc), we obtain:
(le) aAKJaMDD + sam^  4 aAD^  * A
Substituting (Id) and (le) into (la) and (lb) yields:
<2a) 0ldD + 0LM M - L
(2b) QkdD + QkmM - K
where:
^LD ( aLAaA M aM D '+ aLAaA D + aLMaMD 4 a LD ^
^KD “ ( aKA aAMaMD 4 aKAaAD 4 aKMaMD 4 a KD ■
^LM *  ( aLA aAM 4 aLM *
^KM “ ( aKA aAM 4 aKM ^
The terms QLj .and 0Kj represent GROSS amounts of labour and capital
embodied in the final goods D and M (i.e. the direct purchases of primary 
factors, and their indirect consumption deriving from the purchase of 
intermediate goods.) In what follows the distinction between GROSS (i.e. 
total) and NET (i.e. direct) factor inputs will play a crucial role in the analysis.
In a perfectly competitive equilibrium, firms earn zero profits and 
hence unit costs reflect market prices. Thus:
where:
Pj « Price of good J 
w = wage rate
/
r * rental on capital
The assumption that production functions are linearly homogeneous 
makes each input-output coefficient dependent on input prices, and implies 
that factor demands are homogeneous of degree zero. Thus we have the 
following input demands:
(4a) aiD ■- f„ (w. r, PA, P„)
(4 b )  a iM '  f M ( w - r - P A)
(4c) aiA = fA (w, r.)
We now introduce a distortion into the system in the form of a 
differential property tax. In keeping with the rating system in the UK, it is 
assumed that a tax is levied on the manufacturing and distribution sectors at
the rates tM and tD respectively. Following Mieszkowski's (1972) seminal
paper, the property tax is treated as a tax on the stock of capital in each 
. sector. For greater generality, it is assumed that the tax rates levied on the
two sectors differ, and hence the situation where tax rates are uniform is 
subsumed as a special case of the model. The yield from the tax is given by:
^ = tDKD + tMKM = I d^ kd1^  + V aKM
where:
Kd « aKDD = Direct stock of capital in D
Km - skm^  = Direct stoc^ caPifal in M
It is perhaps worth noting paranthetically, that this formulation of the 
property tax differs from that used in several important extensions of 
Mieszkowski's model (e.g. Breukner(198i)). Typically, these studies treat the 
property tax as a tax on the housing or construction industry. In a frequently 
cited proof, Musgrave (1959) has shown that a tax on the output of a constant 
returns industry is analytically indistinguishable in its effects from a tax at 
equal rates on all inputs in the industry. Thus, in contrast to these studies 
the commodity being taxed in the present model is unambiguously the stock 
of capital.
With the introduction of a tax it becomes necessary to amend the price 
equations as follows:
166
Restated in terms of final goods and primary factors we have:
(6a) Qldw  + QKDr  + aKDtD + aKMaMDtM = PD
(6b) QLMw + 0KMr + aKMtM = PM
The comparative static properties of the system and the solution are 
deduced from the equations of change; differentiating equations (2a) and (2b) 
yields:
where:
L^D « QldD = fraction of the labour force employed in D
T ”
^lm " “ fraction of the labour force employed in M
1T ~
the circumflex (A) is used to denote proportional changes.
(i.e. D * _dD; L - dL ; etc.)
D L
Similarly differentiating the price equations (5a) and (5b) we obtain:
where:
a LD *  aLDw  = labour’s share of sector D's income
"P iT
a LM = 3l m w  " labour’s share of sector M’s income^tc.
Expressed in terms of primary factors and final goods, we have: 
(9a) 0LDw + 0KDr + a{,DtD + aKMaMDtM = PD
+ e KMr + “ km1^  *  PM 
where:
©ld = QLDW = labour’s GROSS share of sector D’s income, etc.
~ pT  . ____________
a KD " aKDH) anb a KM *  aKMtM
PM
Subtracting (9a) from (9b) we obtain an expression for the change in 
relative prices of the final goods:
(10a) (PD- £>m) = w (0LD- 0LM) - r (0KM - 0KD) + a^ptjj + a‘KMtM ( a{,D -1)
From Equation (10a) it follows that ceteris paribus the impact of 
a change in factor rewards on prices depends crucially on the coefficients
(0ld - 6lm) and (0KM - 0RD). These terms represent factor shares and
hence if sector D pays a relatively greater share of its income to labour then
(0ld - and ^ f°U°ws (^km‘ wb c^b *mPlies lbat sector M is
relatively capital intensive. Let |0| denote the determinant of equations (9a) 
and (9b). Jones (1971) has shown that 101 provides a measure of relative 
factor intensities based on factor SHARES IN VALUE ADDED. In contrast, the
determinant of Equations (7a) and (7b) { i.e. I X\ - XLD - XKD - XKM - XLM) 
yields a measure of factor intensities in PHYSICAL terms rather than factor 
shares. Jones (1971) proved that in an undistorted market, both 101 and \X\ 
must have the same sign, implying that a factor which is utilised relatively 
intensively also receives a greater share of the income of the industry. From 
the Samuelson-Stolper theorems it then follows than an exogenous 
disturbance has a "magnified effect" on the intensively used factor. However 
in the presence of a distortionary factor tax this condition no longer holds,
and hence |8| and |X| may have opposite signs thereby implying than an 
intensively used factor receives a smaller share of the industry's income.3 
Thus "perverse" supply responses may result if the distortions are 
sufficiently severe. To ensure that the supply curves in this model are "well
behaved", we therefore assume that |0| and \k\ have identical signs.
To close the model it becomes necessary to specify the demand side. 
In an effort to isolate the impact of the tax from the concomitant income and 
demand effects, we employ an artifact commonly used in the literature. 
Specifically it is assumed that the government spends its taxes so that the
reduction in private expenditures is exactly counterbalanced by increases in 
government spending. Furthermore, it is assumed that marginal propensities 
to consume final goods are equal and constant. Hence any changes in demand 
resulting from the distributive effects of the tax will be exactly offsetting. 
This together with the assumption of full employment implies that only 
relative prices are meaningful., and there is only one demand equation which 
can be expressed as follows:
(1 la) D « f, (PD/PM)
Differentiating:
( lib )  D - £ d (Pd -Pm)
where:
6 D - income compensated elasticity of demand for D
f*  A
Finally substituting Equations (9a) and (9b) for PD and PM in ( l ib )
yields an expression for D in terms of factor shares and primary factor 
returns:
die) D -£ D {0LDW - 0LMW + 0KDr - 0KMr + aKDtD 'a KMtM + a KMa MDW
5.2 The Solution:
The final incidence of the tax can be deduced from the changes in after 
tax rewards. Thus for instance, if the wage-rental ratio remains constant 
after the imposition of a property tax, then by implication the relative shares
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of labour and capital in national income remain unaffected (i.e. d(rK/wL) « 0). 
Expressed in terms of changes in relative factor rewards this "equi-burden" 
condition implies that ?=w. However, if this condition is to be expressed in 
terms of relative prices then it becomes necessary to assign one 
factor/commodity as a numeraire. Following Harberger (1962) we assume 
here that the wage rate is the numeraire (i.e. w=0) and hence r represents the 
relative price of capital. It then follows that the "equi-burden" condition 
reduces to r-w*0, or merely r=0. If on the other hand, capital were to bear a 
proportionately greater burden of the tax relative to its share in national 
income, it follows that ?<w, but since w=0 this simplifies to r<0. Thus the 
incidence of the tax can be inferred from the sign of r.
The model is solved for r by equating the proportionate changes in the 
demand for D as embodied in equation (11c) with the corresponding changes 
in supply.
A
Applying Cramer's Rule to (7a) and (7b) and solving for D, we obtain 
the following supply side expression:
A A A  . A  A
D -  ^lm^kd^kd ~ *k m \d Q ld  4 ^kntlm^km ~
*LD*KM ~ ^KD^ LM
The terms Q.j in Equation (12) represent gross factor shares and thus contain
A A  Ar. To solve for r it therefore becomes necessary to decompose the Ojjterms
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into their constituent components. This process is rather tedious and 
complicated and is therefore relegated to the appendix where it is shown 
that:
(13a) Qlm - (pr + n tM)/9LM
(13b) Qkm * (pr + n tM)/0KM
(13c) Old *  (pr + Y tM + titD)/0 LD
(13d) 0KD - - (pr + Y1M+ nt„ )/0KD 
where:
p “ f a LM a KM°KL '  a LMa KAa AMaAL + a LAa A ^K M aKA + a LA a AM a KA°K J  
11 " * a LMa KM°KL + “ lA ^N pK M 0^
P -  { [ a KD a MD( a LM + a AM a ± A )2] Om  + [ a MD«KDa LAl°MK + t a KA a AD a LD*°AL 
+  ^a KDa LD^°KL+ I a K A °W  05AM a MD” a AD^°LK + a^ LAa KK^MDa AM^°KA 
+ la KAa AM0fMDa LMl°LA + ^KM^MD^LM^KL *
Y -  H  aMDaKMaLD(aKAa AM + a KM)]o^M+ [ o:KI)aMDaKM( a LAa AM + a LM)l oMK
+ I ^MD^KM^AD^KM + a AMa KA " a KA^°MA +  ^0fLA0fAMa MD ° W  °KA*
X\ -  { [ « MD« KD( a LAa AM + a LM M °MK +  ^^AD^KD^LA^K + ^*KD a LD^KL *
The o*j terms in expression (13) denotes Allen Partial Elasticities of 
Substitution (AES hereafter) (i.e. o.j = p. ). While a negativeAES
d Pj &rK
signifies factor complementarity, a positive AES is indicative of factor 
substitutability. The signs of the AES are crucial to the stability of the input 
demand functions. Allen (19.09) has shown that a sufficient condition for the 
stability of the factor demands requires that:
°L D °U ; + «KD °KK + a MD°MK + “ AD0AK '  0
Since each own price AES is by definition negative (i.e. oKK<0), the other
positive cross price AES must be more numerous or important than the 
negative AES to ensure that the above condition holds. Thus by implication 
the stability conditions restrict the maximum number of negative AES in a 
production function (see Appendix 2). For simplicity, we therefore initially 
assume that all cross AES are positive. This restriction is relaxed in section 
5.4 in an attempt to explore the empirical consequences of factor 
complementarity.
The final solution for f  is obtained by substituting (13) into (12) and 
equating this supply side expression with the demand side as embodied in 
Equation (11c). Thus the tax burden borne by capital is given by:
(14)
r - (6D Ala^ptp + ) 'Jvc/f&pQ^-hJl/($Km 9l$ j
fcD A (©*„ - 0KP)} * P C / ^  + y / ^  f t„ %
where: A - XKD _ XLD - KJ .  LD
WKM "LM K*km UM
C = ^LD ^KD * QKdXld - ®LD^D ♦ 0L D ^  
Xjr-AKM LM M l m
(*) denotes GROSS quantity of a factor
The denominator of (14) is frequently referred to as the "aggregate 
elasticity of substitution" (Jones 1965). Under the stringent assumptions 
underlying the model, the denominator can be shown to be positive, and 
hence the sign of r will depend crucially on that of the numerator.
THE SIGN OF THE DENOMINATOR:
i.e .£  D K* L* Kd - l D [^KM - 6 Kd J+ : P ' . C + P
K* V  M. QLD 0 KD .
The first term in the denominator € D , is the income compensated 
elasticity of demand which is by definition negative, hence if it can be shown
that K * L* “D - D ( 0KM“ 0KD) is negative the denominator will be positive. In
Section 5.2 it was assumed that |9| and \X\ have the same sign thereby
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ensuring that a factor which is relatively intensively utilised, receives a
greater share of the income of the industry. Hence, if ( C^ M- 0KD) >0 sector 
M
pays a greater share of its income to capital, and is consequently capital 
intensive which implies that Kp _ Lp <0, and hence the denominator
will be positive. The second term in the denominator contains p and
p whose signs depend on their constituent AES which are assumed to be 
positive. Thus the denominator of the incidence expression will be positive.
Having established the sign of the denominator certain general 
conclusions can be inferred from equation (14). The first term in the 
numerator embodies the demand effects and in Mieszkowski’s parlance is 
termed the "output effect". The second and third terms are referred to as 
"substitution effects", and describe the impact of factor suitability on r. The 
sign of the "substitution effects" is ambiguous. Hence if the "output effect" is 
positive and greater in absolute value than the "substitution effects", r will be 
positive implying that part of the burden has been shifted to labour. The 
following conclusions can now be deduced from (14).
PROPOSITION 1
Labour bears a greater proportion of the tax, if and only if, 
the overall burden of the tax falls more heavily on the LABOUR 
INTENSIVE sector (i.e. r>0).
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It was noted earlier that when labour bears a proportionately greater 
burden of the tax, this implies that ?>w, and since w is the numeraire (and 
hence w=0) this condition simplifies to r>0. Clearly, r will be positive only if 
the numerator and hence the "output effects" are positive and greater in 
absolute value than the "substitution effects". Consider the "output effects" in
The third term represents the relative tax burdens borne by sector M and D. 
While, ot'KD{D and a’KMtM reflect the direct taxes levied on the two sectors;
a KMaMD^M on ot^er hanc* represents that fraction of the tax levied on M 
which is transmitted to sector D through the sale of higher priced 
intermediate goods. Thus the term (a‘KD?D + describes the
OVERALL tax burden, both direct and transmitted, borne bv sector D. The 
second term in the above expression represents the gross relative factor
intensities, whileCD denotes the income compensated elasticity of demand.
Since£D is by definition negative, the "output effect" will be positive, if and
only if, Kp _ L j (a'KDtD + a'KMaMDi M - a Thus if sector D is labour
intensive then ( _ L^ )<0, and the "output effect" will be positive only if
M
( _ L'D ) ( a KDtD + a - a km^   ^ 0 which implies that the
overall relative tax burden suffered by the labour intensive sector D 
(i.e. a'KDtD + g'ki^md^ ls 8rea^ t  than that borne by sector M. This result is
in fact similar to Harberger’s (1962) much quoted conclusion that the burden 
of a tax on capital income can only be shifted to labour if the taxed sector is 
labour intensive. In the present model, the general tenor of Harberger’s 
result holds under the additional caveat that the labour intensive settor bears 
a higher proportion of the overall (i.e. direct and transmitted) tax burden. 
PROPOSITION 2
The greater are the AES between capital and labour in the 
untaxed agricultural sector, the greater will be the tendency for 
labour and capital to bear the tax burden in proportion to their 
initial shares in national income (i.e. ?=0).
The AES between labour and capital in the untaxed agricultural sector
(i.e. o£l ) appear only in the denominator of equation (14) as a component of
p. Thus, in the limit as o^L approaches infinity and all other elasticities tend
to zero, ? will approach zero.4 
PROPOSITION 3
The greater are the AES between the product of the untaxed 
sector (A), and the untaxed primary factor (labour), the greater
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will be the tendency for labour and capital to bear the tax in 
proportion to their initial shares in national income (i.e. r=0).
Once again, o®L and o^L appear only in the denominator as
components of p and p. Hence as these approach infinity, r tends to zero.
PROPOSITION 4
Increases in the following AES: o^K 0jJL o£L c^L
tend to raise the relative burden of the tax borne by capital 
relative to its initial share in national income (i.e. r<0).
These AES appear in both the numerator and the denominator with 
equal coefficients but opposite signs. Hence as they approach infinity and all
other elasticities tend to zero, $ will approach (-tD -tM ). Thus the price of
capital will fail by the amount of the tax. However, since the reduction in 
price applies to capital employed in all sectors, taxed and untaxed, the decline 
in the returns to capital will exceed the revenue garnered by the government 
in taxes.
The elasticities discussed in Propositions 2 and 3 above, reflect the 
ability of the untaxed sector to absorb the capital released from the taxed 
sectors. Hence increases in these AES tend to dampen the proportion of the 
tax borne by capital. In contrast, the result in Proposition 4 reveals that 
increases in substitutability between taxed factors and the products of a
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taxed sector provides little opportunity for capital to escape the burden of the 
tax and hence in the limit the returns to capital decrease by the amount of 
the tax.
PROPOSITION 5
When gross factor intensities in the final goods sectors are
equal, the "output effect" is rendered impotent.
This result derives from the fact that when ( _Lp )=0, all terms
Hi -
containing the elasticity of demand and hence the "output effect" are reduced 
to zero, and consequently? depends only on the "substitution effects". 
PROPOSITION 6
When all factors are used in fixed proportions (i.e. o^ -0)
the incidence of the tax depends only on the "output effects".
In this case, expression (14) simplifies to:
£ d .a  ^ k m * W
The numerator is the "output effect", whose sign was shown to depend on 
relative factor intensities, and the relative tax burdens. Thus with a positive 
denominator, the incidence of the tax depends on the sign of the "output 
effects".
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PROPOSITION 7
If  only one final goods sector is taxed, labour will bear a 
greater share of the tax burden in proportion to its initial share in 
national income, if and only if, the taxed sector is relatively labour 
intensive.
With a tax on only one final goods sector, the "output effects" simplify 
to:£ D ( KjJ -  Lq ) ( a'KDtD ) if sector D is taxed, a n - L j  ) (- + a'KM
T/t T* y* T *
a MDtM ) if sector M is taxed. Clearly, the “output effects" will be positive only
if the taxed sector is labour intensive. This result corresponds to Harberger s 
conclusion, and it therefore appears not unreasonable to suggest that the 
Harberger model can be regarded as a special case of this more general 
framework which incorporates intermediate goods, and a tax on two sectors 
of the economy.
PROPOSITION 8
When the tax rates levied on the two final goods sectors are 
EQUAL, the incidence expression simplifies to:
(15)
r «£ D A(a'KDt + a'KMt - - ICiY+fLl/fQ&fy*) + n/^KM^W 1
^ D A   ^ e KM " + P £ / ( . 0 K i ;& p " )  + p/  ®KM )
Once again r>0 iff the labour intensive sector bears a greater proportion of the
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overall tax burden. This result is therefore a special case of that derived in 
Proposition 1. It would however be putative to thence conclude that the 
incidence of a uniform tax on the two final goods sectors is identical to that of 
an unequal tax, for by definition the "substitution effects" in the incidence 
expressions describe the consequences of a diversion of economic activity 
from high to low taxed sectors. Hence, this subsection attempts to discern the 
"differential incidence" of substituting an unequal property tax levied on the 
two final goods sectors, with an equal yield uniform tax. Algebraically, the 
alternative tax regimes yield the same revenues if the following condition is 
satisfied:
(16a) i D. aKD + tMaKM - t (aKD + aKM)
(16b) t - t D aKD 4 t M aKM
a^KD + ° W
where:
A
t = uniform tax rate levied on sectors M and D.
The "differential incidence" resulting from a change to a uniform tax 
regime can be derived by subtracting expression (15) from (14) subject to 
(16b). For ease of exposition we analyse the "differential output" and 
"substitution effects" separately. Consider first the "output effects" under a 
system of unequal taxes. From Equation (14) we have:
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where: S - a KDtD - a'KMtM + a’KD aKMtM
If on the other hand an equal yield uniform tax is levied on sectors M 
and D from (15), the "output effects" are:
(17b) C  d A (Of'KDi D - + a KDaKM^ ^ ^
where: R = a '^ t - a*KMt + 
and t is as defined in (16b)
Subtracting (17b) from (17a) yields the "differential output effect":
(18) £ D ^ a KD + a*KDaKM " a*KM ^  ^
Substituting (16b) for t and solving:
(19) ^ D ^ a KDaK M ^  " a MD " W   ^ ^
Equation (19) reveals that [ o'kd^ m ^  " a MD ^
determines the absolute magnitude of the "differential output effects", and 
£ D A the eventual sign. Thus if sector D is capital intensive, then (Kg /K „
>LJ/L*) and hence i  D A<0. If in addition (tp- tM) >0 then ( a‘KDaKM (2 -
a MD ^  anc* hence (19) will be negative implying that the output
effects under a uniform tax regime exceed those under a differential tax 
system. Thus ceteris paribus the tax changes will lower the burden borne by
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capital. Conversely, if sector D is labour intensive, then£D A>0 and if in
addition (tD-tM)>0 then (19) will be positive and consequently the substitution
of an equal yield uniform tax for the unequal taxes will reduce the "output 
effects" thereby increasing the burden on capital. Table 5.1 summarises the 
main results:
TABLE 5-1
1 D A
"Output Effects” under a 
differential tax 
i.e. (tD* t M)
'Output Effects under 
a uniform tax 
i.e. (tD= tM)
1. If (tD-tM)>0 and£p A>0 • > -
2. If (tD-tM)>0 and A<0 < ■
3. If and £jj A<0 - > -
4. If (^ d~^)<0 and A>0 •• < -
Clearly the overall effect of the tax change depends on the combined 
impact of the "output" and "substitution effects". From (14) we have the 
following "substitution effects" under unequal taxes:
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(20) - (Y.C/( 0K5 ■■+ n/( 0KM 0LM) tM - ( TIC /  (0*j> Slu) lD “ ^ lM 4 ^ lD
where: X -YC/(0w' E j ^ J n / (  0KM0LM) and Y - tjA © ^© ^ )
Under uniform taxes, the "substitution effects" are:
(21) - { G(Y* ( [ ) /  (0kp 0to) 4 nA ©lm )) t
where: t  is as defined in (16b)
Subtracting (21) from (20) we obtain:
(22) X(lM-t)  + Y (tD - 1)
Simple algebraic manipulation of (16a) and (16b) reveals that:
If (^ D-^ jyj) >0 <& (tD- t )  >0 and if tfD-tM) <0 <«> (tM-1) >0, it then follows
that if (tD-1)>0 then tfM-t) <0 and vice versa. Thus in equation (22) when
d jj- l)  >0 then (^-t) <0. if in addition the coefficient of (tM4) (i.e. X) is greater
than the coefficient of dp-t) (i.e. Y) then equation (22) will be positive, which 
implies that the negative "substitution effects" under the differential tax
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system exceed those under a uniform tax regime. The results are 
summarised in Table 5.2
TABLE 5.2
(tD"W X*Y
The NEGATIVE 
“Substitution Effects- ><
The NEGATIVE 
“substitution effects"
■fcp ~
1.
(i.e. (tM-t)<0
X > Y •* > -
2. (tD-tM)>0 
(i.e. (tM-t)<0
X < Y ii <
3. (tD-tM)<0 
(i.e. (tj -^t)>0
X > Y <
^D~W<0
(i.e. (tj^ j-t)>0
X < Y > "
The overall impact of the tax change is provided by the combined results 
of Tables 5.1 and 5.2. which are summarised in Table 5.3 below.
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TABLE 5.3
£ d a X > Y
r under differential 
taxes (i.e. >
funder uniform 
taxes i.e. (tD-1^)
1. >0 >0 X > Y u ?
2. >0 >0 X < Y = >
3. >0 <0 X > Y = <
4. >0 <0 X < Y - ?
5. <0 <0 X > Y = >
6. <0 <0 X < Y « ?
7. <0 >0 X>Y ?
8. <0 >0 X < Y - <
There appear to be two relevant Inferences to be drawn from the 
ambiguity portrayed in Table 5.3. Firstly, the results suggest that a move 
towards a uniform tax system will not necessarily serve to dampen the 
distortions emanating from the "substitution effects", which depend crucially 
on the coefficients X and Y, and their constituent factor shares and AES. Thus 
in the absence of further restrictions on the form of the Production function 
and thence the factor shares and AES, it seems impossible to draw more 
definitive conclusions about the differential incidence of the tax. However,
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the model has yielded unambiguous conclusions regarding the "budget 
incidence" of the property tax. Thus, the spirit of Harberger’s conclusions 
have shown to endure, albeit with minor aberations, the introduction of a 
three sector hierarchical production process, and a tax on the stock of capital 
in two sectors. Hence while the intermediate goods were seen to provide 
additional "escape hatches" for capital thereby increasing opportunities for 
factor substitutability, a tax on two sectors of the economy necessitated a 
distinction between the direct tax burden levied on an industry, and the 
overall tax burden. The eventual incidence of the property tax thus reflected
the complex interaction between these and other frequently conflicting
\
forces.
5.3 Empirical Estimates of Incidence:
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the general equilibrium 
framework lies in its ability to generate numerical estimates of the economy 
wide distortions resulting from a tax. Hence this section seeks to infer from 
the above model the overall incidence of the UK non-domestic property tax. 
The computations are restricted to the year 1978-1979; the period for which 
the most recent data on input-output coefficients are available. It would, 
however, seem worth stressing at the outset that the estimates are at best 
suggestive rather than definitive, partly owing to the strong assumptions 
invoked to obtain a theoretical solution, and partially as a result of the 
inadequacies of the available data. The statistics used to estimate the
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incidence were derived mainly from the National Income Accounts. However, 
in applying these to a general equilibrium model, it becomes necessary to 
convert the "Keynesian" macro-aggregates into their "Walrasian"
microeconomic components. In the first instance, the general equilibrium 
models implicitly assume competitive behaviour, as exemplified by the 
assumptions of perfect commodity and factor markets. Thus in so far as the 
decision making process in the public sector is guided by political fiat rather 
than market forces, it becomes necessary to exclude the public sector from 
the incidence estimates. Appendix 3 outlines the procedure employed to 
purge the public sector contribution to national income. A further difficulty 
stems from the assumption that factors of production are homogeneous, 
thereby implying that in equilibrium returns to mobile factors are equalised. 
This clearly contradicts the observed wage and rental differentials between 
sectors, industries and regions. Following Harberger (1962), this impasse is 
circumvented by defining a physical unit of a factor as that quantity which is 
capable of generating £ 1/- worth of net-of-tax income. Thus the physical 
measure of a factor corresponds to the income earned by a factor. Following 
the procedure outlined in the data appendix the direct shares of capital and 
labour in the agricultural, manufacturing and distribution sectors in 1978 are 
presented below in Table 5.4
TABLE 5.4
DIRECT SHARES OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR (1978)
Agriculture Manufacturing Distribution Total
Capital 1,773 10,570 2,396 14,739
Labour 1,945 77,147 14,163 93,255
Estimates of the gross (i.e. direct and indirect) shares of labour and 
capital in national income were derived from the data on inter-industry 
transactions provided in the UK Input-Output Tables (1979), which revealed 
that 75% of the agricultural sector's output was sold to manufacturing, and 
hence 25% was assumed to have been sold to the distribution sector. 
Similarly, 70% of the output of the manufacturing sector was sold through 
distribution, and 30% directly to final demand. Using these estimates Table 
5.5 below presents data for the gross shares of labour and capital in national 
income.
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TABLE 5.5
GROSS SHARES OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN NATIONAL INCOME
Manufacturing Distribution Total
Capital 3,570 11,169 14,739
Labour 23,582 69,673 93,255
From the above information the factor shares in the incidence 
expression (14) can be calculated as shown in Table 5.6
TABLE 5.6
FACTOR SHARES
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The incidence of the non-domestic property tax is to be estimated 
using an elasticity measure derived from the algebraic solution in (14). The 
required elasticity is given by:
(23a) £ t^D + (d r/r) /  (dt0 ^ D+ d tM^ M)
We derive £ ^ tD + lM^  from the incidence expression (14) as follows: 
LetXM= tn/tn+i* and XD= tp/t»+i$
then XM + XD » 1, and hence £^ tD + tM)can be expressed as the 
weighted sum of partial elasticities as follows:
(23b) £^tD + tM) » (d r/r) /  { XM (dtM/tM) + XD ( dtD/tD) )
But (d r/r) (dtM/t„ )  £■ = the PARTIAL elasticity of capital
income with respect to tM.
Thus,
(23c) £^d + tMj - (£ tM XM + £ tD XD )
From Equation (14) the partial elasticities £ lD and £ tM can readily
be deduced, and hence the elasticity of capital income with respect to
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property taxes is given by:
£  ( id  4  tM )
X « k j U ^ M  -  e *  e LD-C+
£j> A /6(fn *“ © «z)* -./*—-
©/3> 0 KP Q xn Olm
The absence of data on the AES renders it necessary to assume
)
"plausible" values for the elasticities in the equation (24). Thus in Table 5.7
Row 1 reveals the value of £ ^lD+tM^  under Cobb-Douglas assumptions.
Specifically, it is assumed that (a) all intermediate goods are used in fixed 
proportions, hence their AES are zero, and (b) all other elasticities in 
production and demand are assumed to equal unity. Harberger (1962) 
formally proved that in this situation "capital will bear precisely the full 
burden of the tax". Heuristically, this result can be seen to derive from the 
peculiar property of a unitary elasticity of substitution production function 
(see Silberberg 1981), which ensures that the total payments to factors of 
production are unaffected by the substitution of one factor for another. Thus, 
if the post-tax returns to labour are to remain constant, the burden of the tax
must fall entirely on capital. Hence the value of + lNj)— 0.107 in the
Cobb-Douglas case implies that capital bears a 100% of the tax burden. Row 1 
will be used as a benchmark for comparison with other equilibria.
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TABLE 5.7 
INCIDENCE ESTIMATES (£ tD ♦ tM)
Value of o V - - 1 <2 n O V  -  -1 .5
1. o£l « oM l « * a11 othef °U "  ° ’000001 -0.107 -0.108 -0.107
2. A l i o ' - l -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
3. A ll Oy - 0.00001 allother O .j -  1 -0.107 -0.106 -0.107
4. A ll Ojj -  0.00001 allother O .j -  1 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013
5. A ll O jj - 0.00001 allother O.* -  1 -0.097 -0.096 -0.096
6.
7.
°MK " °AK " °AK “ 0 00001 a11 other ° i j  " 1 
" °K L “ °K L " 0 00001 allother O .j - 1
-0.1
-0.02
-0.101
-0.02
-0.1
-0.02
The results in row 2 are derived under the assumption that all AES in
equation (24) are unity, and thus C^tD + tM^ is seen to fall to -0.09 implying
that capital bears 86% of the tax burden. In contrast, in row 3. it is assumed 
that all AES in sector D are approximately zero, while those in other sectors 
are unity. (Specifically, it is assumed that the AES are 0.00001 to ensure
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that the stability conditions outlined in Section 2 are satisfied). Once again, 
capital bears a 100% of the tax burden. In rows 4 and 5, the AES in sectors M 
and A are assumed to be zero respectively, and it can be seen that in the 
former case, capital bears a mere 13% of the burden, and in the latter 92% of 
the tax. When AES in sector A are zero, it becomes impossbile for A, the 
untaxed sector, to absorb the capital released from the taxed sectors and thus 
the tax burden rises to 92%. In contrast, by constraining the AES in M to zero, 
opportunities for substituting untaxed factors for capital are substantially 
diminished, thereby lowering the burden of the tax on capital. A comparison 
of rows 3 and 4 reveals that factor substitutability in sector M is of far 
greater significance than in sector D. This result appears to derive from the 
location of sector M in the production hierarchy, which allows the impact of 
factor substitutability and taxes to be transmitted through to sector D.
In Row 6, the AES between capital (the taxed factor), and all
intermediate goods are assumed to be zero, and £ tD + tM equals -0.10
implying that capital bears 93% of the tax burden. In contrast, in row 7, the 
AES between "primary” factors (i.e. labour and capital) are assumed to be
zero, and £ tD + tM t0 approximately -0.02 implying that capital suffers
only 19% of the tax burden.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.7 reveals the consequence of varying the 
elasticity of substitution in demand (denoted V) between the final goods D
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and M from 0 to 1.5. The elasticity of substitution in demand is related to the
elasticity of demand via the following formula (see Harberger 1962):
£. D -V In the main, the table reveals that the incidence estimates are
D + M
unaffected by the change, thereby revealing the insensitivity of' £ t^D + tM^  to
variations in the elasticity of demand.
Finally, Table 5.8 presents the results of introducing complementarity 
between factor inputs. The cases considered satisfy the stability conditions 
outlined in Section 2 above. However, complementarity between labour and 
capital, rather unrealistically, implies that increases in the rental on capital 
induce decreases in the demand for labour, and this case is consequently 
ignored in the foregoing analysis.
T A B L E  5 . 8
V - - 1
* * = °LA  *  °AT ” -1 all other OiJ " * -0 .1 1 8
°MK *  °LA  *  °AA " -1 all other OiJ “ * -0 .1 2 1
°AE = °A M  *  °AK ’  -1 all other OiJ " ^ -0 .0 9 4
°AK = 0 AM = 0 A L " -1 all other OiJ " * -0 .101
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In general Table 5.8 appears to reveal that in sector D, 
complementarity between M and K on the one hand, and L and A on the 
other, tend to increase the burden on capital, while complementarity between 
A and K, and A and M lower the burden. Similarly, in sector M 
complementarity between A and L raises the tax burden borne by capital, 
when compared with complementarity between A and K.
Perhaps the most definitive conclusion to emerge from the numerical 
simulations stems from the crucial role played by the location of a 
multi-sector tax in a hierarchical production economy. The exercise reveals 
that the overall distortionary impact of a property tax levied on intermediate 
goods producers, exceeds the deleterious consequences of a tax on the final 
goods sectors. Overall, the empirical results appear to suggest that over a 
large range of not inplausible situations, capital bears much of the property 
tax burden.
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APPENDIX 1 
DERIVATION OF a.j and Q,j
From equation 4a, we know that:
(1) aLD - a LD (w, r, PM PA tD)
Differentiating totally:
(2) \ d ^ \ p > d w ; . w  + eaLD . (r + tD) + daLD.dPM PM
dw w aLD d(r + tD) aLD dPM PM aLD
+ aLD dPA Pa 
dPA PA a LD
Now define Allen partial elasticities of substitution (i.e. AES) 
between factor i and factor J in sector D as:
aiD ° ij “ d a jd •
dPi a JD
Applying the AES formula to (2) yields:
(3) a LD = aLD. o* .w + aKD . o^ K . (r + tD) + aMD . . PM + aAD. oAL. PA
Allen (1969) has shown that:
(4) aLD. o^L + aKD • + aMD . + aAD. o^L - 0
In addition from (8b) and (8c) we have:
(8b) aLMW + aKM + + ttAM • PA " PM
[S c ) aLA .w + aKA. t  -  PA
We know that w - 0, since w is the numeraire.
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Hence substituting (8b) and (8c) into (3) yields:
aLD " ^  a KD * ° l l  + a MD ‘ °ML  ^a KM + a AM a KA  ^+ a AD * a AD ‘ a KA‘ °AL
*  • I aM 3 ‘ aKM’ °MlJ + lD I aKD ’ °iaJ
A
Derivation of aKD:
From (4a) we have:
 ^* 3 ^ kd  " aKD  ^ w> r ’ PD ’ P A‘
Defined in terms of AES this yields:
(2) aKD - aLD. • w + aKD . . (r + tD) + aMD . PM
+ a A D • °A K  * PA
In addition w is the numeraire, and Allen (1969) proved that:
(3) aLD. oKL + aKD . o^K + aMD o,JK + aAD. (rAK «■ 0
We know that:
(8 b )  Pm  -  “ lm  • " + a KM • + + a AM • PA
(8c) &A-o u .W40ICAJ
Substituting into (2) and using (3):
aKD “ ’  r la L D 0KL+ a MD °MK ^a LM + a AM a LA  ^ + a AD * a LA' °AK ^
“ S  1 °LD ' °LL + a MD ‘ °MK + a AD • °AK ^
+ l M ‘  ^ a MD • a KM ‘ °MK '
98
A
Derivation of aAD:
(1) $AD - aLD. oAL + aKD . oAK (r + tD) + . aMA. PM+ aAD . . PA
We know that:
(2) aAD-°AA +0fLD -°AL + aKD ' °AK + aMD * °MA " 0 
and
(*>>)■ PM - a LM ^  + «KM (Ar + t M) + C11A M -P A
(8c) V “ u - *  + 0 iCA-f
Substituting in (1) and setting w - 0:
®AD " ~ r * la KD, a LA' aAK + a MD * °MA *  ^a LM + ttAM * a KA" a KA ^
‘  a LD ‘ a KA °A L  ' + l M 1 a MD ’ a KM * °MA ' + * °K D  * °AK
A
Derivation of aMD:
(1) ^MD“ aLD,0 lM ^  +aKD ' °KM + lD^  + aMD *°MM-PM + aAD ’ °MA ' m 
We know that:
a MD • °MM + a LD • °LM + a KD * °KM + a MD ‘ °MM " 0
and
(8b) PM - « L M W + 0[K M rr + tM) + 0iA M PA 
(80 A^-au .w + aKA.f
Substituting in (1) and setting w - 0:
TO
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^MD “ r  ’ ^ K D  • °KM *  ^ a LM+0fAM ' a LA  ^ " ttLD • °LM  ^1 " a LM " t tAM * ttLA ^
'  a AD ’ a MA *  ^ t tKM + 05AM a KM '  a KA  ^ ^
~ \ l  ’  ^ a KM ,<XLD * °LM + a KM * a KD ’ °MK + °KM * aAD * °MA ^
+ l D  ^a KD * °MK ^
Sector M
Derivation of a^ .
(1) aLM aLM. (r, w, PA, t M)
aLM "  a LM • °LL • W  + a KM * °KL + W  + a AM * °A L  * P A
We know that w = 0 and PA = aLA. w + aKA. r
Substituting in (2):
^LM ^ • ^KM • °KL + aAM * aKA 1 aA J  + lM •  ^aKM * °KL ^
Derivation of aKM.
(1) aKM - aKM • (r, w, PA, t M)
(2) aKM - aLM. oLK. w + aKM. oKK (r + tM) + aAM. oAK. PA
Since . oLK + aKM. oKK + aAM. oAK. = 0
and w - 0, and PA = aLA. w + aKA then 
Substituting in (2):
\ m *  ‘  r * a^ LM °LK + a AM • °AK  ^ 1 “ aKA^  ^
‘  t M  ^ °LM  ' °LK + a AM * °AK 1
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However, since . w + aKA. i  « ^  it follows that:
°L A  + a KA “ 1
•• U - 0 ™ *  -  a LA
Substituting in (3): 
aKM f  ' a^ LM °LK + ttAM ' °LA  °AK ^
M * 1 a LM * C
DERIVATION OF V> > X
(1) ^A M  “ a LM • ° L A -
AW +a KM ° K A ( r
Since aLM. °L A  + a KM ■Va + a AM
A
Pa
and w * 0, and PA - aLA. w + aKA .f, then 
Substituting in (1):
®AM = ^ • a^ KM ‘°KA  ^ 1 " °KA^  ^ " a LM • a KA‘ 0K>J
+ I a KM’ °KA  ^ l M
Since = (1 -q=kA) :
^ A M  = " r  ’ * t tKM ,0LA . °K A  ‘  t tLM ‘ t tKA* °L A   ^
+ ^a KM °KA ^
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Sector A:
A
Derivation of aLA:
W  aL A ' aL A (r' W)
(2]  •• \ a ‘ ° U - ® I L  ^  + a K A - ° U . / f
A
Since w *= 0, then
aLA * «KA 'f  
Derivation of “aKA
(1) /aKA - aLA. o£k . w + aKA. oKK. r
Since aLA. + aKA. o£K - 0, then substituting in (1):
A A A
aKA~ " a LA*°LK,r
A
Derivation of Qjy
In equation (2a) of section 5.2 we defined:
(1) QlM -  «LA • aAM + aLM
Totally differentiating and manipulating this result yields: (See 
Bhatia (1981)):
^  QlM “ °LM  • aLM + *L A  • °*AM ‘  ^ aLA *  aAM ^
0 LM
Substituting for §LM , SLA and SAM from above and rearranging 
we obtain:
L^M “ (p r + n tM)
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where:
p = J a LM,a KM- °KL+ aLM- a KA a AM * °AL + aLA ' °AM • a KM ’ °KA
+ aLA aAM ' aKA • °KL ^
11 = I a LM * aKM * °KL+ a LA * aAM * aKM • ° iTa ^
The other §.j terms are derived in an analogous manner and
defined in equation (12) of section 5.2.
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APPENDIX 2 
THE STABILITY CONDITION
Allen (1969) proved that the weighted sum of the AES in a linearly 
homogenous production function equals zero i.e. in sector D we have:
aLD°LL + V 0KL + a MD°ML + V aL * 0
11 ttLD°KL a KD°KK + aMD°KM + aAD°AK “ 0
111 aLD°ML a KD°KM + a MD°fMM + ttAD°AM = 0
IV  a LDaAL a KD°AK + a MD°AM + a AD°AA " 0
Each own AES is negative. Thus in the above system of equations, 
the terms in the leading diagonal are negative. If the above conditions are 
to be satisfied then the positive AES in each row must be more numerous 
or important than the negative AES. In particular, all the AES in each row
cannot be negative. Thus, for example, if a^L <0 and ojJL <0 then o^L >0. If 
in addition oj?M <0 then >0 and o^M >0. On the other hand with cj^ l<0,
°ML <^ * °AM anc* °AK we must ^ave 0M. >0, °KM ^  f°U °ws ^ al 
above conditions are satisfied either if all AES are positive, or specified 
combinations are negative so that each row has at least one positive AES.
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APPENDIX 3
CALCULATION OF LABOUR INCOME AND CAPITAL INCOME 
Labour Income:
Private sector labour income is calculated as income from employment, 
and the component of income from self employment which accrues to labour. 
Income from employment for each industry is taken from the GDP accounts in 
National Income and Expenditure (NIE hereafter). To obtain data for the 
private sector alone, a correction must be made. For this purpose, 
employment data by industry group for central government, local authorities, 
public corporations and the private sector, published in Economic Trends 
1980 was used. This data was converted to an industrial basis consistent 
with the disaggregation employed in the National Income and Expenditure 
Accounts.
Total income generated by self employed persons and partnerships is 
published in the NIE accounts. However, it becomes necessary to 
disaggregate these statistics by industry group. For this purpose, Inland 
Revenue Statistics on net income by self employed persons and partnerships 
was used. The industry wise data thus obtained was divided into returns to 
labour and capital using average weekly income published in the New 
Earnings Survey. The self employment return to labour is computed as the 
income which self employed persons would have received had they been 
employees receiving the average income for their industry.
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Capital Income:
Capital Income originating in the private sector is taken to comprise 
trading profits, rental income, the component of income accruing to self 
employed persons which represents a return to capital and capital 
gains/losses.
Data on trading profits (including rental income) are taken from the 
NIE accounts. Data on capital gains on an industrial basis are not available. 
However, to the extent that retentions are included in the data on trading 
profits, and these represent future capital gains, some account is taken of 
this factor. The method employed to calculate the proportion of self 
employed income accruing to capital was discussed above.
Division of the Economy into sectors:
The NIE Accounts divide the economy into the following industries:
1. Agriculture
2. Forestry, Fishing
3. Mining, Quarrying and Manufacture
4. Gas, Water and Electricity
5. Transport and Communications
6. Other Services
7. Insurance, Banking and Finance
8 Distribution
It was assumed that the "agricultural sector" comprised of the rate 
exempt sectors which are agriculture, forestry and fishing. Industries 2 - 7  
were defined as the "manufacturing sector", and 8 the "distribution sector".
Calculation of Effective Property Tax Rates Paid by Each Sector:
/
Payments of "rates" are difficult to assign by industry group. The 
method used is to take assessments of rateable values for 1978 by type of 
structure and assign these to industrial groupings. The rateable values were 
assigned to each industry using capital stock data on buildings published in 
NIE Accounts. This data was used as weights for assigning each year's rate 
payments given in the aggregate in NIE Accounts. To purge the public sector 
from these estimates, Economic Trends data on public sector capital stock was 
used as weights to scale down the figures.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1. There are, however, two notable exceptions: Whalley (1975) and 
Piggott and Whalley (1985) in a study of the distortionary impact of 
the UK tax system, include in their general equilibrium models, 
property taxes together with other major factor taxes. Their 
computations thus describe the distortionary impact of the entire tax 
system rather than property taxes in isolation. Hence a number of 
"new-view" conclusions have remained largely unestimated. 
Specifically, there have been no previous attempts to compute the 
economy-wide incidence of property taxes per se. This is the main 
purpose of the current endeavour. The approach employed here, 
however, differs considerably from that of Whalley (1975) and Piggott 
and Whalley (1985). These authors have articulated elaborate general 
equilibrium models and obtained solutions employing Scarf's algorithm. 
The objective of this exercise is much more modest, both in terms of 
size and computational techniques. The method adopted here draw;s 
mainly from the literature on corporation taxes, and in particular the 
work of Harberger (1962) and Bhatia (1981).
2. The paucity of data on land rents in the manufacturing and distribution 
sectors has rendered it necessary to assume that "capital" as defined 
here includes land as a factor of production.
3. Thus, for example, if an industry is labour intensive in physical terms, 
and the tax on labour is excessively high, then it is possible that in 
terms of income shares labour receives a relatively smaller fraction of 
the industry's income. That is |k| and |0| will have opposite signs.
4. In essence, this result reflects the fact that the untaxed agricultural 
sector acts as a "reserve", which absorbs factors released from the 
taxed sectors.
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
*i t  cannot be that axioms established by argumentation can suffice fo r 
the discovery o f new works, since the sublety o f nature is  greater many timet 
over than the subtlety o f argument
Bacon, Novum Organum 1.14 (translation Ellis and Spedding)
Introduction
This Chapter deals with the main methodological difficulties 
encountered in measuring the incidence of a broad based tax such as the 
property tax. Section 6.1 thus introduces a coherent framework for 
comparing the different measures of incidence, while the following three 
sections discuss the assumptions underlying the measures based on the 
income distribution approach, the general equilibrium framework and 
econometric techniques. It is suggested that the income distribution and 
general equilibrium approaches rely on highly restrictive assumptions which 
are imposed on the data rather than empirically verified, and therefore 
appear to be of questionable value. In contrast, the econometric approach 
provides a framework for both testing existing incidence theories and 
generating data consistent estimates of tax shifting. Section 6.4 therefore 
discusses the pioneering Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) econometric study 
of corporation tax incidence, and its methodological implications. The final
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section briefly reviews an approach to dynamic specification due to Sargan 
(1964) and Hendry (1983), which appears to overcome the major econometric 
inadequacies of the Krzyzaniak and Musgrave ( K-M hereafter) study.
6.1 An Operational Definition of Tax Incidence
The deficiencies of the various techniques used to measure tax
incidence appear to stem from the difficulties involved in defining the
incidence of a tax. Rather than survey the voluminous literature surrounding 
the precise meaning of this term, the definition provided in Musgrave's 
(1959) widely accepted work can be used to discuss certain methodological 
issues within a coherent framework. Musgrave distinguishes between the 
incidence, output and resource transfer effects of taxation. The incidence 
effects are defined as" . . .  the resulting change in the distribution of income 
available for private use". The incidence of a tax is then primarily concerned 
with its effect on equity, and in particular upon the distribution of income 
defined by size brackets. In contrast, the resource transfer effects refer to 
the transfer of resources from private to public use at a given level of 
employment, while the output effects are concerned with the change in 
output or real income associated with a tax, given the distribution of income.
There appear to be three central points implied by Musgrave's 
definition of incidence. First, the definition suggests that incidence is to be 
measured with reference to the distribution of income in the absence of a tax.
Hence, as in most policy studies, it becomes necessary to compare the
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prevailing distribution of income with a hypothetical state that would have 
existed if the tax had not been levied. More formally, let YH denote the 
hypothetical distribution that would have existed in the absence of the tax, 
and Ya the actual distribution of income. A measure of incidence is then 
given by the difference between the two values, i.e.
(1) (Ya - Y„) - f (t) 
where:
t - a tax under consideration 
f - functional relation to be specified
Yh being hypothetical, cannot of course be observed, and must
therefore be derived or estimated using quantitative techniques. The various 
procedures used to measure tax incidence differ in two important respects: 
(a) in the techniques used to infer the hypothetical distribution of income, 
and (b) the specification of the functional form f ( ).
It is perhaps worth noting parathetically, that the pre-tax distribution 
of income is only one of several possible points of comparison which could be 
applied. A number of alternative hypothetical states have been proposed in 
the literature1, and the usefulness of any of these clearly depend on 
considerations of analytical tractability, and the policy issue under 
investigation.
Musgrave's definition further appears to suggest that it is necessary to
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consider the entire adjustment process induced by a tax. This therefore 
implies that a full general equilibrium assessment of the distributional 
changes is required. Thus Shoup (1969) has shown that if an estimate of 
incidence is confined to the taxed sectors (i.e. partial equilibrium analysis), it 
must be assumed that (a) the elasticity of substitution in production between 
factors of production in the taxed and untaxed sectors are zero, and (b) there 
are no close substitutes for the products of the taxed sector. The first 
assumption serves to ensure that supply conditions in the untaxed sectors are 
unaffected, while the second confines tax induced demand changes to the 
taxed sector. In general, neither condition is likely to be satisfied by a broad 
based tax (such as the non-domestic property tax) which covers a large 
section of the economy. Hence, a general equilibrium measure of incidence, 
or some quantitative approximation to it, is required if the analysis is not to 
yield incidence estimates which are either appreciably incomplete or 
incorrect.
Finally, it would seem worth noting that Musgrave's demarcation 
between the output and incidence effects of a tax, are only valid if the 
economy is at full employment. It will be recalled that in the Post Keynesian 
framework the level and distribution of income are functionally related. 
Thus taxes which alter the distribution of income, change the level of 
output2. The distinction between the output and incidence effects therefore 
appears to be of questionable value in the seemingly more general Keynesian
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system which subsumes full employment as a special case.
6.2 The Income Distribution Approach
Perhaps the oldest and most popular quantitative exercise in public 
finance has been to distribute tax burdens by income class. Households are 
categorised into differential income groups, and the resulting division is 
deemed to provide a measure of the hypothetical distribution of income 
before considering the effects of taxes. In the next stage the total tax bill is 
allocated to the different income groups under a variety of assumptions 
regarding tax shifting. It is typically assumed that direct taxes fail on their 
legal base, while indirect taxes are shifted forward into prices. The measure 
of incidence is then based on a comparison of the "pre-tax" and "post-tax" 
distribution of income in each group.
In the UK, these studies have typically treated the property tax as an 
indirect tax which is fully shifted into prices. This assumption is employed 
by the Central Statistical Office in its official computations, and used by Mair 
(1974) in a study of the distributive effects of non-domestic property taxes. 
Not suprisingly, the property tax is found to be highly regressive in its 
impact, falling more heavily on lower income groups who consume a larger 
proportion of their gross incomes.
In contrast, the North American studies have focused on the issue of 
property tax exporting (i.e. the extent to which a particular jurisdiction 
exports its tax bill to firms and households located elsewhere). The most
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comprehensive study was undertaken by McLure (1960) who found that 25% 
of all local and state taxes were borne by non-residents.
However, the income-distribution approach has been heavily criticised 
by a number of authors (see Interalia Prest (1955) (1968), Shome (1985), 
Peacock and Wiseman (1968) ). The most far reaching criticisms are due to 
Prest (1955) who, with customary clarity and incisiveness, has shown the 
assumptions implicit in these calculations to be inconsistent and 
contradictory. The studies allocate the total tax bill to different income 
groups on the assumption that the total level of income is held constant. For 
income to remain constant, it must therefore be assumed that factor supplies 
are perfectly inelastic. Consider, for example, a study of the incidence of a 
general property tax which is assumed to be shifted fully into prices. For 
prices to rise by the amount of the tax, the supply of goods must be perfectly 
elastic3. However, a perfectly elastic supply of goods cannot be produced 
with a completely inelastic supply of factors. Hence, the assumption of full 
forward shifting requires conditions which contradict the initial assumptions 
on which the calculations are based. It follows that the income-distribution 
studies use assumptions which are inappropriate for calculating the incidence 
of a broad based tax.
A further problem relates to the measure of the hypothetical pre-tax 
distribution of income. It will be recalled that the incidence measure is based 
on a comparison of gross incomes with post-tax incomes. Gross income is
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therefore seen to provide a measure of the hypothetical pre-tax distribution. 
Hence, it is implicitly assumed that the distribution of income before the tax 
levied is independent of the tax system. The problem is perhaps best 
illustrated with reference to equation (1). Incidence was formally defined as:
(1) (Ya - Yh) = f
The actual post-tax distribution of income (YA) is calculated by
allocating the total tax bill to different groups under a variety c/f shifting 
assumptions. In contrast, gross incomes are seen to provide a measure of the
hypothetical distribution in the absence of a tax (i.e. YH). Consider for
simplicity the limiting case where the tax falls entirely on its legal base. 
Equation (1) simplifies to:
(2) (YA -YH) = t 
Rearranging:
(3) YH = Y A+t
That is. hypothetical pre-tax incomes are assumed to be independent of 
taxes. In general, the introduction (or abolition) of any broad based tax will 
induce changes in relative prices, factor rewards and output as the economy 
adjusts to a new equilibrium. Thus, the assumptions underlying the income 
distribution studies seem difficult to justify'1 and inappropriate for assessing 
the incidence of a tax with broad coverage such as the non-domestic property 
tax.
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6.3 The General Equilibrium Approach
Tax incidence in the general equilibrium approach is calculated by 
comparing the existing distribution of income to an algebraically derived 
hypothetical distribution that would have prevailed in the absence of the tax. 
Central to this approach is the notion that the economy is in a static 
equilibrium which can be adequately described by the simplifying 
assumptions of the marginal productivity theory of distribution. By 
employing the linearisation and approximation techniques pioneered by 
Harberger (see Chapters 2 and 5), the models generate an algebraic 
expression which can be numerically solved for the change in factor rewards 
due to the introduction of a tax. Neither the model or the assumed functional 
forms are statistically estimated. The analytical expression for tax incidence 
is thus imposed on the data rather than statistically inferred. It would seem 
useful to illustrate this issue by considering the hierarchical general 
equilibrium model desribed in'Chapter 5. Using the standard assumptions of 
a static closed economy with fixed factor supplies, the numerical simulations 
revealed that capital bears much of the tax burden. However, if the economy 
is viewed as a price taker, participating in international capital markets (i.e. 
the “small country" assumption of international trade theory), the algebraic 
solution and the conclusions would necessarily change. In this case, it would 
be impossible for capital to bear the tax burden, since the tax would simply 
induce an outmigration of capital to lower taxed countries until the net
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returns equal that prevailing on world markets. The assumptions of the 
model can thus powerfully affect the numerical estimates of tax incidence.
The fundamental problem stems from the fact that there are several 
competing models proposed in the literature (see Chapters 2 and 3), each 
yielding a different measure of property tax incidence. General equilibrium 
analysis does not provide a way of discriminating between models, for no 
statistical testing is involved. Thus, while a uniform non-domestic property 
tax is non-distortionary in a static model, it is partly shifted if the taxed 
sector is oligopolistic, and becomes distortionary in a growth context due to 
the effect on savings. Conflicting theories clearly cannot be reconciled by 
imposing data on pre-specified algebraic expressions of tax incidence.
A further difficulty stems from the sensitivity of the results to the 
elasticity values in the incidence expression. In the absence of elasticity 
estimates, it is common to assume "plausible" values for these parameters. 
Typically, these elasticities are varied in an attempt to test the sensitivity of 
the results to a particular parameter. However, as noted by Shoven and 
Whalley (1984), the incidence expressions contain a large number of 
elasticities, and these may combine in compounding or offsetting ways, so 
that the robustness to any single elasticity may be of little significance.
It is also the case that incidence estimates have been found to depend 
crucially on the level of disaggregation employed in the model. Shoven 
(1976) showed that the welfare loss of the corporation tax in the US rises by
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30% if the level of disaggregation is increased from two to twelve sectors. A 
similar results was discovered in Chapter 5, where the incidence varied 
according to the location of the tax in the production hierarchy5.
In essence, these criticisms reflect the failure of the general 
equilibrium approach to test the restrictions and assumptions which are 
imposed on the data. Ignoring the ideological objections to alternative 
theories, proponents of the neoclassical paradigm have frequently alleged 
that empirical verification of their models is either unnecessary or 
misleading. There appear to be three separate, though closely linked views 
on this issue.
First, it has been argued that the general equilibrium system is 
vigorously derived from assumptions of optimising behaviour. Any 
alternative theory based on non-optimising principles (such as the 
Post-Keynesian theory) is deemed to be ad hoc.
Second, it has been suggested that if a theory based on non-market 
clearing assumptions is to be acceptable, it must be shown that it is in the 
interest of maximising agents not to undertake " . . .  some PERCEIVED 
mutually advantageous trade". (Barr: o (1977); emphasis added).
Finally, following Friedman's (1953) essay on positivism, it is asserted 
that it is inadmissible to evaluate a theory by the relevance of its 
assumptions. Rather a theory is to be judged by the accuracy of its 
predictions (see also Blaug (1980) and Katousian (1980)).
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Consider first the charge that the superiority of the general equilibrium 
framework, over Keynesian theory is evinced by the fact that it is based on 
micro-economic optimising principles. In so far as Post-Keynesian theory is 
highly aggregated, and relies on non-optimising, non-market clearing 
assumptions, it may be deemed to be ad hoc. However, in contrast to general 
equilibrium theory, Post-Keynesian analysis yields empirically refutable 
hypotheses, and is based on less restrictive verifiable assumptions. 
Proponents of the general equilibrium framework reject the possibility of 
testing the assumptions underlying their models. The Walrasian general 
equilibrium system is regarded as the "Magna Carta of economics" 
(Schumpeter quoted in Tobin (1980) ) which cannot be empirically refuted. 
Thus Hayek (1975) argues that:
"Nor can we statistically test our theory that it is the deviations from 
the equilibrium system of prices...  which makes it impossible to sell certain 
products ... at the prices at which they are offered".
In essence, by asserting that it is impossible to test the assumptions of 
their models, the general equilibrium theorists attempt to immunise their 
conclusions from empirical falsification. A general equilibrium model may 
provide a useful vigorous abstraction of the economy, but if it cannot be 
falsified, it is an empirically vacuous framework of questionable value. The 
framework must then presumably be accepted on a-priori reasoning (or 
perhaps even faith) rather than statistical inference.
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Consider next Barro's assertion that a theory based on non-market 
clearing assumptions must show that it is in the interest of maximising agents 
not to undertake perceived mutually advantageous trades. In part, Barro's 
criticism appears to reflect the widely differing informational assumptions 
underlying Post-Keynesian and neoclassical theory. In Post-Keynesian 
analysis, unemployment derives from the fact that agents are supply 
constrained, so that notional and effective demands diverge. The price 
mechanism, however, only transmits information on effective demands; as a 
result not all mutually advantageous exchanges are perceived and 
unemployment persists. In contrast, neoclassical theory assumes that 
resources ae fully employed, so that notional and effective demands are 
equal, and hence prices accurately transmit information about agents 
desires.6 Thus, in Barro's parlance, all mutually advantageous trades are 
perceived and undertaken. To counter Barro's criticisms, it is therefore 
sufficient for Post-Keynesian theory to show that in an economy operating 
through historical time, money is used as a medium of exchange and hence 
effective and notional demands can diverge.
Finally, following Friedman (1953) it is argued that if a theory is to be 
tested, it should be judged not by the relevance of its assumptions, but the 
accuracy of its predictions. Theorising involves abstraction, and hence it is 
argued that assumptions are best simplified to a point where they are 
interpreted "as if" they were true, even if they can be shown to be manifestly
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false. Friedman draws an analogy with the problem of predicting the shots of 
a billiard player: " . . .  excellent predictions would be yielded by the 
hypothesis that the billiard player made his shots as if he knew the 
complicated mathematical formulae that would give the optimum directions 
of travel... Our confidence in this hypothesis is not based on the belief that 
billiard players . . .  do go through the process described; it derives rather 
from the belief that, unless they were capable of achieving essentially the 
same result, they would not in fact be expert billiard players." Thus theories, 
according to Friedman, are only to be judged by their predictive power.
However, Friedman's positivist criterion for choosing between rival 
theories runs into the familiar inductive problem: any particular conclusion 
may be implied by a number of mutually incompatible theories. Thus 
predictive accuracy, though necessary, is not in itself a sufficient criterion for 
not rejecting a theory against a rival hypothesis which is also consistent with 
the data. Stated differently, the statistical results may accord with the 
predictions of a theory for reasons other than those implied by it. Thus, for 
example, in general equilibrium incidence theory the assumptions of perfect 
competition and profit maximising behaviour serve to preclude short run 
forward shifting. However, the observed absence of forward shifting might 
well derive from alternative forms of pricing behaviour such as normal cost 
pricing, or price leadership, or predatory pricing, or alternative firm 
objectives. Hence, the predictions of a number of rival hypotheses may be
conformable with the data.
Friedman suggests that in these circumstances the most abstract and 
general theory should be chosen for it yields the " .. greatest economy, clarity 
and precision in presenting the hypothesis". However, it is well recognised 
that this proposal has no epistemological justification within positivism (see 
Hollis k  Nell (1975) ), and does little to distinguish genuine and spurious 
correlations between data sets.
Thus, the approach adopted in the present study differs somewhat 
from Friedman's suggestion. Rather than choose data comformabie models on 
the basis of their degree of abstraction and generality, the data admissibility 
of the restrictions implied by rival theories are tested. The analysis thus 
begins with a general dynamic model which subsumes the rival explanations 
of tax shifting, and the restrictions implied by various theories are 
statistically tested rather than imposed on the data. Where two or more 
conflicting explanations are found to be data admissible either nested or 
non-nested tests are employed to choose the "best" fitting model.
6.4 The Econometric Approach
The econometric approach to tax incidence was pioneered by 
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) (K-M hereafter) in their seminal study of 
the corporation tax in the US. Using statistical procedures designed to isolate 
tax eflbcts from the plethora of forces operating on income distribution, K-M 
concluded that the coporation tax is more than fully shifted to consumers in
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the form of higher prices. The K-M model has been heavily criticised by a 
number of eminent theorists, strongly defended by its authors, and applied 
uncritically to four foreign countries. Few of the points of controversy 
generated by the study appear to have been resolved, hence this section 
reviews some of the general methodological issues implicit in the debate. We 
begin with a brief description of the K-M study, and its purported 
methodological deficiencies.
The K-M study attempts to estimate and measure the degree of 
corporation tax shifting. Since the focus is on tax shifting rather than 
incidence per se, the analysis is confined to the corporate sector, and profits 
are used as an approximate indicator of the distributional impact of the tax. 
The K-M measure of incidence is thus given by:
(4) nA -  n H = f (t)
where:
nA = actual profits
nH = hypothetical profits in the absence of the tax.
Equation (4) represents a sharp narrowing of the concept of incidence, 
which refers to the entire distribution of income disaggregated by size 
brackets. In the K-M approach, the focus is on the production sector, and in 
particular the single variable, profits. The incidence problem is thus limited 
to one of inter-sectoral equity - that is the extent to which firms shift the tax
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burden to households in their role as consumers and suppliers of labour 
services. Although the division between firms and households is not the 
complete answer to the incidence issue, the results if valid would arguably be 
at least broadly indicative of the distributional impact of a tax.
The econometric measure of incidence is based on a statistical estimate
of the hypothetical no-tax level of profits (nH). Consider a simple linear
regression model constructed to explain actual profits (i.e. nA):
(5) nA = po + pi Zo + p2 t + $ 
where:
Zo = vector of exogenous explanatory variables used to explain nA 
t - tax
4 - disturbance term
If t - 0, the model provides an estimate of the hypothetical no-tax 
position nH Thus the coefficient of the tax variable P2 yields a measure of the
impact of the tax on profits. It follows that if the variables in the vector ZQ 
are misspecified, or if the model fails to satisfy the statistical assumptions of 
regression analysis, the measure of the tax impact (p2) will be incorrect and 
misleading. Thus, the conclusions of the econometric approach are entitled to 
no more credence than the model that is intended to explain profits.
In their "preferred" model, K-M include three variables in the vector Z:
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(1) the change in the ratio of consumption to GNP, (2) the ratio of inventories 
to sales, (3) the ratio of taxes other than the corporation tax to GNP.
Little explanation is provided to justify the inclusion of these variables 
in the model. Hence, much criticism has been directed at the choice of 
variables and lag structure (see for example Goode (1963), Slitor (1963), 
Cragg, Harberger, and Miezkowski (1967)).
It is unnecessary to repeat these criticisms here in detail, but it would 
seem useful to briefly mention certain important deficiencies of the K-M 
study which have more general implications.
In earlier versions of their model, K-M experimented with a variable 
representing the ratio of government expenditure to GNP. However, the 
coefficient was found to be negative, and when the variable was excluded 
from the model, there was a gain in reliability and overall goodness-ofit. K-M 
nevertheless agree that government expenditure will influence profits 
through its impact on aggregate demand, and concede that they are unable to 
separate the tax effects from expenditure effects. Critics of the K-M study 
such as Cragg, Harberger and Mieszkowski (1967) thus included a demand 
"pressure" variable in the model and calculated the bias in the shifting 
estimate.
The problem reflects a basic dilemma of incidence analysis: Tax 
changes are typically accompanied by a change in some other policy variables 
such as government expenditure, alternative taxes, the money supply, or
stock of government debt. Thus, in practice, no broad based tax can have an 
incidence of its own: it only has an incidence relative to some other public 
finance instrument which will also affect the distribution of income. It 
follows that these instruments should, in principle, be included in the vector
of explanatory variables Z.
This difficulty has its parallel in the theoretical literature in public 
finance. Following Musgrave (1959) theory distinguishes between the 
specific or absolute incidence, budget incidence and differential incidence. 
The absolute incidence measures the impact of changes in a tax, holding all 
othe fiscal instruments constant. In contrast, the budget incidence takes 
account of the effects of equivalent increases in both taxes and government 
expenditure. Finally, the differential incidence measures the effects of 
substituting one tax for another of equal yield in real terms. Clearly, the 
budget incidence has the important disadvantage of failing to isolate the 
expenditure effects from the tax. In contrast, in the differential approach, 
while the role of macro demand effects are minimised other insurmountable 
difficulties remain. Thus, Shoup (1969) argues that the concept is in fact 
meaningless, for a tax substitution will lead to a change in the pattern and 
level of demand and hence output and employment. If the authorities then 
seek to stabilise employment at its previous level, it will be necessary to 
change a third tax, and perhaps raise government expenditure. In this case 
the differential incidence does not reflect the impact of substituting two
taxes, since three or more fiscal instruments have been changed. To quote 
Shoup (1969) " . . .  if there are eight goals to be achieved by the public 
finance system, eight public finance instruments will normally be required .. 
. If the value for one of these goals is to be changed, . . .  the values of all 
eight of the public finance instruments must normally be changed. . . .  The 
new distribution of disposable income is necessarily the "incidence" of 
changes in eight public finance instruments".
Following the exposition in Davis (1972), the relevance of these 
definitions for econometric estimation of incidence may be illustrated as 
follows. Consider the following regression equation:
( 6 )  ITa = po + piZ + (32 t + (33 R + p4 G +€ 
where:
R = vector of other taxes 
G = Government expenditure
The absolute incidence of a tax may be measured by p2 - the coefficient 
of t. However, the accuracy of this measure clearly depends on the 
assumption that t, R and G are independent. Thus, if t and G are collinear,
then p2 will contain elements of budget incidence. Similarly, if t and R are 
correlated, then P2 will measure elements of differential incidence.
In contrast, a measure of the budget incidence is given by the sum of 
the coefficients of P2 and p4 on the pre-condition that they are independent.
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However, if these variables are correlated, then the estimated coefficients will 
be biased thereby yielding imprecise results. It may be possible to 
circumvent this difficulty by including a proxy for government expenditure 
and estimating the model using instrumental variable techniques.
The differential incidence appears somewhat more difficult to measure. 
Differential incidence analyses the effects of substituting one tax for another 
of equal yield. The exercise is therefore purely conceptual, and hence cannot 
be directly estimated. It may, however, be possible to discern the differential 
incidence by simulating an estimated model. This would clearly require an 
economy-wide macroeconometric model, specified at a high level of 
disaggregation in order to increase the sensitivity of the results to variations 
in different taxes. Even if this could be achieved, there appears to be no 
obvious way of taking account of Shoup's (op cit) goals - instruments 
criticisms, unless seemingly cavalier ceteris paribus assumptions are 
invoked.7
The objective of the present study is much more modest. Following 
much of the existing empirical literature, we merely attempt to estimate the 
absolute incidence. To the extent that the model fails to separate out 
expenditure effects from the tax, the results might overstate the degree of 
shifting. However, as K-M note, with the available techniques," . . .  the best 
we can do is to aim at absolute effects, but even this proves difficult."
Despite the controversy surrounding the specification of the K-M
profits equation, the model has been used uncritically to measure the degree 
of tax shifting in the UK (Davis (1972) ), Canada (Spencer (1969) ), West 
Germany ( Roskamp (1965) ), and India (Laumas (1965) ). The main 
justification for the international application of the K-M model is given by 
Roskamp (1965) who asserts that:
"The rationale for using the US model for another country is our belief
that corporations in mixed capitalist economies have basically a very similar
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behaviour with respect to taxes on income and property which is only slightly 
modified by different institutions".
Thus for Roskamp, the determinants of profits in countries as diverse 
as the US, West Germany and the undeveloped Indian economy are 
adequately captured in the K-M equation. If the K-M model performed 
reasonably in the US, this hypothesis might be worth testing, though it would 
be somewhat surprising if company behaviour in advanced capitalist 
economies and a rural undeveloped country could be adequately described 
by the same equation. Given the uncertain justification of the US model, its 
application to other countries might merely represent spurious correlation 
between trending time series observations, rather than an explanation of 
company behaviour.
An alternative justification for the international application of the 
model is provided by Spencer (1969) who argues that the equation should be 
judged according to statistical criteria and goodness-of-fit, rather than
economic rationale. Thus:
" . .. variables included are important only in their ability to . . .  remove 
non-tax influences . . . Variables are selected for inclusion in the equation 
using standard statistical tests and removed on . . . statistical grounds . . 
However, in all the international applications, the K-M model is evaluated 
merely in terms of the t - statistics and R2. The authors therefore appear to
be unaware of the "spurious regressions" problem (see Granger fc.Newbold
/
(1974) ), which render the R2 uninterpretable.8 Furthermore, no attempt is 
made to test the predictive power of the model in different countries, and the 
data admissibility of the lag structures. Consequently, the seemingly 
satisfactory performance of the K-M model appears to reflect serial 
correlation between trending time series variables, rather than a well 
specified dynamic regression equation.
In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, the approach adopted in 
the present study lies between the two extreme interpretations of the K-M 
model. Thus, in the following section, it is argued that a well-specified, data 
coherent model cannot be formulated without some theoretical 
foreknowledge, and that the results are uninterpretable in the absence of a 
proper theory. Furthermore, it is suggested that imposing theoretically 
deduced models on data is equally unjustifiable, for it neither constitutes a 
valid test of the theory, nor does it yield reliable statistical results. This is an 
old point recognised by John Neville Keynes (1890), which bears repetition:
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"all induction is  biind, so Jong as the deduction o f causai connections is  ie ft out 
o f account; and a ii deduction is  barren so Jong as it  does not start from 
observation ”
6.5 Dynamic Specification: The General to Specific Approach
The econometric analysis presented in the following chapter is based 
on the statistical procedures pioneered by Sargan (1964), Hendry and Mizon
(1978) and others. This section merely describes what appear to be the 
central features of this approach, and does not seek to adjudicate on the 
econometric controversy generated by these authors. However, since these 
statistical procedures appear to have gained the ascendency in much of the 
macro-econometric literature (especially on the demand for money and 
consumption function), they have been used to estimate the incidence of the 
non-domestic property tax. It is hoped that the results obtained are based on 
well specified, robust equations.9
Stated briefly,- the Hendry-Sargan procedures can be viewed as an 
attempt to reconcile the statistical properties of dynamic econometric models 
which describe short run adjustments, with standard economic theory which 
is typically propounded within a static equilibrium framework. The 
modelling exercise is viewed as an attempt to characterise the data 
generation process using statistical procedures. However, since the actual 
data generation process is unkown, economic theory plays a vital role in 
determining the variables which are to be included in the initial model.
2 6 1
Consequently, both statistics and economic theory are relevant in the 
specification of a dynamic model.
The statistical procedures are perhaps best described within the 
framework developed by Hendry (1983) and Hendry et al (1984). The data 
generation process (denoted DGP) is defined as a stochastic process generating 
ail the variables (w) sequentially through time. Ignoring initial conditions for 
ease of exposition, the density function of the DGP may be written as:
(1) D (Wj . . . .  wT/0) = K  D ( w t/w M ... Wp 0)
t - 1
where:
0 = vector of parameters of w
Since the DGP is unknown, an econometric model is obtained by: (a) 
ignoring all but a small subset of variables in w which are denoted x. In 
Hendry's parlance, this is termed marginalising with respect to x.
(b) In addition, it is typically assumed that one sub-vector yt (which is
endogenous) depends on the remaining subset of vectors termed zv That is
we condition Yt on z
The variables included in the set x are typically suggested by theory, 
and can be described by:
(2) a F ( X t /  X M .......................X, ; A t)
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The conditional and marginal models for x are then given by:
(3) F ( Xj x t/A  ) - U F(Yt/z t ,  x fr_, x i . oi j ) .
n F ( z t /  x M ................. x,; o2)
The first term on the right hand side of (3) describes the conditional 
model for yt ( i.e. we assume that yt the endogenous variables, depend on z. t
the exogenous variables). The second term in (3) is the marginal model for z t.
Econometric models are typically confined to the conditional models for yt 
and ignore the marginal model for z. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that the 
parameters ai and (*2 are unconnected or "variation free" so that no 
information is lost by ignoring q(i. In this case, zt is said to be "weakly 
exogenous" so that the model for zt does not have to be specified and efficient
estimates of yt can be obtained from the conditional model alone.
These definitions provide a convenient framework for discussing 
dynamic specification. Rival empirical models can be viewed as different 
recombinations of the DGP. Thus, while conflicting theories may be 
non-nested, the econometric models are all nested within the DGP. It follows 
that a parsimonious specification be obtained by adopting a strategy which 
begins with a general model which subsumes rival explanations, and 
sequentially tests the data admissibility of the various restrictions implied by
the competing theories.
There is a second and more obvious reason why a modelling strategy 
proceeding from the general to the specific is to be preferred. Econometric 
models contain several explanatory variables. It is clearly impossible to 
ascertain whether a particular variable is statistically significant if it is not 
already included in the model. In contrast, if an attempt is made to identify a 
parsimonious restricted model at the outset, a test of (say) parameter 
significance will be conditional on more general assumptions which may be 
tested later. If these are rejected, all earlier inferences are invalidated.
Consider for example, the following simple autoregressive distributed 
lag model10.
( 4 ) Yt - pi Zt +.p2 Zt-i + p3 Ym  + £*
where:
Zt is weakly exogenous with respect to pi, p2, p3.
IN (0,o)
Despite its simple lag structure, (4) subsumes nine types of dynamic 
models as special cases as shown in Table 6.1. overleaf.
Thus for example, imposing the restriction p2 = P3 = 0 yields a static 
regression equation of the form:
(5) Yt - pi Zt + £*
It is well recognised that such models seldom provide a useful
TABLE 6,1
Type of Model Equation Restrictions
1. Static V P i z i + £ t fc " P3“ °
2. Unluariate Time Series * t - M i - i  +fc« Pi " P2"°
3. Differenced ?3“ P?""Pi
4. Leading Indicator V, -  fe Z , . 1 + £ i Pi “ h  " 0
5. Distributed Lag Vt ” Pi Zt * Z1-l  1 P3 - °
6. Partial Adjustment Vt “ P| Zi * Z t - I  +  ^ t h
7. Common Factor v, -  p, Z , ♦ «!, 
ut “ ?3 “t-1 +£ 1
Pz
8. Error Correction AY, -  p, A Z , M l -  Pjl(Z-V) |
+e*
2 f t-1
9. Reduced form Vt ‘  P2 Z t-1 Vt-1 + £ t Pi -  0
Source : Hendry et al (1984)
Adescription to time series data. This is partly because the model imposes 
unrealistic constraints on the data, requiring short and long run responses to 
be instantaneous and identical. This suggests that the restrictions necessary 
to obtain (5), even if supported by theory, should be tested against the 
general form (i.e. equation (4) ) to gain protection from misspecification. 
Clearly commencing from (4) when equation (5) is true, and testing the
admissibility of the various restrictions would yield a well-specified model.
/
The converse will not hold; fitting (5) when (4) is true will induce 
misspecification errors.
The models described in Table 6.1 can be derived from equation (4) by 
imposing the appropriate restrictions. However, in what follows, we focus on 
the error-correction mechanism (i.e. Case 8) which has been accorded 
considerable attention in the recent literature. Thus, Nickell (1980) has 
shown that the error-correction mechanism is the optimal decision rule when 
adjustment costs are quadratic. Moreover, the mechanism is compatible with 
"servomechanistic" behaviour, and yields a long run homogeneity solution 
consistent with static optimising behaviour. (Davidson et al (1978) ). The 
mechanism thus has a potentially wide range of applications and has been 
used in the analysis described in the following chapter. The error correction 
mechanism implied by equation (4) can be obtained by imposing the 
restriction 2 pi = 1. Thus the mechanism is described by :
(6) AYt - Pj AZt + (1 -p3)(Z-Y) t-1 + £*
Equation (6) postulates that agents adjust from Yt - l to Yt in response 
to: (a) changes in Zt (i.e. a short run adjustment process, (b) the previous
disequilibrium between Z and Y [ (Z-Y)t-i) (i.e. a feedback effect resulting 
from disequilibrium in the previous period).
The error correction mechanism has the desirable property that it 
subsumes long run steady state adjustments as a special case. In a steady 
state, all variables grow at the same rate and hence:
(7) AYt - po + plAZt +£* 
where: is white noise
That is, a simple difference model adequately describes the data in 
long run equilibrium. Moreover, equation (7) can be approximated by a 
levels formulation:
(8) Yt - ao + ai Zt + vt
where: vt - (1 - P3) vt - 1 + is an auto-correlated error term.
In a useful way, equation (6) nests levels and differences as special 
cases. Adding a lagged dependent variable to (7) will yield a partial 
adjustment model with auto-correlated errors. In a similar manner, the error 
correction mechanism can be shown to subsume all the models in Table 6.1 as 
special cases. Consequently, beginning with the error correction mechanism, 
and testing the admissibility of the various restrictions would yield a well 
specified model, even when one of the other types represented the DGP. In
contrast, fitting a more restricted form, when the error-correction mechanism 
describes the DGP will induce misspecification errors. Thus Hendry et al 
(1984) assert that:
" . .  error correction is essentially a necessary and sufficient model form and 
it is this property which explains the considerable practical success of error 
correction formulations in encompassing and reconciling diverse empirical 
estimates in many subject areas".
While the general-to-specific approach provides a useful modelling 
strategy designed to minimise dynamic misspecification, it cannot by itself 
establish whether an equation adequately characterises the DGP. It therefore 
becomes necessary to use a number of selection criteria which a model has to 
satisfy to be acceptable. The diagnostic tests suggested by Hendry et al seek 
to assess whether a model satisfactorily replicates the DGP:
Data Coherence
The purpose of constructing a model is to account for as much of the 
variation in the data as possible. Hence, if a model adequately characterises 
the data, it seems reasonable to require the residuals to be approximately 
random. Departures from randomness may then be taken as an indication of 
errors of conditioning, marginalising, measurement, or specification. Hence, a 
minimal condition for an acceptable model to fulfil is that the residuals be 
white noise. A white-noise process is one which cannot be predicted linearly 
from its own past. This condition therefore serves to eliminate low order
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residual auto-correlation.11 However, as noted by Hendry and Richard (1982) 
a white noise process may be predictable given an extended information 
set12, and may have temporal structure. Furthermore, white-noise residuals 
may be predictable using lagged values of the variables already included in 
the model. Hence a white noise residual is at best a weak necessary condition 
for an empirical model to satisfy.
A stronger condition is to require the residual to be an innovation
process. A time series vt is said to be an innovation process with respect to
an information set Ft if and only if : E ( vtIFt) = 0 ¥ t  and D ( vtIFt) = D ( vt);
where D is a density function. It follows from this definition that whether or 
not a series is an innovation process depends crucially on the information set
(Ft). Thus, white noise may be an innovation process if the information set
only contains its own past. In the present context, it seems reasonable to 
include in the information set all past variables and residuals in the model. It 
follows that the residuals will be an innovation process if and only if they 
cannot be predicted from their own past and the past of other variables in 
the model.
A measure of the innovation in a model is provided by its variance. 
This suggests a modelling strategy which requires a preferred parsimonious 
model to have a lower variance than its rivals. Intuitively, this result can be 
seen to derive from the fact that a true model which describes the DGP will
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have a lower variance than a false one. More generally, models can be 
ranked according to their variance: Model A is said to variance dominate
model B if and only if oA2 < oB2 ( where o f denotes estimated variance).
Variance dominance is asymmetric and transitive, both of which are useful 
attributes for a selection criterion.
Parameter Constancy
A second selection criterion frequently suggested in the literature is 
that of parameter constancy. A model is said to have constant parameters 
(denoted 0) if (Go, 0t) = 0 v t = 1 . . . ,  T (see Hendry and Richard (1982) ). It 
follows that a well specified model with constant parameters will 
satisfactorily predict future changes of the endogenous variable, in the 
absence of structural shifts. Thus, in much of the literature predictive 
accuracy is used as an indirect test of either structural breaks or 
misspecification.
In contrast, Hendry (1980, 1983) argues that there is no necessary 
connection between predictive failure and functional misspecification. 
Specifically, a misspecified model will continue to forecast within the limits of 
its error variance as long as the system is stationary and the economic 
structure remains unaltered (Hendry 1977). Hence, predictive accuracy is 
compatible with functional misspecification. On the other hand, with an 
unchanged structure, a mispecified equation may fail to predict and reveal 
apparent structural breaks, if an excluded (though relevant) exogenous
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variable changes through time. It follows that forecast accuracy is consistent 
with misspecification, whereas predictive failure may reflect either a 
structural break or a misspecified equation interacting with a changing 
exogenous variable. Thus, predictive accuracy per se cannot be used as a 
criterion for diagnosing misspecification.
Encompassing
Rival statistical models may be viewed as different recombinations of 
the DGP. Hence, while the underlying theoretical models may be non-nested, 
their empirical counterparts are all subsumed within the DGP. It follows that 
a true model which adequately describes the DGP will be capable of 
accounting for the results obtained by other (false) models. A model which 
satisfies this condition is said to encompass its rivals. Model encompassing is 
both asymmetric and transitive, and hence provides a useful criterion for 
choosing between models. Furthermore, Hendry and Richard (1982) have 
proved that encompassing implies variance dominance, but is not implied by 
variance dominance. Intuitively, encompassing must entail variance 
dominance since a badly fitting model with a high variance cannot explain the 
findings of the true model with a lower variance. Encompassing, according to 
Hendry (1983) thus provides a sufficient selection criterion in the sense that 
if the encompassing model is known, rival explanations can be ignored.
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Theoretical Consistency
A major strength of this approach is seen to derive from the fact that it 
yields a model which i s " . . .  consonant with the time series properties of the 
data and yields a long run solution which appears to be fully consistent with 
standard economic theory" Hendry (1983). Thus, in addition to satisfying the 
above mentioned statistical criteria, the preferred model is required to be 
consistent with economic theory. Since theories typically relate to long run 
static equilibria, while the empirical models describe short run adjustment 
dynamics, the error correction mechanism can be used to reconcile theory 
with the dynamic properties of the short run empirical model. In the present 
study, this line of reasoning is extended further and all long run parameters 
have been empirically estimated, rather than analytically derived from the 
short run model as in Hendry (1980) and Davidson et al (1978). The 
estimation procedures are based on a technique recently described by Bewiey
(1979) and will be discussed in greater details in Chapter 7.
Data Admissibility
Finally, a well specified model is required to satisfy all data and 
definitional constraints. Thus, for example, if a consumption function (C) has 
been estimated, savings (S) can be inferred from the identity:
Y -  C + S 
where:
Y e income
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C = consumption 
S = saving
Alternatively both consumption and savings could be estimated in
order to verify that the identity is satisfied. Clearly, if the relationships are
correctly specified, the identity will hold automatically, and need not be 
imposed on the models.
Thus, a model which satisfies the above mentioned statistical criteria
w ill:
(a) have an error which is an innovation process
(b) constant parameters
(c) encompass its rivals
(d) be data admissible
(e) meet the conditioning and exogeneity requirements
Such a model is termed a Tentatively Adequate Conditional Data 
Characterisation (TACD) by Hendry and Richard (1982). Since a TACD 
adequately describes the dynamic properties of the data, and encompasses its 
rivals, it is seen to constitute a "progressive research strategy". We note 
parantheticaliy that theory consistency has not been included as a condition 
since "there always exists some theory consistent with the observed results." 
(Hendry and Richard (1982)).
In the present study an attempt is made to formulate a TACD by 
employing the following procedure and test statistics: Economic theories
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indicate which variables are to be included in each equation (i.e. marginalise 
with respect to all observables). The formulation suggested by theory is then 
estimated in its most general form, and sequential test procedures are used to 
identify the restrictions implied by the data.
At each stage of the simplification search a variety of disagnostic test 
statistics are employed. The usual t-statistics and R2 apart, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic (denoted DW) is used to test for autocorrelation in the 
residuals. However, it is well established that the DW statistic is biased in 
models with a lagged dependent variable, and hence the Box-Pierce statistic 
(denoted Qzo) for a correlogram of white-noise residuals, and the Lagrange 
Multiplier test (denoted LM (4) ) for autocorrelation up to the fourth order 
are also reported. The absence of serial correlation is seen to provide an 
indication of the data coherence of a model. The post sample forecast 
accuracy and parameter stability of each equation are tested using Theil s 
Inequality Coefficient (denoted U), and an asymptotic approximation of the
Chow test derived by Hendry (1980) (denoted Z (4)). Moreover, an F-test is 
used to test the validity of restrictions in nested models. However, where 
non-nested hypotheses are compared the Cox-Pesaran test is employed. As 
noted by Hendry and Richard (1982) , this provides a test of variance 
dominance rather than encompassing. Thus models selected on the basis of 
non-nested tests satisfy the minimum conditions necessary for rejecting 
alternatives (i.e. variance dominance) rather than encompassing rival
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hypotheses. It is perhaps worth noting parantheticaily that the exogeneity 
assumptions implicitly evoked in the modelling exercise cannot be tested 
directly. However, an approximate indication of valid conditioning is 
provided by the tests of parameter constancy and random residuals (Hendry 
1983). Finally, the long run parameters of the preferred models are directly 
estimated using a procedure described by Bewley (1979). This provides a 
test of the theoretical consistency of the results.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1. For example, an equal yield neutral tax (i.e. differential incidence)
2. Recall that a tax induced change in income distribution, alter spending 
flows and hence output and aggregate demand.
3. Except in the limiting case where demand is totally inelastic.
4. In an attempt to rescue these studies, a number of authors such as 
Prest (1955) and Shoup (1969) have suggested that the calculations 
should be restricted to a comparison of taxes over different time 
period. The incidence calculations would then relate to the effects of a 
marginal change in taxes, rather than the effects of a tax with 
reference to the no-tax position.
5. It may be argued that in practice the policy implications of the general 
equilibrium framework are irrelevant for the analysis fails to take 
account of the "general theory of second-best". The theory of second 
best asserts that if “ ... one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot 
be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can be achieved only by 
departing from all other Paretian conditions". Lipsey and Lancaster 
(1956). This suggests that the abolition of a single distortionary tax 
may reduce efficiency and welfare if there are other divergencies from 
the Paretian conditions. The failure to take account of these distortions 
may well imply that the policy inferences of the general equilibrium 
framework are totally misleading. The theory of second best thus 
appears to pose for midale problems of computation and interpretation 
which are ignored by proponents of general equilibrium analysis.
6. In addition, neoclassical general equilibrium theory assumes that ail 
Arrow-Debreu future and contingent markets exist. There is therefore 
perfect knowledge and certainty about the future.
7. The existing macro models of the UK economy typically distinguish 
between the main direct taxes on firms and households and indirect 
taxes. It seems unlikely that these could be used to discern the 
incidence of say substituting a property tax for a corporation tax.
8. We note in passing that the "spurious regression" problem was first 
discussed by Yule (1923). There appears to have been little 
recognition in applied econometrics of the difficulties involved in 
modelling and evaluating time series data prior to Granger and 
Newbold's (1974) article.
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9. In contrast to the macroeconometric literature, the empirical work in 
micro economics in general, and public finance in particular, appears to 
be based wholly within the more orthodox framework. It is hoped that 
the robust equations derived in the present study will immunise the 
results from the familiar charge of misspecification.
10. The foregoing argument is based on Hendry et al (1984).
11 • e .g . v *  -  a  V t - i  +  Ec
where: 6* is random
12. We can thus predict a white-noise series if we know the formula of a 
random number generator.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SHORT RUN SHIFTING OF THE NON-DOMESTIC PROPERTY TAX IN  THE
MANUFACTURING SECTOR:
AN ECONOMETRIC ASSESSMENT
In this Chapter, we attempt to measure statistically the impact of the 
non-domestric property tax in the manufacturing sector. The analysis draws 
on and seeks to extend the work of Gordon (1967), Davis (1972), Coutts et al 
(1978) and Beath (1979) on the incidence of the corporation tax. The 
investigation is based on a general unrestricted model of mark-up pricing. 
The equation used is of a form that has obtained widespread empirical 
support in the UK literature (see for example Bain and El-Mokadem (1971). 
Coutts et al (1978). Nield (1963) ). In this context, the analysis provides 
useful evidence on both the incidence of the non-domestic property tax in the 
manufacturing sector, and its impact on prices.
The study makes use of quarterly data for the manufacturing sector 
from 1963:1 to 1983:4. The data on costs, prices and taxes are all obtained 
from published sources which are described in Appendix 3.
Before discussing the econometric framework, it is perhaps worth 
commenting on the use of quarterly data to measure the impact of a tax 
which is levied annually. It will be recalled, that any measure of tax shifting 
relies crucially on the model that is used to explain firm behaviour (see
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Chapter 6). Thus model specification and estimation are perhaps of greater 
importance in estimating the impact of a tax than in other areas of policy 
research. It was suggested earlier (see Chapter 6) that the general to specific 
techniques pioneered by Sargan (1963) and Hendry et al (1983) provide a 
procedure for obtaining well specified, data coherent models. With the use of 
annual data, and the consequent loss of degrees of freedom, it is clearly 
impossible to test a general dynamic model with a large number of variables 
and lags. In order to infer a well specified, restricted model, we are therefore 
compelled to use quarterly observations and convert the annual data on 
non-domestic property tax revenues into a quarterly series. A number of 
techniques were used to interpolate the annual property tax series, and these 
are described in Appendix 1. Initial experimentation revealed that the 
simplest interpolation technique due to Lisman and Sandee, (1964) yielded 
the most reliable results, which were consistent with estimates obtained 
using annual observations.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 
discusses the rationale underlying the use of a mark-up equation to measure 
the short run impact of the non-domestic property tax. Section 7.2 describes 
the theoretical and the empirical framework, while sections 7.3 and 7.4 
discuss the implications of introducing alternative expectational schemes in 
the empirical equation. Section 7.5 presents the final results, and the 
theoretical implications of the conclusions are dealt with in section 7.6.
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7.1 A Measure of Tax Shifting:
Conflicting theoretical conclusions regarding the incidence of the 
non-domestic property tax appear to be inextricably linked to different 
models of firm behaviour. Thus the neoclassical general equilibrium 
conclusion that the property tax does not affect prices in the short run. relies 
crucially on the assumption that firms are constrained by market forces to 
maximise profits. Clearly, any attempt by a firm operating at its optimum 
point, to increase prices will lead to a fall in profits. At the other extreme, 
Post-Keynesian incidence theory is based on the assumption that prices are 
set by the dominant firms in oligopolistic markets. With rigid prices, output 
is below its full employment level, and hence balanced increases in taxes and 
government expenditure raise aggregate demand, thereby increasing 
employment output and profits. Thus, in the short run, none of the burden of 
the property tax falls on firms. Alternatively, if we assume that full cost 
pricing is the dominant form of firm behaviour, then property taxes together 
with other costs will be shifted directly into prices. Between the extremes of 
perfect competition and full cost pricing lie a profusion of theories, which 
allow for almost any degree of shifting. More generally, the difficulty one 
confronts in testing for the presence of tax shifting is that the effect is 
ambiguous, depending on the objectives of the firm, and the market structure 
within which it operates.
Following Coutts et al (1978). the problem can be illustrated with 
reference to diagram 7.1 below. In the diagram Xl and X2 represent firm 
objectives as embodied in managerial preference function - denoted U (Xl 
X2). Line AB portrays the post-tax budget constraint or opportunity locus 
between the two objectives, and Ui Ui the preference functions. Thus for a 
firm which maximises sales subject to a profit constraint Xl might represent
sales and X2 profits.
DIAGRAM 7.1
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Within this framework, an increase in taxes will, ceteris paribus lead 
to a downward shift in the opportunity locus to a position such as A'B'. Full 
shifting of the property tax would then require an increase in the mark-up
sufficient to attain the original preference level Uj Ur  In the special case of a
profit maximising firm, if Xi represents profits, then B defines the pre-tax 
position and B' the post-tax position. Thus a measure of tax shifting based on 
these observed positions would yield precise conclusions. However, such a 
measure provides unambiguous results under a rather limited set of 
conditions. Clearly, a firm with multiple objectives could respond to the tax 
by changing the composition of bundles it consumes. Diagramatically this 
might leave the level of the opportunity locus AB unaffected, but change its 
slope. In general, a firms' response to a tax will clearly depend on its 
preferences and objectives. Thus, in an effort to minimise the ambiguity 
surrounding our measure of tax incidence, it is assumed that: (a) profits 
represent an important component of the firms’ objectives, and hence in 
attempting to shift the tax burden, firms seek to increase profits, (b) We 
further assume that the ratio of profits to all other objectives remains 
constant over time. This implies that managerial preference functions are "L" 
shaped1, and hence shifts in the pre and post tax in difference curves are 
confined to movements along a ray from the origin such as 0D in Diagram 7.2.
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DIAGRAM 7.2
H
2
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R
Degree of Shifting
H,6B0
Thus, for example, if the firm is initially at a point such as S, and there 
is an increase in taxes such that with prices and costs unchanged the 
opportunity locus shifts to A’B', but the firm is observed to be at point C, then 
the degree of shifting is defined by the distance CE. Under these assumptions, 
it then follows that in the short run, with a fixed stock of capital, any attempt 
to shift the tax will be reflected directly in the mark-up between prices and 
costs. Thus a measure of tax shifting in the short run can be formulated in 
terms of a mark-up pricing model. This is the approach adopted in the 
present study.
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7.2 The Model:
The empirical analysis is based on a general unrestricted model of 
mark-up pricing in the manufacturing sector. The model is based on the 
presumption that prices are in general set by firms, and held constant over a 
finite period. Thus following Arrow (1959) we implicitly assume that the 
selling side of the market is much more concentrated than the buying side, 
and hence prices are set and adjusted by firms.2 Under these circumstances, 
the price set by firms will at least partly depend on the expected level of 
output/sales. Corresponding to this level of output, we can then define a 
level of value added which the firm expects if all its plans are realised:
(1) Ve = P.Qe
where: Ve = expected value added 
Qe « expected output
P - price of value added (value added in manufacturing being 
profits plus labour costs)
It is worth stressing that this assumption in no way precludes profit 
maximising behaviour. Thus the expected or target output might correspond 
to the lowest point on the firms' cost curve, or alternatively, a certain share 
of the market.
However, let p denote the share of gross profits in value added, then:
(2) Ile - p V e -p P Q e
where: Ile - expected gross profits.
Similarly we can define expected profits net of property taxes as 
follows:
(3a) IT* = ( ne -T )  = pN Ve = pN PQe 
Rearranging we obtain:
(3b) n J « p NPQ</T
where: IT* - expected net profits
pN - share of net profits in value added 
T = non-domestic property taxes
Value added in the manufacturing sector consists of wage costs and 
profits. We can therefore express value added from the cost side as:
(4) Ve - ne + weQe
where: we - expected unit wage costs
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Substituting for Ve from (1) and ne from (3b ):
(5) PQe -  pN P Qe + T + weQe
Rearranging terms:
(6) P* = 1 T + w e
1 - pN i---
---
--
o r
t>
 
1. 
..
That is, the price set by firms P* is a mark-up 1 on expected
1 - pN
unit property taxes, and expected wage costs. Even though price is expressed 
in terms of a mark-up over costs, this approach does not rule out profit 
maximising bahaviour. Empirically all that is required to support this 
hypothesis, is a mark-up which is sensitive to demand, and a zero coefficient 
on expected unit property taxes. At the other extreme, if full cost pricing 
represents the main form of firm behaviour, the mark-up will be unaffected 
by demand, and fully reflect changes in costs and taxes. The model therefore 
imposes no ^-/wb/vconstraints on the coefficients, and allows for any degree 
of tax shifting consistent with the data.
Linearising and rearranging equation (6), we obtain:
(7) (In Pt - In wet) = C + pN In _I
Qe
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The mark-up in Equation (6) 1 represents the summation of
1 - pN
a geometric series. We have approximated the series with the coefficient Pn, 
and relegated higher order terms to the constant C3 The dependent variable 
in equation (7) can arguably be interpreted as the expected or target 
mark-up.
There are a number of empirical and theoretical advantages in defining 
the dependent variable in equation (7) in terms of the mark-up (i.e. (InPt-In
wet) ) rather than price, (i.e. Pt): First, as noted in section 7.1, the empirical 
measure of the tax burden is based on the assumption that any attempt to 
shift the property tax is reflected directly in the mark-up. Furthermore, we 
seek to measure absolute rather than budget effects3 of the non-domestic 
property tax. It therefore becomes necessary to separate out the impact of 
the tax from the demand effects of government expenditure, and this is done 
by including a measure of demand in the regression equation. However, it is 
well established in past empirical research that wages move procyclicallv. 
Thus, demand measures, when included together with wages are typically 
found to be insignificant (see McCallum (1972) ). Arguably, the approach 
adopted here at least partly circumvents this difficulty.
An important question which arises with respect to equation (7) is 
whether in fact the mark-up responds to other factors which have not been
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formally integrated into the model. By ignoring these, we may be omitting 
important elements from the equation and hence to guard again spurious 
correlation, an extended dynamised version of (7) was estimated with a large 
number of variables lagged. The general form of (7) is given by:
+ I a ,  ct . + a, D + 2 a., A(p - we) + Time
C~0 t-4 t-1 5 i - {  lb /
+ (Seasonals) 
where: Lower case letters denote logs
(t-qe) = expected unit property taxes
d = measure of demand
r = price of raw materials
c = measure of international competitiveness
D = dummy variable for the 1973-1974 revaluation
Time = time trend
(Seasonals) = seasonal dummy variables.
The first variable included in the extended equation is a measure of 
demand. As noted earlier, this is included in order to separate out the 
’budget' and absolute' effects of the property tax. However, the impact of 
demand on prices and the mark-up is an issue which has generated a 
considerable amount of controversy. One view, proposed initially by Nield 
(1963), and supported by proponents of the normal cost hypothesis, asserts
that the mark-up is unaffected by the level of demand in the short run. 
Instead, prices are seen to respond only to long run changes in costs (termed 
’normal’ costs). Critics of the normal cost hypothesis such as Smith (1979) 
and McCallum (1972) have argued that the empirical models on which the 
normal cost hypothesis is based are misspecified, and that if the model is 
properly formulated demand exerts a significant, though not powerful, 
impact on prices. In the present study, demand effects are proxied by three 
measures: the excess demand for labour (i.e. unemployment minus 
vacancies), real GDP which is assumed to measure the level of economic 
activity, and a Wharton Index of capacity utilisation. The initial results 
revealed that the measures based on the demand for labour and GDP were 
statistically insignificant and frequently had the wrong sign. In contrast, the 
Wharton Index was found to exert a powerful effect on the mark-up. The 
implications of this finding are discussed at length in later sections.
We further include a measure of raw material costs in the extended 
mark-up equation. It will be recalled, that our theoretical model (described 
in equations (1) to (7))takes no account of variations in raw material costs, for 
these do not form part of the value added of the manufacturing sector. 
However, it is possible that in setting a target for their profits, firms take 
account of changes in raw materials, for these lead to changes in working 
capital which in turn warrant higher profits. While this possibility is not
i
formally integrated into the structure of the theoretical model, it is allowed
for empirically in the equation.
Furthermore, equation (8) includes a measure of international 
competitiveness which is based on the ratio of the wholesale price index to 
world export prices. The rationale underlying the inclusion of this variable 
derives from the monetarist law of one price* which asserts that export 
prices are influenced more by world prices and international competition 
than domestic costs. Hence, by way of a transmission mechanism linking 
traded and non-traded goods, it is argued that international competition has a 
greater influence on prices, than domestic costs or other factors. By 
implication, the law of one price* therefore suggests that in the short run, the 
property tax burden will fall wholly on firms, thereby leading to a decline in 
profits. Thus, in terms of equation (8), if the international competitiveness 
measure is found to be significant and close to unity, this would suggest that 
the coefficients of the property tax variable, and the domestic cost terms will 
be small, if not statistically insignificant. It is perhaps worth noting 
paranthetically, that in the longer run if capital is sufficiently mobile between 
countries, international tax differentials will induce capital flows which will 
eventually equalise net-of-tax returns.
Finally, a dummy variable is included in equation (8) to capture the 
possible impact of the 1974 revaluation which led to a redistribution of the 
tax burden from manufacturing to the service sector. The precise role of this 
variable remains somewhat ambiguous, for the revaluation broadly coincided
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with a number of "structural" changes such as entry into the EEC, the 
emergence of a ("dirty") floating exchange rate and the first “oil price shock" 
which led to a steep decline in the mark-up over this period. In addition, a 
time trend has been included to capture the impact of other variables not 
already included in the model.
In equation (8), both wages and output are expressed in expectational 
form. In the absence of any data on expectations, we are thus compelled to 
construct a model of expectation formation.
7.3  M odelling Wage and Output Expectations:
In this section, we consider three general processes of expectation 
formation: a first order autoregressive scheme; a univariate time series 
forecast; and rational expectations forecasts.
In the first expectations scheme, we assume that one step ahead
forecasts are generated by a first order autoregressive process. For wages, a
series of expectations was derived from the fitted values of the model:
(9) A wet = 0.024 + 0.221 Aw,.,
(4.58) (3.7)
Sample: 1965:1 - 1983:4 : OLS
o = 0.029; Q20 = 22.4; LM (4) - 9.51
[Note: t-statistics are shown in paranthesis, QJs the Box Pierce 0 statistic for a
random correlogram of residual, and LM (4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test
for fourth order autocorrelation.].
The model can arguably be regarded as the empirical counterpart of a
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simple process in which the expected change in wages equals a fraction of the 
change in the previous quarter. The series generated from (9) will hereafter 
be referred to as the "naive expectations scheme".
In addition, we consider a more general extrapolative scheme, based on
the univariate time series properties of the variable under consideration. The
parameters of the model were identified and estimated using the techniques
pioneered by Box and Jenkins (1976). Accordingly, wages were found to be
described by an integrated AR (4) scheme. Thus our second series for wage
expectations are based on the fitted values of the following model:
(10) A w et = 0.29 A w  t_, + 0.17 A w {_2 4 0.19 A w t 3 * 0.23 A w t_4
(2.01) (1.86) (2.43) (2.003)
Sample 1965:1 - 1983:4 (Max. Likelihood)
.o =.0 21; Q20 = 19.1; LM (4) - 4.28
It is well established that any linear rational expectations model in
which the exogenous variables follow a stationary process, can be expressed 
in terms of a univariate time series model (see Wallis (1980) ). Thus 
equation (10) can be regarded as the extrapolative representation of a 
rational expectations predictor. However, Wallis (1980) has shown that an 
extrapolative predictor such as (10) is in general inferior to a rational forecast 
because it collapses separate information about the structure of the model 
into a single parameter. Thus, the forecast error of the extrapolative 
predictor is greater than that of a rational expectations forecast. Hence.
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following Wickens (1982), predictions such as these which are based on a 
subset of ail available information will be referred to as "weakly rational 
expectations".
A similar procedure was employed to derive a univariate time series
model for output. However, it was discovered that the series for
manufacturing output followed a random walk with drift. Attempts to
identify a subset of the observations by truncating the model, and splitting
the observations into pre and post floating exchange rate periods, or using the
"oil shock" as the demarcation line, made little different to this disturbing
result. Clearly, in a univariate time series model the best prediction of a
random walk is its past value, and hence the "weakly rational expectations"
forecasts for output are identical to the "naive expectations" scheme. The
time series model for output is given by:
(11) qet - 0.18 ♦ 0.96 q t _,
(2.40) (2.86)
Sample: 1965:1 - 1983:4 (Max. Likelihood)
o = 0.072; Q20 = 16.2; LM (4) = 3.19
7 .4  Rational Expectations:
The expectational schemes described above are based on mechanistic 
extrapolative rules which take no account of other factors which might 
influence wages and output. They therefore have the disturbing implication
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that individuals make systematic forecasting errors. Consider, for example, 
the output equation; it seems not unreasonable to suggest that in forming 
expectations, firms take some account of the impact of demand, competition, 
and exchange rates on output. Extrapolative schemes ignore these factors and 
hence persistently under (over) predict increases (decreases) in a series, and 
fail to track sudden changes and turning points.
An alternative approach is offered by the rational expectations 
hypothesis (REH hereafter) which asserts that expectations are . . informed
predictions of future events and hence depend . . .  on the structure of
the relevant system describing the economy" Muth (1961). Thus, according 
to the REH agents in forming their expectations take full account of all the 
available information, and the interrelationships among variables described 
by the appropriate economic theory. The potential advantages of RE over the 
mechanistic rules are clear; the process of expectations formation is 
endogenous to the model, and the forecasts are efficient and unbiased.
We therefore examine the implications of introducing RE forecasts of 
wage and output in the mark-up equation. It is possible that RE may 
improve our ability to derive a robust model, and yield results which differ 
substantially from those of the other expectations schemes.
However, before describing the estimation procedures, it seems vital to 
distinguish between the REH per-sezxid the model to wrhich it is applied. The 
REH is typically used in models which embody strictly neoclassical
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assumptions (i.e. flexible prices and perfect markets). The hypothesis has 
therefore been used to attack "Keynesian" models which give effective 
demand the leading role in determining output. Recall that for output to be 
demand determined, it must be assumed that some markets do not clear. 
This does not, however, necessarily imply that expectations are formed 
adaptively. Price rigidities and involuntary unemployment may derive from 
a number of sources such as imperfect competition (as in Kalecki (1971) or 
Wietzman (1985) ), fixed training costs (Oi (1962) ), or increasing returns 
(Kaldor (1964) ). None of these situations presupposes any form of 
"irrationality" or extrapolative expectations schemes. There is therefore no 
necessary contradiction in using the REH in a model which embodies 
"Keynesian" features. The present study does not seek to adjudicate on the 
macro policy implications or validity of the REH. Rather, concern here is 
restricted to the narrow question of assessing the effect of R.E on the 
mark-up equation, and the property tax coefficient.
Estim ation Procedures:
In his seminal article Muth (1961) defined RE as being " . . essentially 
the same as the predictions from the relevant economic theory". Formally 
this implies that the RE of a variable (say Y) is given by its mathematical 
expectation conditional upon the available information:
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(12) Yet -  E (Y, | n t_j)
and
n M =(Z ,e )
where: Yet - rational expectation of Y in period t
Ot l = information set dated t-1
Z * variables in the information set '
0 - structural coefficients of these variables in the 
information set.
The information set 0 includes the structure of the relevant model, as 
well as realisations of all relevant exogenous variables. It follows that to 
obtain rational forecasts of (say) wages, it becomes necessary to model the 
wage-price subsystem in the manufacturing sector. If we assume that agents 
are in possession of this subsystem, then we have the problem of estimating a 
model in which expectations are determined endogenously. With RE, 
computational considerations are of greater importance than in conventional 
model estimation. Hence it would seem appropriate to describe the 
estimation procedures used in the present study. In what follows, we ignore 
problems arising from learning mechanisms, and time varying parameters.
Consider the following n equation stable linear system:
(13) YUB, ♦ Y > 2 ♦ Y2tB3 ♦ XUC -  U,
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where: YJt and Y0t = vectors of endogenous variables of size nj 
and n2 respectively.
Yt s [Yu Y2l] = size (nj + n2) vector
YJt - rational expectation of YJt
X - vector of exogenous variables of size q
U - disturbance term
Rationality implies that:
(14) Y,t - Y* * n
where: r|t = random disturbance term
We assume that the exogenous variables Xt are described by the time 
series process:
(15) 9(L)Xt - 'Fd)£ t
where: £, t _ white noise
0 (L) and ¥ (L) - lag polynomials of finite length 
Substituting (14) into (13) we obtain:
(16) Yt B + XtC = Ut  ^ r\fi2 
where: BT - [ Bj * B l : Bj]
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Rearranging (16):
(17) Yt - I - X(C + Ut + T)tB2]B-'
Taking expectations of (17) conditional upon O t l :
E(Yt,| n t l ) = - B - '  c  E U jn ,. , )
Writing Xt for E (Xj  0 t l ) which is the optimal predictor for X given by 
the realisation in (15):
(18) Y‘ =B-'CXt
That is, the RE of Ylt is given by the predictions of the exogenous 
variables.
There are two procedures commonly used to estimate RE models: the 
substitution method, and the errors in variables method. In the substitution
method, the rational expectations (Y*t) are replaced by the actual :• forec&ts
of the variable. More formally, in the substitution method, we first obtain the 
form of the RE in terms of the unknown structural coefficients (i.e. equation
(18)), and substitute this into (13) to obtain the observable system.
(19) YjjBj + Y2tB3 + Xt C « U 
where: C - C [I - B_I]
u T ut ♦ e ,
Since (19) is non-linear in B and C, efficient estimation requires the use
of a highly non-linear systems estimator. One method of circumventing this
difficulty is to replace Y*t with its forecasts from (18) which are then treated
as exogenous variables. This however may lead to the well known errors of 
two-stage procedures (see Wallis (1980)).
In contrast, the errors in variables method replaces the expected 
variables with their ex-post realisations. Thus in terms of equation (13), by
substituting (14) for Y*t we create errors in variables of qt:
(20) Yt B + Xt C = (Ut B2 )
Clearly^  both Yt and X( are now correlated with the augmented
disturbance term through r)t B2. We therefore have more jointly dependent
variables than equations. However, Wickens (1982) has shown that
asymptotically efficient estimates can be obtained by estimating (20) with Zt
(the variables in the information set) jointly using FIML. Since the errors in 
variables procedure is easier to implement, it has been used, where possible, 
to derive rational expectations.5 
Wage Expectations under the REH:
Under R.E., we assume that agents are in possession of the complete 
model. Hence, to obtain rational forecasts of wages, it becomes necessary to 
model the wage-price system. Considerable controversy surrounds the 
specification of the appropriate model of wage determination. However, for
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the purposes of this study, we merely require a sufficiently general equation 
which has a reasonable empirical performance. A wage-price subsystem 
which has been widely used in past research is of the form:
(21) Aw, - ao + J.au A pre ♦ £ aj2 A. r . r . ♦ £ a ls A. (w-pr)
+ 2 0! , dt . + 2 X f .I H t-1 ^  15 t-1
i » f  t r y? t r y
(22) A Pf Po +^I pn A m (.j + ^ Wt-i + J ^ i3  * V i
,m . . rrv
At «-i d.-i
where: pr = consumer price index
r.r - retention ratio
d - measure of demand
m = import prices
i.t = indirect taxes NET of property taxes
tA = non-domestic property taxes paid by all services and
industries
X = vector of other exogenous variables
The wage equation described in equation (21) has received a 
reasonable degree of empirical support, and is used in both the National 
Institute and Treasury macro models. However, its precise theoretical
interpretation remains somewhat ambiguous. Thus, the National Institute 
modellers suggest that equations such as (21) represent workers demands for 
wages. Wage demands are seen to depend on net earnings (i.e. the retention
ratio r.r), real wages (w-pf ) expected inflation (Apf ) and other variables
included in X which reflect workers' desired or target real wage path. In 
contrast, other authors such as Sargan (1980b) and H.M. Treasury modellers 
treat the wage equation as the outcome of a wage bargain. In this view, the
real wage (w-pf ) and retention ratio (r.r.) are seen to determine the supply of
labour, while the other terms reflect the demand for labour. On this
interpretation, the variables included in X( attempt to measure employers'
willingness to concede higher wage claims. In the present study variables 
such as a time trend, indirect taxes, strike activity and union density were 
included in X4, and it was found that only the union density variable was 
statistically significant. In addition, we experimented with three measures of 
demand in the wage: equation: the excess of unemployment over vacancies, 
unemployment and vacancies. It was discovered that ony lagged 
uemployment was statistically significant.
The price equation in (22) is of the familiar cost-based pedigree, which 
have been widely used in single equation studies and the main 
macro-econometric models of the UK. The interpretation of equations such as 
these has been discussed in Section 7.1. However, it is perhaps worth noting
paranthetically that there is no necessary contradiction between modelling 
prices in terms of costs, and allowing the money supply a role in the 
inflationary process. The cost-based price equation can be viewed as the 
mechanism through which changes in costs feed into prices.
The system was initially estimated using single equation techniques. 
This general procedure of moving from single to systems estimators is 
commonly applied, recent examples being Sargan (1980b) and Henry and 
Ormerod (1982). Thus, the dynamic specification of each equation was tested 
using the general-to-specific approach described in Chapter 6. We report 
below our preferred parsimonous specification:
(23) Awt - c + Oj A(w-pr) l_1 + a2 A r.r. + a3 Au.d. M
+ a 5 u t -6 + a 6 r r M + a :  A Pr
D.W. « 1.93; a = 0.025; Q20 = 17.0 U = 0.32
(24) Apr - C * pj Am t_, - p2 Aw t_, *p3 AtA * p4 lpr-w)t_,
D.W. - 1.86; 0 - 0.017; Q20 - 20.8; U - 0.165
where: u.d = union density 
u = unemployment 
(Note; D.W. = Durban Watson statistic; U = Theil's Inequality 
coefficient)
Finally, these equations were estimated jointly using FIML in order to
obtain rational asymptotically efficient estimates of price expectations (p*). 
The FIML estimates are given by:
(25) =  0.8 - 0.3 A(w-pr) t _ j  - 0.92 Ar.r. +0.24 Au.d. M
(1.98) (2.1) (-2.5) (3.16)
+ 0.16 u,.6 - 0.33 r.r,_, + 0.47 p«
(1.99) (-2.71) (2.18)
RSS = 0.027; o = 0.021; DW = 1.95; LM (4) -= 5.32; U - 0.068
(26) A pr = - 0.003 + 0.104 A m t_, + 0.157 A wt_, + 0.22 A tA
(-1.82) (3.05) (1.9 ) (3.48)
- 0.33 (pr- w) .
( -2 <)
RSS = 0.0062; o= 0.0162; DW = 2.48; LM(4) = 4.08) U - 0.00527
In general, the model appears to be well specified. The expected rate of 
inflation coefficient has a plausible value of 0.47 and is well determined. 
While concern here is focused on the manufacturing sector, it is worth noting 
the size and sign of the coefficient of the property tax variable. Equation (26) 
reveals that 22% of any increase in property taxes is shifted forward into 
prices. Finally, the predictions based on the reduced form of this sytem were 
used to generate one step-ahead rational expectations of wages. The 
predictions closely track the actual change in wages, and this is reflected in 
the Theils Inequality Coefficient between actual and predicted values of 
0.00327. This would appear to suggest that the model is well specified.
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Output under the REH:
The model used to derive expected output draws on the work of Wren 
Lewis (1983) and Nickell (1981). The model is based on the observation that 
variations in the output of a firm that is on its supply curve may either 
derive from (a) shifts in the demand curve, or (b) movements along the 
demand curve. In the former situation, output is exogenous to the firm, being 
determined primarily by demand factors. On the other hand, changes in 
output resulting from movements along the demand curve are induced by 
variations in real factor costs. In this case, output is a choice variable of the 
firm, as in a neoclassical world of perfect competition.
To contrast these two possibilities, we estimated a general reduced 
form' type of output equation based on both real wage costs, and variables 
related to government policy and demand factors. The general model is given 
by:
( 2 7 )  q , -  P o + 2  pn q H  ♦ £  P2I ( w - p ) , . ,
+ t|  P3i b d t-i + h  C + Time + £  h  1 t-i * ^6 D
where: qt = output in manufacturing
b.d - measure of fiscal policy/demand 
c - measure of competitiveness
D = exchange rate dummy variable
t = property taxes in the manufacturing sector
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The budget deficit (b.d.) was included in the above equation to capture 
variations in output which derive from demand factors. We experimented 
with four measures: M3, £ M3, the unadjusted budget deficit, and the 
cyclically adjusted weighted deficit ( CAWD hereafter). Both M3 and £ M3 
were included on the assumption that the influence of government policy can 
be adequately captured by some broad measure of the money supply. The 
argument is based on the monetarist contention that fiscal policy is effective 
only if accompanied by increases in the money supply. However, both 
measures of the money supply were found to be statistically insignificant, and 
were therefore excluded from the equation. It may be argued that this result 
stems from the fact that certain monetary policies (such as the removal of the 
’corset') have served to distort existing measures of the money supply. Thus 
the absence of a link may reflect the inadequacies of M3 and £ M3 as a broad 
measure of money, rather than the ineffectiveness of monetary policies. The 
unadjusted budget deficit was also found to be statistically insignificant and 
frequently had the wrong sign. This result is not surprising for their exists a 
reciprocal causation between the budget deficit and aggregate demand. 
While increases in the deficit raise demand: increases in aggregate demand in 
turn tend to lower expenditures and raise taxes thereby reducing the deficit. 
These so called automatic stabilisation’ properties of the deficit have long 
been recognised, and have led to corrections in an attempt to extract the 
influence of the cycle on the deficit. Thus a measure of the cyclically adjusted
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weighted deficit (CAWD) was used. The statistics were obtained from the 
National Institute (Savage (1982), and Biswas et al (1985)). This measure is 
based on the variations in the deficit that would have occurred if output had 
growTn at a specified trend. The trend for output from 1963 to 1973 was 
assumed to equal its e i post rate of 2.8% and after 1974 to equal 2%. Thus 
the CAWD seeks to measure the overall fiscal stance of the authorities. As 
noted below, this variable performed well in the equations and was robust to 
changes in specification.
The measure of competitiveness is defined as the ratio of wholesale 
prices to world export prices. The precise role of this variable in the output 
equation seems somewhat difficult to interpret in the floating exchange rate 
period. Under fixed exchange rates, it is clear that this measure captures 
both the authorities exchange rate policies and movements in foreign prices. 
The variable can therefore be viewed as a proxy for the world demand for 
domestic products. However, under floating exchange rates, this measure 
might well be influenced by interest rates if they lead to movements in the 
exchange rate, and hence the measure of competitiveness. There is 
consequently an a priori reason for either including a dummy variable to 
account for the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates, or estimating 
different equations for the two periods. On the basis of the forecasting 
performance of the equation, an exchange rate dummy variable was included.
The behaviour of lagged real labout costs in the equation was
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somewhat ambiguous, and highly sensitive to changes in specification. Ceterii 
paribus real wages should exert a negative impact on output. However, the 
lagged variables were frequently insignificant and alternated in sign. An 
attempt was made to improve the performance of the equation by excluding 
the insignificant lags, with the wrong sign. In addition, we experimented 
with Almon polynomial lags, using the tests described by Sargan (1980a) to 
determine the optimal degree and length of the lags. However, with real 
wages included in the equation, the forecasts failed completely to track the 
major turning points in the series (in particular the 1980 recession). 
Consequently on the basis of the predictive performance of the model, real 
wages were excluded from the preferred parsimonous specification.
Finally, we include a measure of property taxes in the manufacturing 
sector. In all versions of the model, this variable was found to be statistically 
insignificant. This result is not surprising, for as noted in earlier chapters, the 
link (if any) between property taxes and output is likely to be highly complex 
and indirect. It will be recalled that in general equilibrium theory, 
differentially higher property taxes induce firms to migrate to lower taxed 
sectors, thereby causing distoritions in the economy and lowering the level of 
output. Thus by this interpretation, lagged values of the property tax 
variable should have a negative sign. In contrast, Post-Keynesian theory 
suggests that equivalent property tax and government expenditure increases 
augment aggregate demand and raise output. Property taxes are therefore
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seen to have a positive impact on output.
At a high level of aggregation, it is difficult to reliably test these 
conflicting theoretical conclusions. In part, the difficulty stems from the fact 
that a change in any broad based fiscal instrument (such as the property tax) 
will typically be accompanied by a change in some other policy variable (e.g. 
government expenditure, alternative taxes, the money supply). Thus, a broad 
based tax only has an incidence relative to some other public finance 
instrument which should also be included in the model. In Equation (27), the 
CAWD is included to capture the overall fiscal stance of the authorities, and 
hence provides a summary measure of changes in policy variables. However, 
if these variables are related to the property tax, its impact will be subsumed 
within the CAWD. It may therefore be argued that our result stems from the 
failure to isolate the property tax effects from those of the other fiscal 
variables included in the CAWD.
The equation used to generate one-step-ahead forecasts of output is 
given by:
(28) qt - 1.576 + 0.813 qt_, + 0.005 b.d. - 0.147 c 
(2.92) (9.81) (1.91) (-3.52)
+ 0.0007 D 
(2.27)
DW - 1.98; RSS = 0.006; o - 0.062; Q20 - 8.91; U = 0.094;
LM (4) = 4.67
Despite the forecasting ability of this equation, as reflected in the U
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statistic, it is worth noting the relative size of the coefficients. Clearly, the 
lagged dependent variable plays a dominant role in this equation, and this 
stems from the difficulties encountered in modelling a series which follows a 
random walk. The best prediction of a random walk is its past value, and 
hence the coefficient of output is close to unity. The one period forecasts 
from this model were used to generate a series of rational expectations of 
output.
7.5  The M a rk -U p  Equation:
Having derived the three expectations schemes, it is now possible to 
estimate the mark-up equation (8). The dynamics of equation (8) were 
subjected to a data based simplification search using the general-to-specific 
procedures. Theacuve expectations and weakly rational expectations (WRE 
hereafter) versions were estimated by substituting the appropriate one 
period forecasts into the mark-up equation. Estimation of the RE version is 
however more complex and therefore warrants further discussion.
In the previous section RE of wages were obtained using the 
computationally simpler errors in variables method. However, this procedure 
cannot be used in the mark-up equation, for the dependent variable is 
defined as (p-w6). To use the errors in variables FIML estimation method 
described by Wickens (1982), the dependent variable would have to be 
defined as (p-w)e. In the mark-up equation only a component of the 
dependent variable (i.e. wages) is defined in expectational form. Hence, the
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Wickens procedure does not yield rational asymptotically efficient, unbiased 
estimates. We have consequently used an iterative approximation of the 
substitution method described by Henry and Ormerod (1982). In the first 
step of the estimation procedure, a data series on Awe and qe was obtained 
from the forecasts of the Aw and q equations. The model was then jointly 
estimated by 3SLS, and the Awe and qe series were revised, being based on
the fitted values of the 3SLS estimates of the Aw and q equations. The model 
was re-estimated with these new series. The process was continued until the 
estimated coefficients in the model remained constant between iterations, to 
the third decimal place. The estimates thus obtained are consistent, though 
not asymptotically efficient.
The results are presented in Table 7.1 overleaf. There are a number of 
points of interest sugested by these results. First, in all three models, the 
measure of competitiveness, the revaluation dummy variable, and the time 
trend were found to be statistically insignificant. Furthermore, all three 
equations have a reasonable degree of explanatory power, and are well 
specified in terms of white noise residuals. Now, clearly the naive 
expectations model is a special case of the WRE equation. Hence the relative 
performance of these models can be formally tested by means of the usual 
likelihood ratio test. The test revealed that naive model can be 
unambiguously rejected in favour of the WRE model. A comparison of the RE 
and WRE model is, however, somewhat more difficult for there appears no
TABLE 7.1
The Mark-Up Equation 
Sample 1965:1 -  1980:2
URRIRBLE
Rational
EKpectations
UJeakly 
Rational EKpectations
Naiue
EKpectations
Constant -1.225
(2.91)
-0.6517
(3.7)
-0.168
(1.38)
A (p -u « e)M +0.216 +0.403 +0.361
(1.93) (3.34) (3.23)
A (t - Qelt +0.137 +0.124 +0.125
(2.95) (2.47) (2.59)
A r t - 1 +0.176 +0.109 +0.158
(3.75) (2.52) (3.69)
d1 +0.047 +0.04 +0.0003
(2.89) (2.07) (1.051)
dt-l +0.051 +0.034 +0.106
(2.41) (4.02) (2.83)
dt_2 +0.053
(3.19)
+0.028
(1.29)
-
dt-3 +0.056 +0.022 -
(2.05) (1.82)
dt-4 +0.043
(1.98)
+0.016
(2.13)
-
R.S.S. 0.0086 0.0071 0.016
0 0.0205 0.0183 0.0371
LM(4) 5.3 2.04 7.09
°20 12.5 9.6 10.34
Z(4) 9.26 5.35 19.1
Note: 2 (4) is an asymptotic epproHimetlon of the Chou; Test, see Hendry (i960 )
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obvious way of nesting the two hypotheses into a composite model. Hence, 
we assume here that the two models are non-nested and use the familiar Cox 
test to obtain a preferred model.6 The Cox procedure treats each hypothesis 
as the null and compares the observed likelihood functions with an estimate 
of the likelihood functions if the null hypothesis were true. If the alternative 
fits better than it should if the null were true, then we can clearly reject the 
null. The Cox test statistic is of the form:
To - L(6o) - L (0i) - T [plim _!_ ( L (0o) - L(ei))]eo-eo
T->oo T
A
where: L (0o) = log likelihood function under the null hypothesis
, A
L(0i) - log likelihood function under the alternative 
hypothesis
T = number of observations
The advantages of the Cox test over other selection criterion are clear, 
Firstly, the test makes use of the information contained in the alternative. In 
addition, the test may reveal either that one model can be rejected, or that 
neither can be rejected or that both models can be rejected. Hence, the Cox 
procedure provides an additional test of model specification. The Cox 
statistics of the models are:
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Null
Hypothesis
Alternative Hypothesis
Rational Expectations Weakly Rational Expectations 
-3.438
Rational
Expectations
Weakly
Rational
Expectations
+ 1.362 -
The Cox statistic is asymptotically normally distributed with a critical 
value of ± 1.96 at the 5% level. Hence, we can clearly reject the RE model in 
favour of the WRE version.
However, which ever model is in fact deemed to be preferable, the 
most striking result in the Table 7.1 derives from the coefficient of the 
property tax term. This variable is clearly robust to changes in specification 
and varies from an upper limit of 0.137 in the RE model to a low of 0.124 in 
the WRE version. Lagged values of the property tax variable were found to 
be insignificant in all versions of the equation. This therefore implies that 
what little effect the property tax has on the mark-up is both direct and 
immediate. More specifically, the estimates suggest that much of the 
property tax burden falls on firms with less than 14% being shifted into the 
mark-up.
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Table 7.1 further reveals that demand lagged over four quarters exerts 
a positive and significant efect on the mark-up. It will be recalled that 
demand is measured by the Wharton index of capacity utilisation. The 
coefficient is clearly sensitive to the assumed process of expectation 
formation; with the cumulative impact in the RE version being greater than in 
the rival models.
One possible explanation for this result is that the short run tax shifting 
coefficient merely represents the adjustment process by which firms vary 
prices in response to changes in excess demand. Stated differently, it may be 
argued that the model fails to separate out the tax and expenditure effects 
and hence the positive coefficient merely reflects changes in demand rather 
than forward tax shifting. By this line of reasoning, in the long run the 
mark-up responds to changes in excess-demand alone and not demand in 
addition to cost and tax changes. Thus, as in neoclassical pricing theory, 
demand may be viewed as a generic factor that sums up all the forces acting 
to bring about changes in price. To investigate this possibility, we estimated 
the long run equilibrium coefficients directly using a procedure suggested by 
Bewley (1979). Bewley outlines an algebraic method of reparameterising 
short run adjustment models in a manner that permits direct estimation of 
the long run equilibrium coefficients. The procedure is briefly described in 
Appendix 3 and the estimates are presented in Table 7.2
TRBLE 7.2 
THE LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
Sample 1965:1 - 1980:2
VtRIRBLE
Rational
Expectations
Weakly 
Rational EKpectations
A (t -  qe)t 0.1448 0.1163
(3.72) (3.55)
a  r t 0.1577 0.062
(3.12) (1.15)
dt 0.992 1.28
(3.77) (2.72)
The results reveal that both demand and property taxes exert a
powerful influence on the mark-up in long run equilibrium. Raw material
costs, however, are found to be insiginifcant in the WRE model. In addition.
the long run coefficient of demand is close to unity in the RE and WRE
versions, thereby implying that in the long run changes in demand lead to
equiproportionate changes in the mark-up.
However, at the same time, property taxes exert an influence on the
/
mark-up with the coefficient being largely unaffected by the assumed form 
of expectations. This therefore suggests that property taxes exert a positive 
impact on the mark-up independentlyof demand.
7.6 Theoretical Implications of the Empirical Results:
It is instructive to consider the theoretical implications of these results. 
The estimates presented in Table 7.1 revealed that less than 14% of the 
property tax burden is shifted forward into the mark-up thereby implying 
that the tax burden falls mainly on firms in the short run. It may therefore 
be argued that the results validate neoclassical incidence theories which 
predict that the property tax burden is borne wholly by firms in the short 
run. Moreover, the finding that the mark-up is sensitive to demand appears 
to support the assumption of general equilibrium theory that firms maximise 
profits and prices respond to excess demand. By this interpretation, the 
long run forward shifting coefficients may be taken to represent the "excise
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effects" of the property tax which result from the outmigration of firms from 
higher taxed sectors.
However, the argument appears to be somewhat misleading, for 
general equilibrium theory asserts that none of the burden of the property 
tax can be shifted forward in the short run. This result stems from the 
assumption that firms maximise profits in perfectly competitive markets. 
Any attempt by a firm at its optimum price - output configuration, to raise 
prices can lead only to a decline in profits. It follows that in the short run the 
tax burden must be borne wholly by firms. Thus despite the apparent 
similarity of the empirical results, with the predictions of general equilibrium 
theory, it is evident that any degree of forward shifting (however small), is 
incompatible with the behavioural assumptions and conclusions of general 
equilibrium theory.
In contrast, Post-Keynesian analysis suggests that none of the burden 
of a uniform property tax falls on profits in the short run. In the competitive 
version of the model, prices are assumed to be flexible, and hence the 
expansionary demand effects of balanced property tax and government 
expenditure increases, raise prices and profits. This implies that the 
property tax variable will have a coefficient close to unity in the mark-up 
equation. In contrast, our results suggest that there is little forward shifting 
into prices. In the non-competitive version of the Post-Keynesian model, 
prices are assumed to be rigid, and hence a balanced property tax and
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government expenditure increase raises output, employment and profits. 
This suggests that property taxes exert a significant and powerful impact on 
output. However, in the output equation which was used to derive rational 
expectations, property taxes were found to be statistically insignificant. This 
result, it was argued, may reflect the fact that the demand effects of the tax 
(if any), are likely to be captured within the measure of the budget deficit. 
The difficulty encountered here is similar to that described in the discussion 
of budget and differential incidence in Chapter 6. Given the interrelations 
between policy variables it is often difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the 
impact of any one tax. At a high level of aggregation, there appears to be no 
obvious alternative way of testing this conclusion.
In the Post-Keynesian world, differential property taxes are shifted 
into prices by those firms which enjoy a sufficient amount of market power 
as measured by the degree of monopoly. Thus it may be argued that the 
coefficient of the property tax variable in the mark-up equation merely 
reflects forward shifting of the differential component by firms who enjoy a 
sufficient amount of market power. However, since this conclusion relies on 
the unverified expansionary output effects of the property tax, and depends 
on factors such as the degree of monopoly which can only be tested at a 
higher level of disaggregation, it would seem inappropriate to uncritically 
endorse this interpretation of the property tax coefficient. Furthermore, in 
the non-competitive model, prices are rigid and unaffected by demand. In
contrast, our results reveal that demand exerts a statistically significant effect 
in the short run, and a powerful impact in the long run equilibrium.
The estimates presented here are therefore neither wholly compatible 
with the conclusions of neoclassical theory or Post-Keynesian analysis. 
However, the results do appear to be consistent with the predictions of 
Davidson and Martin's (1985) general equilibrium model with an oligopolistic 
sector (see Chapter 2). It will be recalled that in the Davidson-Martin model, 
firm behaviour in the oligopolistic sector is governed by non-Cournot tacit 
collusion in the form of output quotas. The analysis is based on an infinite 
period supergame, in which it is assumed that firms adhere to a cartel only if 
there is no cheating. If any firm cheats the cartel is abandoned and output 
reverts back to its Nash level. Hence, a potential cheat compares the higher 
profits from cheating with the discounted future lower profits resulting from 
the dissolution of the cartel. An optimising firm will use the net returns to 
capital as the rate at which- to discount future profits and losses. Thus 
property taxes which lower the returns to capital, serve to increase the 
present value of future losses from cheating. This permits the cartel to 
further restrict output and increase prices and profits. Hence the coefficient 
of the property tax variable in the mark-up equation may be interpreted as a 
measure of the aggregate "cartel effect". Furthermore, within this framework 
the mark-up remains sensitive to demand. Thus, the results presented in 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 appear to accord with the conclusions of the Davidson
266
Martin model. This suggests that firm behaviour in the manufacturing sector 
is best described by a model of oligopoly thereby implying that future 
theoretical research should integrate alternative forms of collusive and 
non-collusive strategies within the general equilibrium system, and perhaps 
incorporate the demand effects of taxation.
APPENDIX 1
INTERPOLATION OF THE NON-DOMESTIC PROPERTY TAX SERIES
In the UK, non-domestic property taxes are levied annually, though 
they are typically paid in advance by firms either quarterly or half yearly.7 
Interpolation of the annual series is therefore not a purely statistical exercise, 
and arguably bears some relation to the flow of property tax payments 
through the accounting year.
/
Since only annual totals are available, but we require quarterly data, 
no assumption can be made about the seasonal (i.e. quarterly) pattern of 
fluctuations. The various interpolation techniques discussed here are based 
on different statistical criteria which the quarterly series are required to 
satisfy.
Thus, the procedure described by Lisman and Sandee (1964) (L-S 
hereafter) assumes that the unknown quarterly figures lie on a smooth trend 
between the annual observations. Interpolating this trend is, however, 
problematic because the trend underlying an annual series may differ from 
that of quarterly observations. To circumvent this difficulty L-S propose that 
the derived quarterly series should meet four statistical criteria of 
"reasonableness”:
(i) The sum of the quarterly figures must equal the annual totals
(ii) Symmetry in a series requires that if the annual totals for years 1, 2
and 3 are yj y2 y3 respectively, then the quarterly figures for year 2
will be in reverse order from what they would have been had the 
yearly totals beeny3, y2, y,.
(iii) Trend considerations dictate that if yearly totals increase in equal 
amounts (i.e. y2~ y ^  y2 - y3) then the quarterly figures must also rise 
in equal steps.
(iv) If the annual series follows a cycle such that y2- Vj= y2 - y^ then the
quarterly series in year 2 must lie on a sinusoid. This is the "cycle’' 
requirement.
More formally, let yj (i = 1 ,  n) denote the annual observations and
i. (J = 1, . . . .  p) be the quarterly figures. Now, from conditions (ii) to dvi it
follows that the quarterly series (x.) will be the weighted sum of the annual
figures y.
( 1)
1
M a e d
h
X6 b f c i
x7 c f b
Y,
x8 d e a
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where: x5 to x8 = quarterly figures in year 2
Yj to Y3 = annual figures in years 1, 2, and 3 
Furthermore, from condition fi) we have:
(2) 2 X- = Y2
7 - 5  ]
L-S then show that:
(3) 2 (e + f) = 4 and
(4) a + b + c + d = 0 
Solving the system leads uniquely to the result:
(5) f  xe 0.073 0.198 -0.021
*5
*6
*7  •
1--
---
-
W On 1
-  0.010  0.302
-0.042 0.302
-0.021 0.198
-0.042
- 0.010
0.073
Thus to obtain a quarterly series we merely substitute values for Y. in
equation (3). Despite its simplicity, the L-S procedure has a number of 
disadvantages. First, no quarterly values can be inferred for the first and last 
year. Second, the four criteria of reasonableness’ are arbitrary in the sense 
that they are not based on any form of optimising conditions.
An alternative method described by Boot et al (1967) minimises the 
sum of squares of the differences between successive quarterly values.
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subject to the constraint that the quarterly figures sum to the annual totals. 
Thus:
(6) Min. I  (x. - i .  ,)2
L = 2  1 1 1
subject to :
(7) 2 Xj = yk (k = 1,2,......... J)
The Langrangean function is then given by:
0 7 \ U
(8) 2 (x. x. J* - 2 A A 2  (x. -y  J
tz 2  k t -U -J  1 *
Solving (8), we obtain the system:
(9) * B - JT ' X '  o '
J o I y T
where:
2 -2  
r2 4 
-2
-2
4 -2 -2
i
L
iT -
and
1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1  1
. . .  > i£ ..............
4
-2
29)
A second quarterly series was derived from Equation (9). Solution of the
B - JT
J - 0
of order 5j x 5j,system require the inversion of the matrix
and this was done using a FORTRAN programmed
This procedure circumvents the problems associated with the L-S 
technique, but has been shown to produce an "S" shaped quarterly series 
when the annual trend is rising continuously. This is clearly an undesirable 
result, for it seems "reasonable" to require the quarterly figures of a 
monotonically increasing annual series to lie on a positively sloped straight 
line.
Thus Lesser (1961) suggests that quarterly figures should be inferred 
by minimising the sum of squares of the second differences between 
successive quarterly values:
(IO)MuiI(A  x. - A x. ,)2
ir-l ' 11
where:
A Xj -  A X, .,  - I ,
subject to:
( I D  ^ x,  -  y
Forming the Langrangean function and solving:
(12) c - J X = 0
J 0 I t
A
where:
CM -4 2
-4 1 0 COI 2
2
C
O1 1 2 1 2
2 - 8
O
OI
-2 8 10 -4
2 4 -2 |
j
This procedure satisfies the summation condition that I  i i - y .
Furthermore, there is symmetry in the sense of L-S, and the cycle 
requirements are satisfied. In addition/if yearly totals increase in equal 
amounts, the quarterly figures lie on a straight line trend. It would therefore 
appear that the Lesser interpolation technique is theoretically superior to the 
L-S and Boot et al procedures.
However, having obtained quarterly figures using all three techniques, 
these were substituted into the price equation (22), output equation (27). and 
the mark-up equation (8). The estimates thus obtained were compared with 
the results of regressions using annual data. It was discovered that only the 
L-S series yielded results which were consistent with the annual estimates. 
Thus the estimates reported in the study are all based on the L-S series.
APPENDIX 2
DIRECT ESTIMATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM RESPONSE: 
THE REPARAMETERISATION PROCEDURE
Bewley (1979) has described a simple algebraic procedure for 
reparameterising linear dynamic models in a form which enables the 
equilibrium coefficients to be estimated directly. For expository convenience, 
we describe here the procedure for a static partial adjustment model. The 
technique can readily be extended to more complex dynamic systems. 
Consider the equilibrium relation:
(1) Y*t = B X t 
where:
Y*t = n x 1 vector of the equilibrium value of Y
X t = k x 1 vector of exogenous variables
B = n x k matrix of unknown equilibrium parameters 
Assume that in the short run agents adjust to Y* by means of the 
familiar partial adjustment model:
(2) A Y t = A(Y\  - Yt_j) + u t 
where:
A = n x n matrix of adjustment parameters 
u = vector of disturbances with E(u t) = 0 and E(ut u ) * 0, t * s.
Substituting (1) into (2) we obtain the short run disequilibrium 
regression equation:
(3) AYt - C X, - AY,., ♦ «,
where:
C » AB
The usual regression coefficients in short run disequilibrium models 
are based on C (= A B). However, concern here is focused on the long run 
coefficients in B. Since C and B are non-linearly related, direct estimation of 
A in Equation (3) is clearly difficult.
Bewley (1979) therefore suggests the following reparameterisation:
Premultiply (3) by A"1
(4) A"1 AY, - BX, - Y,_, + A '1 u,
Let A '1 - (I - P),so that rearranging (41 we obtain:
(5) Y, = P AY, + B X, + v,
where: v - A '1 u,, E( v )  = 0 and E(v v )  = 0, t * s.
We can directly estimate (5) and hence obtain the equilibrium 
responses in matrix B. The results reported in Table 7.2 are based on this 
reparameterisation procedure extended to take account of dynamic 
responses.
APPENDIX 3
DATA SOURCES
International Competitiveness from Economic Trends
Demand = Wharton Capacity Index based on output from 
Economic trends.
Budget Deficit from Economic Trends and Savage (1982) and 
Biswas et al (1985).
Price of value added in manufacturing derived from Economic 
Trends and/or National Income and Expenditure
Wage Costs derived from Economic Trends and National Income 
and Expenditure.
Consumer price Index derived from Economic Trends
Raw Material Costs derived from Economic Trends
Retention Ratio from Tarling and Wilkonson (1979) and 
Economic Trends.
Import Prices derived from Economic Trends
Manufacturing Output obtained from Economic Trends
Indirect Taxes = (GDP Nominal - GDP Real - Business Rates)
GDP Nominal and GDP Real from Economic Trends
Rates in the Manufacturing Sector from CIPFA Statistics 
Scotland; CIPFA Statistics England and Wales and National 
Income and Expenditure.
Total Business Rates from CIPFA Statistics Scotland, and CIPFA 
Statistics England and Wales
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u = Unemployment from Economic Trends,
v = Vacancies from Economic Trends.
M3 from Economic Trends.
£M3 from Economic Trends.
297
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Stated differently our assumption implies that the objectives are 
perfect complements. Thus increased "consumption" of one objective 
is accompanied by higher "consumption" of the other.
2. We require this assumption to circumvent the logical shortcomings of
the perfect competititon model noted by Arrow (1959): If all 
producers and consumers are price takers, then prices can never be 
changed.
3. The linearisation procedure is based on Beath (1979) and is as 
follows.
We have:
P* - ]___ T + we
Taking logs and rearranging:
In P - In v '  - C + BN In ( X )
Qe
where: C - .In ♦ B* In __T_ ♦ B* In
Since C approximates all the higher order terms in the expansion _L_
1 - B|
we would expect it to be negative. Thus consider the diagram below which 
depicts the relationship between our approximation BN and the actual
coefficient 1 . Let AA denote the true relationship, and B B our
1 - bn
linear approximation. Clearly, i_  - BN only at the origin. Hence at the
1 " bn
origin, we get an accurate estimate of the mark-up.
f
1 / 
' • b n
/
/
s '
/ / .
>L
/ "/ C
/
t ” ------ - R
. K B
V
Bd
H ^  H
However, the observations will lie somewhere along AA - say in the 
range XX with sample mean ji. Thus, a p rio ri we would expect a
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negative constant. The final results presented in Table 7.1 confirm this.
4. See Chapter 6 for the definition of absolute differential and budget 
incidence effects.
5. The Wickens (1982) procedure cannot be used in the mark-up 
equation since the dependent variable is defined as (p( - w*) rather
than (pt - wt )c, and hence is not in eipectational form. This is
discussed in detail in the following section.
6. It is recognised that the RE and WRE versions are not strictly 
non-nested equations. A set of equations are said to be non-nested if 
neither equation can be derived as a special case of the others. It will 
be recalled that Wallis (1980) showed that a linear RE model can be 
expressed in terms of a univariate time series equation (termed here 
WRE) However, the forecast error of the time series model is greater 
than that of an RE prediction. Hence, while the predictions of the RE 
and WRE versions differ, the two models are in fact algebraically 
related and therefore cannot be strictly defined as non-nested 
hypotheses. However, in so far as the Cox-test is merely a test of 
variances, the results of the procedure can be seen to yield 
approximate results.
Thus, published accounts of P.L.C.s frequently reveal that rates are 
paid in advance for either quarterly or half yearly. Further anecdotal 
evidence to support this assertion was obtained from a random sample 
of thirty firms audited by a large firm of chartered accountants. It was 
found that 14 paid their rate bills half yearly, 11 quarterly and the 
remainder annually. For reasons of confidentiality, the author is 
unable to reveal either the name of the auditors, or the Companies 
involved.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS:
The effective incidence of the non-domestic property tax is an issue 
which either by design or default has been consistently ignored in much of 
the literature on the rating svstem. Proposals for the reform of the svstemi
have consequently been based on the theoretically and empirically 
unsubstantiated assumption that the formal and effective incidence of the 
non-domestic property tax are identical. The present study has thus 
endeavoured to remedy this deficiency and infer the incidence of the 
non-domestic property tax. However, the analysis has not been concerned 
with detailed proposals for reform of the property tax. or the desirability of 
any particular change. The intention has been to provide further insight into 
the effective incidence, rather than answers to current policy problems. 
Consequently, much of the discussion has been concerned with theoretical 
issues, and in developing a coherent framework to empirically infer the 
incidence of the non-domestic property tax.
Incidence theory is a notoriously controversial issue, over which 
opposing schools of thought have long waged an intense but inconclusive 
battle. In part, the disagreements appear to arise because of the failure to 
trace the full consequences of a tax. Thus, in Chapter 2. it wras argued that
the main differences between the "traditional view’" and the "new view" of 
the property tax arise from the secondary or general equilibrium effects 
which may offset the direct impact of the tax. The "traditional view" 
concluded that a tax on property is shifted forward into prices. This result 
stems from the fact that the analysis is confined to the effects of the tax on 
one market in isolation, hence the taxed factor ( property) is assumed to be
perfectly elastic in supply. In contrast, the "new viewr" analyses the impact of
/
the property tax in an economy-wide context in which the supply of factors 
of production are fixed. It follows that the burden of a uniform property tax 
falls entirely on its legal base, i.e. property owners. In part, this conclusion 
derives from the plethora of stringent assumptions wThich are employed in 
general equilibrium theory. The models abstract from the aggregate demand 
effects of taxation, and assume that factors of production are fully employed 
and all markets are perfectly competitive. Given this entourage of 
assumptions, a tax can only be shifted by varying the supply of the taxed 
factor or product. In a closed economy, a uniform tax on land or capital is a 
clear case where the taxed factor cannot be decreased, hence the entire 
burden of the property tax is borne by the owners of land and property. In 
section 2.2, this conclusion was shown to endure the introduction of the 
public sector (Henderson (1985)), a variable supply of land (Sonstellie (1979) 
). and an endogenously determined intermediate product (termed capital) 
(Breuckner (1981) ). This result is not surprising, for none of these
extensions of the standard two-sector model alter the basic tax shifting 
mechanisms, or allow factor supplies to vary.
In contrast, the introduction of risk induced portfolio changes in a one 
sector neoclassical model revealed that if uniform property taxes are fully 
capitalised into lower land values, the riskiness of land vis-a-vis other assets 
declines. Thus the demand for land increases and land prices rise. That is, 
part of a uniform land tax is shifted to other factors of production.
/
Similarly, in the analysis of the dynamic incidence of the property tax, 
it was discovered that a uniform tax on capital may be fully shifted to labour. 
This result stems from the fact that in growth models labour is treated as a 
primary factor, while capital is assumed to depend on saving out of labour 
and capital income. Thus, a tax on capital lowers its net returns and 
decreases savings and the stock of capital. In turn, the reduced supply of 
capital raises its marginal product, and net returns increase. In the extreme 
case, where there are no savings out of wages, the decline in the capital stock 
is sufficient to ensure that the tax is fully shifted to labour. The analysis of 
the dynamic incidence of the tax therefore suggests that a uniform property 
tax which appears progressive in a static framework might, as a result of 
changes in factor supplies, be highly regressive.
The policy implications of this conclusion are apparent: The dynamic 
and secondary effects of the property tax may well offset the initial or direct 
impact. Hence, policy recommendations based on the formal incidence may
well have the reverse of their intended effects. What is needed is a clear 
recognition of the general equilibrium repercussions of the property tax, and 
an adequate model in which to incorporate these. This, however, leads to a 
second major source of controversy in the incidence literature - the model 
which is to be used to describe the economy.
In general, there appears to be little disagreement over the need to
analyse property tax incidence within a general equilibrium system. What is
/
at issue is the nature of the model to be used, and in particular, the 
assumptions about the structure of markets within which firms operate. In 
section 2.3, we argued that the response of firms to the property tax depends 
crucially on the assumed form of competition. The analysis focused on the 
consequences of introducing monopolistic competition and oligopoly in the 
standard two sector general equilibrium model.
Under monopolistic competition, a uniform property tax once again 
falls wholly on its legal base. However, the number of firms, and hence 
market structure are affected by the tax. In contrast, under oligopoly, the 
assumed form of collusive behaviour and retaliatory actions provide an 
additional mechanism through which a uniform property tax may be shifted. 
Specifically, the model assumed that collusion takes the form of output 
quotas. If any firm  cheats, the cartel is dissolved and output reverts back to 
its Nash level. Thus cheating is only profitable if the current higher profits 
from cheating exceed the discounted future lower profits from the dissolution
of the cartel. Since profit maximising firms discount future profits and losses 
by the rate of return on capital, an increase in property taxes which initially 
lowers profits serves to raise the present value of future losses from cheating. 
Thus, cartel output can be further restricted thereby raising prices and 
profits.
The assumed form of competition has further implications for incidence
theory. If the economy is dominated by price setting oligopolists, agents may
/
transact at false (i.e. non-market clearing) prices, and hence effective and 
notional demands and supplies w ill diverge. In this situation, equivalent 
property tax and government expenditure changes w ill affect not only the 
distribution of income, but also its level. Thus in the amended 
Post-Keynesian non-competitive model, balanced property tax and 
government expenditure increases raise consumption flows which augment 
aggregate demand, thereby raising employment output and profits. It follows 
that in the short run, none of the burden of a uniform property tax fails on 
firms. In contrast, property tax differentials in the Post-Keynesian world 
may be shifted forward into prices if firms enjoy a sufficient amount of 
market power. However, unless the tax is fully shifted into prices, property 
tax differentials w ill lead to variations in net profits which w ill induce 
movements of capital between sectors and regions in the long run. By 
ignoring these tax induced supply side shifts, Post-Keynesian theory appears 
to be crucially incomplete.
The second major component of this study is the empirical analysis in 
Chapters 4-7. In Chapter 4, we reviewed the existing empirical literature on 
the impact of the non-domestic property tax in the UK. Thus section 4.2 
discussed the Crawford, Fotherfill and Monk (1985) (C.FM) and Gripaios and 
Brooks' (1984) studies on the effect of non-domestic property taxes on 
regional employment. It was suggested that the authors failed to distinguish
between the final impact of the property tax on employment, and the
/
mechanisms through which the tax may affect employment. Hence property 
taxes were found to be highly correlated with the main explanatory variables 
in the regression equations. It was further argued that CFM's estimation 
procedures were statistically flawed and their results theoretically 
incompatible. In contrast, Gripaios and Brooks’ conclusions appeared to be 
consistent with a broadly Keynesian view of property taxation in which 
balanced tax and government expenditure increases raise aggregate demand 
and employment. In addition, Chapter 4 reviewed Bennetts (1986b)
estimates of the effective property tax rates, and Mair's (1986) investigation 
of the impact of property taxes on prices. Both these studies appear to 
suggest that non-domestic property tax rate differentials between sectors are 
substantial, and hence the allocative impact of the tax is likely to be highly 
distortionary, with the incidence falling primarily on firms.
Thus in Chapter 5, we developed a hierarchical general equilibrium 
model to estimate the effective incidence of the non-domestic property tax.
The model attempted to extend Harberger's (1962) pioneering analysis by
introducing a stylised production hierarchy based on the observed flows of
intermediate goods in the UK economy. Employing the usual entourage of
general equilibrium assumptions (i.e. perfect markets, fu ll employment, fixed
factors, etc.) it was shown that the spirit of Harberger's conclusions are
unaffected by the introduction of a complex hierarchy. Furthermore, the
model was used to discern the "differential'' incidence of varying tax rates at
/
various levels of the production hierarchy. Finally, estimates of the incidence 
of the property tax were derived from the algebraic solution of the model. 
However, in the absence of data on cross-elasticities of substitution in 
demand and supply, the magnitude of key parameters were assumed a-prion 
and varied in an attempt to assess the sensitivity of the results to a particular 
parameter. We further investigated the empirical consequences of 
introducing factor complementarity in the model. Overall, the simulations 
revealed that capital bears much of the burden of the non-domestic property 
tax.
However, the algebraic expression used to estimate the incidence 
contained a large number of elasticities, so that the robustness of the results 
to any single parameter may be of little significance. A further difficulty 
stems from the fact that the general equilibrium model merely imposes 
functional forms on the data, rather than empirically verifying the validity of 
the assumed restrictions. As noted earlier, there are several competing
models in the literature and each yields a different algebraic solution and 
estimate of tax incidence. The general equilibrium method does not provide a 
means for discriminating between models, for no statistical testing is 
involved. Thus, conflicting theories cannot be empirically falsified within this 
framework.
These criticisms suggest that we require an alternative method to infer
the incidence of property taxes. Hence, Chapter 6 reviewed the main
/
quantitative techniques used in public finance to measure the impact of 
taxes. It was argued that while the income distribution method is 
inappropriate for analysing the incidence of a broad based tax, the general 
equilibrium estimates depend crucially on unverified assumptions regarding 
the structure of the economy. In contrast, econometric procedures, while not 
perfect, provide a framework for refuting hypotheses and generating data 
coherent estimates. Chapter 6 thus discussed a procedure widely used in 
econometrics to estimate data admissible short run dynamic adjustment 
models.
These techniques were employed in Chapter 7 to derive estimates of 
the degree of forward shifting of the property tax in the manufacturing 
sector. In common with empirical studies on the incidence of the corporation 
tax, the estimates were based on a model of mark-up pricing. This class of 
models have obtained widespread empirical support, and appear to be 
increasingly accepted as an explanation of price determination in the
manufacturing sector. The form of the mark-up equation was derived from a 
theoretical model of price setting behaviour, and was found to depend on 
expected costs. Thus, one of the questions investigated in the study was the 
process by which agents form expectations. We considered three processes of 
expectation formation: A first order autoregressive scheme, an extrapolative 
univariate time series predictor, and rational expectations. The expectations
procedures were discussed in some detail, and on the basis of a likelihood
/
ratio test, and a non-nested Cox test, it was discovered that the 
autoregressive scheme and rational expectations forecasts could be rejected 
in favour of the time series extrapolative predictions.
However, ail three models revealed that less than 14% of the property 
tax is shifted forward into prices and that the mark-up is sensitive to demand 
(as measured by a Wharton capactiy index). Furthermore, the value of the 
estimated long run equilibrium parameters suggested that demand exerts an 
equiproportionate effect on prices, and that property taxes are shifted 
forward independently of any demand effects.
Chapter 7 further investigated the theoretical implications of these 
results. Since part of the property tax burden is shifted into prices in the 
short run and the mark-up was found to be responsive to demand, the results 
cannot be readily reconciled with either Post-Keynesian or neoclassical 
incidence theories. However, the results do appear to be consistent with the 
general equilibrium model which incorporates an oligopolistic sector. It w ill
be recalled that within this framework an increase in property taxes initially 
lowers profits, thereby increasing the present value of future losses from 
cheating. This permits cartel output to be lowered and prices and profits rise. 
One may arguably view this conclusion as evidence in favour of oligopolistic 
behaviour in the manufacturing sector.
These results appear to present a number of immediate possibilities for
further empirical and theoretical research. The present study has been
/
undertaken at a high level of aggregation. In part, this reflects the paucity of 
regional and sectoral data on costs, prices and profits. However, it would 
clearly be useful to explore the impact of the property tax at a greater level 
of disaggregation. It w ill be recalled that we were unable to adequately test 
the Post-Keynesian assertion that equivalent property tax and govern ment 
expenditure increases raise output. In part, this resulted from the difficulties 
involved in separating the impact of the property tax from the effect of other 
fiscal instruments. At a more disaggregated level, these problems are likely 
to be less severe since most taxes are levied nationally.
The measure of tax shifting used in our econometric study was based 
on the mark-up. It was argued that the mark-up yields a reliable measure of 
the tax burden only if the capital stock is held constant. Consequently, the 
analysis focused on the short run impact of the property tax. The orientation 
once again reflects the lack of reliable data on capital. If sufficient 
information can be obtained, it is clearly important to infer the long run
incidence, both in the aggregate and at the industry level.
The study suggests a number of areas for further theoretical research.
Despite the burgeoning of incidence theories, there seem to be important
deficiencies in the literature. It w ill be recalled that neoclassical general
equilibrium models typically neutralise the aggregate demand effects of taxes
and concentrate wholly on the supply side shifts (i.e. the "output" and
"substitution" effects). In contrast, the Post-Keynesian model aggregates
/
heterogeneous products into a single multipurpose good, thereby precluding 
short run supply variations. The analysis thus focuses on macro-relations 
and the aggregate demand effects of the property tax. However, in the 
Post-Keynesian world, differential property taxes are shifted forward only if 
firms enjoy sufficient market power. It follows that unless the differential 
component of the tax is fu lly shifted, net profits w ill vary thereby inducing 
capital flows between sectors and regions in the long run. Clearly, the final 
incidence of the property tax w ill depend on the combined impact of both 
demand and supply side changes. The separation of the two effects in the 
theoretical literature therefore appears difficult to justify. In other areas of 
economics (such as international trade) this gap has been narrowed 
considerably. There exists a substantial body of literature on disequilibrium 
macro theory which could readily be used in public finance: notable examples 
being Clower (1962) and Barro and Grossman (1976).
The empirical results further suggest that firm behaviour in the
manufacturing sector is best described by a model of oligopoly. One may 
view this as implying that future research should attempt to further explore 
the consequences of oligopoly in general equilibrium tax incidence models. In 
particular it would seem useful to assess the consequences of introducing 
alternative collusive strategies and forms of retaliation in the standard two 
sector model. Despite its shortcomings, the general equilibrium method is 
firm ly established in public finance and is therefore unlikely to be
i
abandoned. As a tool for policy analysis, it appears to serve a potentially 
important purpose. However, the challenge lies in recognising its limitations 
and in interpreting the results with care.
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